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Abstract: 
This thesis is one of the first studies to empirically examine the nature and source of 
financial distress, and the valuation effect of distressed companies' restructuring 
announcements, in an emerging market context. By describing and comparing the Chinese 
bankruptcy code with those of seven other countries, I find that the government's political 
interests and intervention, aggravated by the country's weak enforcement mechanism, 
result in the formal procedures rarely being used in practice. Consequently, the threat of 
bankruptcy is weakened and creditor protection is limited. These issues are confirmed by 
my empirical analysis. My empirical studies are separated into two distinct themes: China 
as a whole compared with what is documented in the literature; and within China state 
owned enterprises (SOE) versus non-SOE. Firstly, I analyse operating and financial 
performance and operating efficiency for 100 firms that became distressed between 1999 
and 2003. I find that during the first year of distress, the main source of distress is 
economic, not financial. In addition, for a significant minority of firms, financial factor 
plays a greater role in causing cash flow shortfall prior to the onset of distress. For this 
reason, I believe that due to the lack of timely restructuring mechanism, financial distress 
leads to economic distress. My SOE versus non-SOE results suggest that "soft budget 
constraints" are widespread among SOEs. However, such lending bias towards SOEs does 
not save these SOEs from being distressed. The deliberate channeling of funds to 
inefficient uses results in the distortion of capital allocation. 
Secondly, I investigate the valuation effect of restructuring announcements made by 100 
firms. Comparing to the literature, I find that asset restructuring including mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) and asset sales are more frequently employed. It is the most popular 
strategy in my sample. In the light of difficulties in officially liquidating economically 
unviable firms in the Chinese context, mergers and asset sales are perhaps a market self- 
correction mechanism to ensure asset mobility, which is essential for the effective operation 
of an enterprise economy. Consistent with the general M&A literature, M&A creates value 
for the target firm shareholders. In addition, asset sales are not perceived positively by the 
market. A potential explanation is that the lack of bankruptcy threat in China minimises 
the potential benefit of avoiding bankruptcy costs which shareholders otherwise have to 
bear. 
In my SOE versus non-SOE study, M&A with payment strategy is effective only for the 
non-SOE firms. On the contrary, the government's attempt to revamp SOE performance by 
transferring the controlling ownership, either with or without payment, is not seen as 
effective by the market. My results also suggest that debt governance is not at work among 
SOEs and this affects the effectiveness of debt related restructuring. The fundamental 
conclusion is that government ownership has an adverse impact on the distress-resolution 
process as it distorts resource allocation, management incentives and investment decisions. 
An effective bankruptcy regime should be more independent from politically motivated 
government intervention. 
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
China had achieved the impressive average annual growth rate of GDP of 9.5% between 
the start of its market reforms in 1978 and 1994, and the rapid growth has continued with 
its annual GDP growth averaging 7.7% between 1998 and 2002 (World Bank, 2003). Its 
recent history of robust economic growth and accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in 2001 has not only made the country the most attractive destination for foreign 
direct investment (FDI)', but has also provided an opportunity to test established financial 
theory in a new context. As the most important emerging market in the world where 
competition and failure becomes reality, China is a significant laboratory- to extend the 
existing distress and restructuring literature on emerging markets. In this chapter I will 
explain the aim, motivation and contribution of my research; and the organisation of the 
thesis. 
1.1 OBJECTIVE AND CONTRIBUTION 
The objective of this thesis is to use China, the most important emerging market in the 
*orld, to test and shed light on the current theoretical and empirical findings in the distress 
and restructuring literature. There are very few theoretical or empirical studies on 
corporate distress and restructuring in emerging markets in the finance literature and no 
known study in China. It is the author's motivation to fill this gap. 
As D'Souza et al. (2001) states, from being extremely controversial during Margaret 
Thatcher's first government, privatisation has since become a global phenomenon. 
D' Souza et al. (2001) record that more than one hundred governments have privatised some 
or most of their state owned enterprises (SOEs) since 1980, and these governments have 
raised a cumulative value of over US$750 billion through share-issue privatisation (SIP) 
alone. As business failures are a universal feature of competitive markets, the concept of 
"survival of the fittest' 'becomes a reality for these newly privatised firms. How do these 
firms survive the new competitive environments? This topic of corporate distress in the 
context of emerging economies is under-researched. China provides a particularly 
1 According to McKinsey&Co., Chinese economy received US$48bn in foreign direct investment in 
2002, more than any other country in the world, including the USA. 
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interesting context in which to address this issue due to its recent share-issue privatisation 
programme initiated in 1990. 
What is the nature and source of distress? What are the frequently employed restructuring 
strategies by distressed firms in China, given the country's high level of non-performing 
loans, the potential existence of soft budget constraints and the developing nature of its 
capital markets? Do debt and equity restructuring assume different patterns to what is 
documented in prior research? How effective are they? How does government ownership 
impact distress resolution processes? Answers to these questions provide important 
implications for the design of an efficient mechanism through which viable firms survive 
while the non-viable ones do not, thus ensuring assets of poor performers are reallocated to 
better uses. 
Firstly, by describing the Chinese bankruptcy code and comparing the Chinese bankruptcy 
regime to seven other codes (US, UK, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Philippines), this work contributes to the bankruptcy literature by shedding light on the on- 
going debate on debtor-friendly versus creditor-friendly bankruptcy regimes initiated by a 
comparison between the US and UK regimes (Franks and Torous 1996). Although both the 
UK and the US codes have deficiencies, they provide a framework for the current debate on 
what is the best practice. The US approach assumes that contracts are necessarily 
incomplete, with Chapter 11 providing a bargaining process to mitigate inefficiencies 
resulting from contractual incompleteness. However, this has led to, as argued by a large 
number of empirical and theoretical studies, a bias towards debtors (debtor-friendly). On 
the other hand, the UK approach is based on the concept of "freedom of contracting", to an 
extent assumes contract completeness. In the case of China, debtor friendly is not the 
consequence of mitigating inefficiency due to contract incompleteness, rather, it is due to 
political and social motivations. Secondly, China's weak enforcement mechanism 
exacerbates this debtor-friendliness to the detriment of creditors. Furthermore, debt in 
China is typically bank loans so the price is interest rates banks charge. However, as will 
be discussed in detail in section 2.4.1, the interest rates are 1. Regulated by the government; 
2. As argued by some empirical studies, does not differentiate default risk levels. 
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A number of issues are highlighted and hypotheses generated for the subsequent empirical 
investigations in this thesis: 1). The existing Chinese bankruptcy code is creditor- 
unfriendly; 2). Government's political interests and intervention, aggravated by weak legal 
enforcement mechanisms result in the formal procedures rarely being used in practice; 3). 
There is a lack of timely restructuring mechanism (such as Chapter 11 for the US). 
Secondly, I examine the characteristics and sources of corporate distress. Prior to 
privatisation, many SOEs in emerging markets were highly leveraged. However, the high 
level of leverage of these former SOEs was significantly reduced following privatisation, 
especially in those privatised through share issue privatisation (SIP). - In the new 
competitive post-privatisation environments, inefficient or non-viable firms fail. Important 
questions arise that need addressing. The first question is what are the characteristics of 
distressed firms in China? Do they exhibit distress across a wide range of financial 
indicators? Do they exhibit the same weak performance in the year prior to distress and 
following the onset of distress? The second question is that, is it weak financial structure or 
poor operating performance that is the main contributor to distress? Prior evidence in the 
inefficiency of Chinese firms and of significant continued state ownership interest in firms, 
r 
even post-privatisation, pointing to the likelihood that operating factor will predominate. 
However, the large amounts of NPLs suggest that firms may be allowed to continue with 
excessive debt in their funding structures without being pressured to restructure their 
finances on a timely basis. 
I find that despite my distressed sample firms' high leverage compared with their industry 
medians, the main source of distress during the first year of distress is economic, not 
financial. In addition, due to the lack of timely restructuring mechanism and inefficient 
financial renegotiation processes, the presence of financial distress leads to aggravated 
economic distress. 
Furthermore, given the importance of government ownership in corporate China, I use my 
sample firms to empirically detect the existence of "soft budget constraint". By separating 
the 100 distressed firms into SOE and non-SOE subgroups, I compare their investment 
behaviour as proxied by capital expenditure scaled by assets, prior to and during distress. I 
find that the non-SOE subgroup experiences a significantly greater reduction in capital 
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expenditure and assets, both statistically and economically. One explanation is that non- 
SOEs face hard budget constraints and have no other alternatives than cutting investment 
. 
and firm size, whereas their SOE counterparts face soft budget constraints, with the result 
that the reduction of investment and firm size is less severe. Nonetheless, the fact that 
SOEs significantly reduce investment over and above their industry median level, and that 
their performance overall is significantly worse than their industry, suggests that despite the 
presence of soft budget constraints, the SOE firms selected by my distress selection 
procedure are indeed distressed, albeit with different investment behaviour compared with 
their non-SOE counterparts when facing distress. The existence of soft budget constraint 
. 
does not seem to save the distressed SOEs from being distressed, as these SOEs 
demonstrate deteriorating financial and operating performance relative to their industry, 
similar to the full sample of distressed firms. The deliberate channeling of funds to 
inefficient uses results in the distortion of capital allocation. One caution on using 
reduction in capital expenditure to proxy for firms' lack of liquidity due to distress, is that 
firms could also be in distress due to lack of investment on capital expenditure prior to the 
onset of distress. The endogeneity of this proxy is a limitation of this thesis. 
Finally, I use event study methodology to investigate the valuation effect of restructuring 
announcements by my distressed sample firms, and quantify the impact of government 
ownership in the distress resolution process. The main restructuring types covered include 
mergers and acquisitions, asset sales, debt and managerial restructuring. Firstly I focus on 
, 
my full sample and compare evidence 
_from 
China to what is documented in the existing 
literature. Takeover and asset sales are frequently employed by my sample firms. As a 
result of difficulties in officially liquidating economically unviable firms in the Chinese 
context due to the lack of effectivebankruptcy laws, the frequent use of asset restructuring 
(asset sales and takeover) is perhaps a market self-correction mechanism, for asset mobility 
which is essential for the effective operation of an enterprise economy. On the other hand, 
the lack of creditor participation in distress resolution is confirmed by the overall lowest 
percentage (17%) of debt restructuring related announcements among the three main 
categories in my whole sample of 303 restructuring announcements. 
Consistent with the literature that target firms receive positive premium, my overall M&A 
with payment announcements generate positive market reaction. On the other hand, 
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different to the current literature based on developed economies such as US and UK, the 
lack of a positive value driver for asset sales announcements suggests that shareholders 
may not necessarily face bankruptcy costs due to the lack of bankruptcy threat. Overall the 
effect of debt restructuring announcements is not clear cut. Different to the documented 
disciplinary role of debt in a developed economy, Tian (2004) argues that debt governance 
is not at work in China. The full sample result on this category is not significant. This 
issue is further examined in the SOE and non-SOEs subgroups study summarised below. 
Managerial restructuring is not seen by the market as an effective restructuring strategy. 
Our explanation is that there is a lack of effective management pool in the domestic market 
due to the documented lack of managerial incentives to perform and of credible punishment 
for poor performance in the current emerging market literature. ' This explanation is 
supported by the positive market reactions to announcements made by foreign invested 
enterprises (FIE) which are arguably less restricted to the domestic managerial pool. 
Alternative explanation for the positive market reaction to managerial disciplinary events 
by FIEs is that FIE firms monitor their management more effectively. 
Next, given the significant role of government in corporate China, I separate my full 
sample by ownership structure to provide further insight on the role of state ownership. In 
the M&A category, M&A with payment strategy is effective only for the non-SOE firms, 
where these firms are subject to a market driven mechanism and competitive environment. 
M&A with payment strategy-for non-SOE target firms signifies- to- the- market that the 
distressed firm is of value to the new owner and that the new owner may be able to manage 
the firm as a viable going concern effectively 
- 
in this circumstance, changing ownership 
stands a good opportunity for the distressed firm to be restructured successfully. The M&A 
with payment announcements made by the SOE firms do not create shareholder wealth. 
The M&A without payment announcements are seen as value destroying. The 
government's attempts to revamp firm performance by transferring ownership, either with 
or without payment, are not perceived as effective by the market, providing evidence to 
support the argument that the government's primary motivation rests in providing 
employment rather than in profit maximisation. 
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The effectiveness of debt restructuring is mixed. The market reacts positively to non-SOE 
firms' announcements of increasing leverage, but the same type of news made by SOE 
firms do not cause significant price reaction. The lack of success in this strategy by SOEs 
is because debt governance is not at work among SOEs. In addition, the market reacts 
significantly negatively to non-SOEs' attempt to renegotiate their debt contracts with their 
banks, but not significantly (economically but not statistically significant) to the same 
announcements made by SOEs. These results provide weak evidence to suggest that there 
maybe lending bias by the Chinese banks towards SOEs. The evidence so far suggests that 
the role of government in corporate China is not desirable yet resources are still allocated 
with a bias towards SOEs. This finding raises the question of what needs-to be done to 
ensure the efficient allocation of financial resources (bank loans). 
The policy implication of my finding are, firstly, government intervention on both lending 
and interest rates should be reduced and eventually eliminated, to encourage efficient and 
effective allocation of bank loans, restore bankruptcy threat and promote market 
competition. Secondly, new bankruptcy code is needed to 1. Provide protection for creditor 
interests under contract; 2. Provide and encourage financing under distress in order to 
provide breathing space for viable firms facing temporary financial difficulty. Thirdly, soft 
budget constraint distorts competition and capital allocation and should be stopped. 
My findings also provide implications for firm managers especially SOE managers. 
Investment decisions in adverse conditions need to be proactively managed for the viability 
of the firms, as soft budget constraints cannot save firms from being distressed, in addition 
to distorting management incentives. As for investors, the Chinese accounting data seem to 
provide credible information about the viability of the firms and hence is useful in aiding 
investment decisions. Furthermore, the Chinese stock markets seem to conform to the 
semi-strong form efficiency hence share prices carry valuable information for investment 
decisions. 
In summary, my empirical results show that the government's continued ownership post- 
privatisation results in inefficient assets reallocations, and in distortion of fund allocations 
and management incentives. This strong political bias should be avoided in designing an 
effective bankruptcy regime for the Chinese economy. 
r 
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The contribution of this thesis is three-fold. Firstly, by studying China, I include the most 
important emerging market in the current corporate distress and restructuring literature. 
Secondly, using firm level data in the Chinese context, I provide insight on the nature and 
source of financial distress and on the valuation effect of restructuring announcements. 
Implications for policy makers, firm managers and investors are provided. Finally, China's 
partial privatisation provides a unique opportunity to study the "soft budget constraint" 
syndrome and the current debate on the role of government in corporate China. The main 
limitation of the empirical work in this thesis comes from restricting samples to publicly 
listed companies, due to data availability. Consequently the findings should not be 
generalised beyond this type of company. Nevertheless, this limitation should provide an 
avenue for future research when data become more readily available. 
1.2 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Firstly, chapter 2 provides an overview of the 
economic and political context within which Chinese corporations function. In particular, I 
review the legal and financial systems, the structure and workings of the corporate sector 
and its financing; and the nature of Chinese firms by analysing two distressed companies' 
accounting performance. These factors assist in the understanding of corporate distress and 
restructuring in the Chinese context. 
In Chapter 3, I describe the Chinese bankruptcy code and compare the code with those of 
the US, the UK, and five other Asian countries. My motivation to choose the US and UK 
for this comparison is to shed light on the existing debate on the cost and benefit of debtor- 
versus creditor-friendly systems using experience from China. Important hypotheses are 
generated for my empirical chapters to follow. Chapter 4 provides an overview of 
important prior studies on corporate distress and restructuring in the literature. Specific 
literature relevant for the two empirical chapters (5 and 6) will be reviewed in that chapter 
itself. In chapter 4, I define distress and categorise restructuring strategies documented in 
prior research into financial and non-financial restructuring. I also review the restructuring 
announcements by two distressed companies to illustrate the types of restructuring 
mechanism in the Chinese context. Empirical studies on the use and effectiveness of these 
restructuring methods are then reviewed. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 are the main empirical research chapters of this thesis. Chapter 5 studies 
the characteristics of corporate distress in the Chinese context. Firstly, using the distress 
definition described in chapter 4,100 firms are identified as being distressed. Using 
accounting data, the financial and operating performance of these 100 firms are compared 
with their respective industry medians in order to reveal the characteristics and sources of 
their distress. Two distinct themes are used in this chapter and the next chapter. Firstly I 
examine my full sample and compare the results to the existing literature. I then separate 
my sample into SOE and non-SOE subgroups to shed light on the role of the government. 
Chapter 6 applies the established event study methodology to study 303 hand-collected 
restructuring announcements made by these 100 distressed firms, focusing on asset 
restructuring, debt-related and managerial restructuring. The unique hand-collected data 
set also allows for the investigation of the role of government in the distress resolution 
process in China. Finally, chapter 7 concludes. 
r 
0 
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CHAPTER 2- THE INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES 
OF CHINA 
China is an important emerging market and is in the process of transition from a command 
economy to a market oriented economy. The underpinning legal and regulatory framework 
is of primary importance for the political stability and economic growth. This chapter is 
not intended to provide comprehensive economic statistics on China, rather, it is intended 
to outline the economic and political background in which this research takes place. These 
factors are important for a proper understanding of corporate distress and bankruptcy in 
China. It then goes on to examine in more detail the structure of the corporate and financial 
sectors in China. 
2.1 ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
As Table 2.1 shows, China enjoyed rapid growth between 1999 and 2002. This growth is 
predominantly domestically driven as a result of high savings rates and gains in factor 
productivity. China's GDP stood at US$1.2 trillion in 2002 
- 
this represents 81% of GDP 
ih the UK, and 12% in the USA. With a population of 1.3bn, this translates into US$950 
GDP per capita, representing nearly 3% of that of the USA. China's continued integration 
into the world economy can be seen from its trade balance of US$33bn in 2002, while 
during the review period its import and export grew at an average annual rate of 17.8°, /0 and 
13.8%, respectively. Table 2.1 also demonstrates that China has become an attractive 
destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). 
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Table 2.1 China economic data 
Domestic Data 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
GDP Growth % 7.1 8 7.3 8 
GDP $bn 991.22 1079.84 1158.7 1240.62 
GDP % of UK 67.87 74.94 81.44 80.66 
GDP % of US 10.69 10.99 11.49 11.9 
GDP Per Capita $ 787 853 911 950 
GDP Per Capita % of UK 3.21 3.54 3.84 3.72 
GDP Per Capita % of US 2.32 2.44 2.58 2.62 
External Data 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Exports $m 194,716 249,131 266,075 293,563 
Export Growth %, y-on-y 6.1 27.95 6.8 10.33 
Imports $m 
-158,734 -214,657 -232,058 -260,121 
Import Growth y-on-y 15.94 35.23 8.11 12.09 
Trade Balance $m 35,982 --- 34,474 34,017 33,442 
Foreign Direct Investment $m 38,753 38,399 44,241 48,600 
Foreign Direct Investment % GDP 3.91 3.56 3.82 3.92 
Source: World Markets Research Centre 2003 
From a medium sized economy in terms of GDP, China is expected to be the world's 
fastest growing economy, with a GDP growth rate of 79% between 2001 and 2010 
(McKinsey&Co 2003), versus 32% and 17% fqr USA and Japan, respectively, as Figure 
2.1 shows. 
Figure 2.1 Real GDP growth comparison 
Real GDP Comparison 
US$IO 12523 
9514 GDP Growth % 2001-2010 
us 5139 US 4377 
123 
Japan 2156 Japan 
2001 2010 Chin, us Japan 
*2001 current pnce 
Source: McKinsey&Co 2003 s being 
ctosety controttea. k-, nina, alter nearly nail a century or commana-nasea economic 
principles, is moving through a gradual transition to incorporate elements of a market 
economy. The government is managing the growth in China, who expects to be the world's 
4 `h largest economy by 2010, through a gradual development. 
This tight control can be seen in 1991, when the Eighth Five-Year Plan determined that the 
sustainable annual growth rate to be limited to around 6%. At the time, it was believed that 
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greater growth rates would expose the shortcomings of infrastructure development and of 
the basic industries (e. g. agriculture, energy), and result in inflationary pressures and social 
tensions. However by 1992, double-digit growth came to be seen as sustainable. So 
China's leader then Xiaoping Deng abandoned this strategy of limiting growth in that year. 
When overheating became problematic in 1993-95, the goal was revised to lower growth 
rates. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the rapid, although patchy, implementation 
of continuing industrial reforms', the cooling external and domestic demand initiated a 
large fiscal pump-priming program. A looser monetary policy and a wide range of 
measures to boost consumption accompanied this. 
Figure 2.2 Incremental GDP growth, Asia 2001- 2010 
Asian Economy 2001-2010 
Total Asian GDP' 
USD Trillions 
:1 ft i 
Representation of incremental GDP 
' growth Greater China 
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- 
2% 
- 
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Source: McKinsey&Co 2003 
As a result of these initiatives, with, growth rates among the highest in the world, China has 
been the most important emerging market during the past two decades in terms of sheer 
size and potential. It has surpassed the economic size of Japan to be ranked number two in 
the world in terms of GNP on a PPP (purchasing power parity) basis (Allen et al. 2005). In 
2002, China's GDP stands at less than one third the size of Japan (US$4 trillion) 
- 
with a 
population ten times the size of Japan. However China is estimated to be the region's core 
2 See Appendix I for a brief chronology of recent reforms (1995-2001). 
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engine for economic growth in the next decade by contributing 40% of Asia's incremental 
growth between 2001 and 2010, as predicted by McKinsey (see Figure 2.2). 
China's history of robust economic growth and its accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) at the end of 2001, made the country attractive to foreign investors. 
Figures released by the government show that the Chinese economy received US$48bn iri 
FDI in 2002, more than any other country in the world 
- 
including the USA. This accounts 
for 40% of the FDI in Asia. 
The expansion of this economy is interlinked with the gains in labour productivity as China 
moves from an agricultural based economy towards a service oriented economy. Table 2.2 
shows the composition of GDP over the period 1981 
- 
2002. In 2002 Agriculture 
accounted for only 14% of GDP, having decreased from 32% in 1981; Industry output 
increased gradually over the review period, to account for nearly half of the GDP; and 
Services accounted for 42% of GDP. This means that the supply side increase in output 
(involving the introduction of services in to the economy) has been a critical element in the 
economic growth. The increase in services output shown in Table 2.2 demonstrates that 
icetween 1981 and 1991, there was an increased demand for personal services as controls on 
the economy started to be loosened. 
Table 2.2 Sector analysis of China GDP 1981 
- 
2002 
of GDP 1981 1991 2000* 2001* 2002* 
Agriculture 31.8% 24.5% 14.8°/ 14.1°/ 13.5% 
Industry 46.4°/ 42.1°/ 45.9°/ 45.2°/ 44.8% 
Services 21.8°/ 33.4% 39.3°/ 40.7°/ 41.7% 
Total 100.0°/ 100.0°/ 100.0°/ 100.0°/ 100.0% 
'Adjustments were made by the National Bureau of Statistics Chia in ZW4 
Source: World Bank 2004 
In short, China is a large emerging economy with strong potential for growth, driven 
domestically, and is increasingly attractive for FDI. Nevertheless the government has keen 
interest and critical role in the process of this transition from a planned economy to a 
market-orientated economy. As a result there is still high political intervention in most 
commercial decisions in China. This occurs in a variety of guises, whether through 
regulation, or explicitly through governance or implicitly as a result of cultural influences. 
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These factors will be of importance in this study of corporate restructuring and bankruptcy 
and they are set out in the next section. 
2.2 POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
China's control culture is being carefully and gradually transformed. However, behind a 
desire based on a cultural legacy to retain state control (or at least a strong political 
influence), there is the very real issue for the government to maintain stability during any 
period of volatility and change. The uneventful succession of Hu Jintao as the new Party 
General Secretary in November 2002 has confirmed the general perception that China's 
leadership continues to be reform-minded and pragmatic. 
China is facing the challenges of transitioning from a large planned economy to a market 
economy. Underpinning the social contract that currently, exists in China, which was 
promoted and celebrated during the years of the planned economy, is the belief that the 
state would look after the individuals. The current Chinese population is looking for the 
current government system to deliver, on this contract 
- 
be this through providing 
cmployment, the conditions for employment or by looking after those who are unable to 
work. Although in 2001 China's unemployment rate stands at only 3.6% (20th highest in 
the world 
- 
China Statistical Yearbook 2002), the result of this rate increasing would be 
widespread and severe. China has to delicately balance the often-antagonistic tensions of 
economic reform and social stability. These pressures manifest themselves in a variety of 
issues that were receiving close government attention over the period of this study. The 
four issues detailed below are particularly pertinent to the background of this study: 
V The social welfare schemes are underdeveloped. In addition China has a large, 
ageing (exacerbated by the one child policy) and extensively unproductive 
workforce. The pension scheme is on the verge of collapse and there is an imminent 
need to fill the pension gap 
- 
by selling state owned shares. The issue is how to 
implement this policy while preventing a securities market collapse. These markets 
currently have among the highest P/E ratios in the world (please refer to Table 2.6 
below). 
V The increasing tension of the wealth gap. Figure 2.3 demonstrates that, in 
comparison to the UK, there is a large inequity between the GDP per capita across 
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the different regions in China. The coastal cities, which to date have driven the 
growth, continue to be enriched and are currently the most fertile area for return on 
investment. This is set against the growing gap in income between these cities and 
the western inner parts of China. There is a danger of igniting social unrest if this 
gap is increased or even maintained. 
Figure 2.3 Income gap comparison 
Regional GDP per capita as a percent of 
national average 
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Source: McKinsey&Co (2002) 
V Non Performing Loans (NPL) is independently estimated to be at 44-55%3 of total 
loans (McKinsey 2002). These loans have been made to under-performing State 
_. . -- -" - 
Owned Enterprises (SOE) on a political rather than commercial basis. Most banks 
in China are therefore technically insolvent and this issue must be resolved to avoid 
a financial crisis in the long-term. However, to retain the credibility and legitimacy 
of the current system of government and avoid social unrest, the solution must be 
delivered whilst preserving the social contract. 
V Allied to this is the pressing need for SOE reform. Due to current state dogma and 
organisational behavioural issues of local banks, loss-malting SOEs receive priority 
capital funding. This capital could be used more efficiently if it were allocated to 
the growth of the less labour intensive private enterprise. Any far reaching SOE 
Against the official release of 25% 
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reform would lead to pressure on the banking system and increased unemployment 
with all the risks that entails. 
Whilst all of these challenges that face China are of crucial importance to the continued 
economic progress in the next decade and beyond, the final two are of particular influence 
in terms of this study and the requirement for a robust insolvency code. 
2.3 CORPORATE SECTOR AND SOE REFORM 
This section will consider the types of companies found in China. It will then provide a 
more detailed examination of the public limited companies and the key issues of SOE 
reform. 
2.3.1. Ownership classification 
China's privatisation process in the past two decades has dramatically transformed the 
structure of its corporate ownership. In the early 1980s China's industrial sector consisted 
almost exclusively of state-owned and state-controlled enterprises (SOE) and collective- 
o 
ed enterprises (COEs). By 1994, these enterprises were out-numbered by the 
mushrooming of newly created enterprises, including foreign invested companies, 
shareholding enterprises, and private companies. 
Unlike the "Big Bang" approach to privatisation adopted by many emerging markets in 
Eastern Europe and Asia, the Chinese government retains a keen interest and critical role in 
the SOE privatisation and reform process. Although Chinese publicly listed companies 
(PLC) are organised and operated under the model of modem western firms, their 
shareholding structures are different from those of western firms in order to allow for 
continued state control of these listed firms. In other words, one of the main characteristics 
of Chinese listed companies is that the State remains in control of many former SOEs, 
despite their being listed on a stock exchange. 
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The ownership structure of China's enterprises can be categorised into five main types: 
"SOEs" 4, "Collectives", "Shareholding enterprises", "Private enterprises" and "Foreign 
enterprises" (also called "Foreign Invested Enterprises", or FIE hereafter) and the 
characteristics of these five types are detailed in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Definition of enterprises of different classes of ownership, China 
Class of Controls and Influences 
Ownership 
SOE Including TSOEs, state-owned or controlled enterprises, in the form of companies 
limited by shares (CLS) 
- 
some of which are publicly listed, or state-owned limited 
liability company (LLC) (more explanations on CLS and LLC are given in "shareholding, 
enterprises") 
State government is the de facto owner. These enterprises are theoretically profit making 
- 
but are often managed on a political rather than commercial basis. 
Collective Community in the local vicinityjoins local government in ownership (agent for the State 
government). 
Shareholding Including two main types: 
enterprises 1) Companies limited by shares (CLS), the approximate equivalent of the large stock 
corporation in Western countries. This sub-category includes public listed companies 
(PLC). 
2) Limited liability companies (LLC), intended for a much smaller and more closely-knit 
group of investors (youxian zeren gongsi) 
Capital raised through issuing shares (some shares non-tradable). Each investor bears 
limited liability for debt. 
Private Refer to economic units invested or controlled (by holding the majority of the shares) by 
natural persons. 
Included in this category are private LLC, private share-holding corporations Ltd., 
private partnership enterprises and private sole investment enterprises. 
FIE Enterprises supported by foreign investment, including foreign Joint Ventures. 
Source: Tian (2002) 
f 
The ownership structure changed dramatically over the past two decades. In the early 80's 
China's industrial sector consisted almost exclusively of state-owned and state controlled 
enterprises and collective-owned enterprises (COEs), by 1994, as shown in Table 2.4, there , 
were sharp increase in the total number of newly created enterprises, including 29,000 
° Clarke (2003), Jiang (2000) and Wang (1999) distinguish traditional SOEs (TSOE) 
- 
state-owned 
enterprises that existed under the planned economy- from enterprises organised under the Company Law that 
happen to be wholly state-owned or controlled by the state 
- 
including those converted from the TSOEs. In 
this thesis I refer to them all as SOEs. 
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foreign invested companies, over 4,300 shareholding enterprises, and nearly 4,000 private 
companies. 
In 1998 China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) revised its statistical system to 
exclude firms reporting less than five million RMB in sales per years. Table 2.4 shows that 
in 2001 the reported 46,767 SOEs represented a sharp decline from the number reported in 
1998. Most of the reduction in SOEs was due to their conversion to shareholding 
enterprises. COEs underwent a similar conversion process. By 2001 the number of 
shareholding enterprises had more than doubled the number in 1998. This conversion of 
SOEs and COEs to shareholding enterprises was the principal mode of SOE restructuring 
and privatisation in China (Clarke 2003, Jefferson et al., 2003a, b). It generally entails the 
corporatisation of the firm, and frequently involves the infusion ofnew assets from outside 
the state system (in the case of listed SOEs, also through initial public offering (IPO)). 
{ 
0 
5 With the exception of sole State-funded enterprises which are included regardless of annual sales figure. 
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Table 2.5 presents shares of the different types of Chinese enterprises in the economy. The 
legitimacy of the government in providing employment rests on the 48% employment 
provided by SOEs and COEs. Collectively they control 68% of total assets in 2001, and 
produce 55% of total industrial outputs (in value terms). The inefficiency of SOEs in 
aggregation can be shown by comparing the SOE with the foreign funded enterprises: 
employing 3% workforce and 20% of total assets, foreign funded enterprises produce 29% 
of total outputs. 
Table 2.5 Shares of different ownership (%) 
No of enterprises output (value) Employment' Assets 
Class of ownership 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 
Domestic funded 
State- owned and controlled 33% 27% 47% 44% 44% 43% n/a 62% 
Collective-owned 24% 18% 14% 11% 7% 5% n/a 6% 
Shareholding 12% 15% 5% 12% 6% 6% n/a 13% 
Private 14% 21% 6% 4% 5% 6% n/a n/a 
Other domestic 0% 0% 0% 0% 35% 36% n/a n/a 
Foreign funded 17% 18% 27% 29% 3% 3% n/a 20% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% n/a 100% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2002 
Economists argue that in competitive markets without significant externalities, government 
ownership is inferior to private ownership (Alchian 1977, Sappington and Stiglitz 1987, 
Shapiro and Willig 1990, Boycko et al. 1996, Hart et al. 1997), due to government's lack of 
transferable residual claims, its political and social objectives over profit maximisation, and 
the associated greater information asymmetries and higher transaction costs. Vining and 
Boardman (1992), and Megginson et al. (1994), among others, provide empirical support 
for such proposition. In contrast, Wortzel and Wortzel (1989) and Martin and Parker 
(1995) suggest that government ownership is not necessarily less efficient than private 
ownership. 
There is inconclusive empirical evidence on the role of government in corporate China. 
Wei et al. (2003) compare the financial and operating performance of Chinese firms prior 
to and post privatisation. They find significant post-privatisation improvement in real 
output, real assets, and sales efficiency, but not in profitability. However, when they 
separate their sample into SOE and non-SOE controlled, they document significant 
improvement in profitability in firms with over 50% voting rights controlled by non-State 
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investors. They conclude that privatisation works. Qi et al. (2000) find post-issue return 
on equity positively related to institutional ownership but negatively related to state 
ownership. Wei et al. (2002) also record a negative relationship between Tobin's q and 
state equity ownership. Different to these findings, Sun et al. (2002) find partial 
government ownership has a positive impact on SOE performance. Tian (2005) finds that 
corporate value decreases with an increased size of government shareholding when the 
government is a small shareholder. However, when the government equity holding is. 
sufficiently large, corporate value increases with increased government shareholding. The 
contradictory findings probably reflect the complexity of the issue. 
Although state ownership in the economy is declining (Jefferson et al. 2003a, b, Sun et al. 
2002, Tian 2004), the government still remains the most dominant force in the economy. 
Clarke (2003) notes, that despite talk of the state withdrawing from the economy, it is 
committed to retaining control over enterprises in some sectors such as national security- 
related industries and pillar industries. This is a critical issue, as unlike studies in many 
developed countries, research into a topic such as corporate insolvency in China needs to 
carefully take into account powerful political influences. 
t 
2.3.2 Public listed companies (PLC) and their capital structure 
The companies listed on the stock markets represent a new enterprise system in China. 
Their ownership structure includes SOEs, COEs, FIEs, and private (i. e. controlled by the 
private sector by holding legal person shares 
- 
see Table 2.9). It is these listed companies 
which form the subject of this thesis. This section describes the Chinese stock market and 
documents the shareholding structure and some other corporate finance factors of the PLCs. 
The role of the Chinese stock market in corporate financing is analysed in the following 
section. 
A. The Chinese Stock Market 
China's share issue privatisation (SIP) of SOEs was a catalyst for the development of its 
two stock exchanges 
- 
Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) in 1990 and 1991 respectively. At the outset the stock exchanges were 
used primarily to supply capital to SOEs that remained in the control of the state. By 2003, 
the total market capitalisation of the two stock exchanges was 43.5% of GDP and the total 
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market capitalisation was ranked as the 12"` largest in the world. Despite its rapid growth, 
in 2000 total capital raised in stock markets accounted for the equivalent of only 15.8 % of 
new bank lending over the whole economy in the same year, and total market capitalisation 
of stocks was 48.4% of the total loans outstanding in China (McKinsey 2003). 
The governing body of the listed companies is the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). The IPO selection process is fiercely competitive, lengthy and 
bureaucratic (Aharony et al. 2000, Chen and Yuan 2004, Jiang et al. 2005). According to 
Jiang et al. (2005), only 0.3% IPO applications are successful. In addition, CSRC has 
imposed a series of guidelines restricting rights issues after November 19937. All listed 
companies are required to disclose information on one of the two official websites for 
information disclosure: www. cnlist. com. cn and www. cninfo. com. cn. Appendix 3 presents 
the CSRC official "format of announcement requirement" on listed companies translated by 
the author. This is the source for restructuring announcements for the studies reported in 
chapters 6. Further details of the announcement requirements will be discussed in section 
4.2.1. 
fable 2.6 shows the Chinese stock markets' rapid growth. Between 1992 and 2002, the 
market capitalisation increased at the average rate of 60% per year. The number of listed 
companies grew 48% annually, from 51 PLCs in 1992 to 1224 PLCs in 2002. We can also 
see that the P/E ratios of these stocks are amongst highest in the world. 
I 
7 For further details see Chen and Yuan (2004). 
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Table 2.6 Chinese stock market 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total listed companies 51 180 290 322 529 744 851 949 1088 1160 1224 
Total cap as % of GDP 3.9 10.2 7.9 5.9 14.5 23.4 24.5 30.7 51.2 43.2 43.5 
Tradable cap % of 31.9 28.8 32.9 41.3 35.2 34.6 34 35.2 36.6 36.6 32.6 
total cap 
Trading Velocity % 204 361 669 281 616 507 355 336 346 240 224 
(turnover/tradable cap) 
Trading turnover 68 367 813 404 2,133 3,072 2,354 3,132 6,083 3,831 2,799 
(volume, billion) 
P/E Ratio SHSE 
- 
42.5 23.5 15.7 31.3 39.9 34.4 38.1 59.1 46.3 34.5 
SZSE 
- 
42.7 10.3 19.5 35.4 41.2 32.3 37.6 58.8 40.8 38.2 
Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) website, Bloomberg. 
B. Corporate features of the PLCs 
According to Tian (2004), as shown in Panel A in Table 2.7, bank loan is an very important 
form of debt financing in PLCs, as the corporate bond market did not exist. The bank loans 
are mainly from state-owned banks. Panel B of Table 2.7 shows that the Chinese PLC's 
total liability to total assets ratio is lower than the US, UK and Japan, but higher than South 
Korea. Furthermore, its bank loan to total capital ratio is slightly lower than that of the 
UK. In addition, according to Tian (2002), these PLCs' average total assets were 
TJS$175mn, of which 53% being current assets'and 36% being fixed assets. Huang and 
Song (2002) find that correlations between firm characteristics (such as profitability, asset 
tangibility, growth opportunity and size) and leverage is similar to other countries and this 
suggests that that these firms are also profit maximisers and basic economic forces are at 
work in China. 
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Table 2.7 Financial leverage 
Panel A: Leverage Ratios of China's PLCs from 1994 to 2003 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Liability to Total Assets 
Mean 0.450 0.477 0.440 0.415 0.420 0.437 0.447 0.493 0.506 0.538 
Median 0.441 0.458 0.452 0.413 0.413 0.416 0.419 0.434 0.451 0.484 
Bank Loans to Total Assets 
Mean 0.217 0.235 0.235 0.219 0.222 0.240 0.240 0.265 0.262 0.276 
Median 0.210 0.226 0.229 0.210 0.216 0.225 0.216 0.238 0.238 0.255 
Bank Loans to Capital 
Mean 0.286 0.314 0.304 0.283 0.290 0.321 0.312 0.316 0.337 0.347 
Median 0.293 0.304 0.298 0.273 0.279 0.288 0.277 0.304 0.315 0.338 
Observations 287 308 519 717 822 919 1054 1130 1193 1252 
Total 
0.470 
0.438 
0.247 
0.229 
0.316 
0.299 
8201 
Panel B: International Comparison 
Nonequity Liabilities Bank debt to Bank Debt to 
No. of Firms Time Period to Total Assets Total Assets Capital 
China 287-1252 1994-2003 0.47 0.25 0.32 
United States 2580 1991 0.58 0.27 0.37 
United Kingdom 608 1991 0.56 0.24 0.34 
Germany 191 1991 0.76 0.16 0.39 
Japan 514 1991 0.75 0.42 0.63 
South Korea 49 1985-1991 0.30 
India 99 1980-1990 0.67 
Source: Tian (2005) 
- 
the data on US, UK, Japan and Germany are from Rajan and Zingales (1995); data 
on South Korea and India are from Booth et al. (2001). 
The corporate governance structure of these companies is the two-tier board structure. 
They have a so-called supervisory board, which is in charge of monitoring any illegal 
behaviour of the managers and directors, of the eompany. It has no authority to interfere 
with corporate management and strategy. The board of directors is elected at the 
shareholders' annual general meeting. The position of general manager is the equivalent of 
the CEO in the USA and so is responsible for the daily operations of the company. As 
stated by Schipani and Liu (2002), in China today, the most important legal sources of 
corporate governance rules include the Corporate Law of 1993 and the Securities Law of 
1998. In additional to legal sources, the memorandum of association of each corporation 
plays an active role in designing each corporation's corporate governance structure. The 
Chinese memorandum of associatidn is comparable to a document that would combine both 
the articles of incorporation and bylaws of an American corporation. 
C. Shareholding structure 
As shown in the above section, the Chinese PLCs are organised and operated under the 
model of modem western firms. However their shareholding structures are different from 
those of western firms. 
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Share ownership is officially classified as state, legal-person, employee, and tradable A 
shares plus shares denominated in a foreign currency (Table 2.8). All the common shares 
bear the same rights for voting and cash flow. 
Table 2.8 Official share classes 
Classes 
Non- State shares Shares obtained by an institution, as a representative of the central government, 
on behalf of the State in exchange for the capital contribution made by the 
tradable State. The institution can be the central government itself, local governments 
or wholly government-owned economic institutions. Although the shares are 
shares not tradable, they are transferable under the approval of China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
Legal person Shares owned by domestic institutions. A legal person in China is defined as a 
shares non-individual legal entity or institution. In official documents, domestic 
institutions include stock companies, non-bank financial institutions' and SOEs 
that have at least one non-state owner. Legal person shares can be transferred 
to other domestic institutions upon approval from the CSRC. 
Employee shares Employee Shares are offered to workers and managers of a PLC, usually at a 
substantial discount. Employee shares are registered under the title of the 
labour union covering that company, which also represents shareholding 
employees trying to exercise their rights. After a holding period of 6 to 12 
months, the company may file with CSRC to allow its employees to sell the 
shares in the open market, but the directors, supervisors and the general 
managers may not transfer such shares during their term of office. 
Tradable A shares Listed in either Shanghai or Shenzhen Exchange. These shares were sold only 
to Chinese domestic investors until December 2002. 
shares Shares This group of shares includes B shares on domestic stock exchanges, H-shares 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and N-shares on the New York Stock 
denominated in Exchange. B-shares were available exclusively to foreign investors until 2001 
when they were also made available to domestic investors. The B-shares foreign currency market is separated from the A-shares market, with SHSE B-shares 
denominated in US dollars and SZSE B-shares denominated in Hong Kong 
dollars. H-shares and N-shares carry the same rights and obligations as the A- 
and B-shares, but they cannot be traded on domestic stock exchanges, although 
can be held by anyone. 
Source: Xu and Wang (1999), Tian (2002) 
This official classification is adopted in most existing research on the impact of 
shareholding structures on corporate value of China's PLCs (for example, Xu and Wang 
(1999), Qi et at. (2000), Sun et al. (2002)). Tian (2002) argues that the official 
classification confuses tradability with ownership, i. e. it confuses institutional shareholders 
with legal-person shares. However I argue that the confusion actually stems from policy 
maker's motivation in retaining control in the PLCs. "State" share is defined only to be 
held by wholly state owned enterprises whereas "Legal Person" share is defined only to be 
held by non-individual institutions with less than 100% state ownership. When the policy 
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makers' attention was founded on differentiating "wholly state-owned" and "partial state- 
owned", institutional shareholders became a vague concept in the system. As Clarke 
(2003) states: 
"The state wants to make SOEs operate more efficiently by subjecting them to a new 
and different set of rules 
- 
the rules of organisation under the "modern enterprise 
system ". Policymakers then find, however, that they must change and adjust the rules 
to take account of continuing state ownership. Moreover, the need to provide for the 
special circumstances of state-sector enterprises ends up hacking the entire 
Company Law, so that instead of state-sector enterprises being made more efficient 
by being forced to follow the rules for private-sector enterprises (the original 
ambition), potential private-sector enterprises are hamstrung by having to follow 
rules that make sense only in a heavily state-invested economy. " 
Table 2.9 presents the composition of shareholding of Chinese PLCs between 1992 and 
2001 by shareholding registration. From the table we can see that the state holds 45% 
shares in 1992. State direct holding declined slightly to 32% in 1999 and went back up to 
46% in 2001. The statistics suggest that the government is the single largest shareholder of 
these Chinese listed companies. However, according to Green (2003), in addition to direct 
holding, the state retains ownership indirectly through Legal Person (LP) shares. He 
believe 
that in 2002,78% of the PLCs 
- 
729 firms were directly or indirectly controlled by 
state organs. 
8 Taking the Glass-Steagall Act of the US as a model, the Commercial Banking Law of China that came into 
effect in 1994 prohibits commercial banks from underwriting, holding or trading securities except for 
government bonds. 
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Table 2.9: Composition of stocks issued by companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Markets (%) 
Nontradable shares 68.1 71.2 67.1 64.6 64.8 65.4 66 64.8 63.3 65.3 
State shares 44.6 48.1 42.7 38.9 37.7 35.4 34.3 31.6 37.1 46.2 
Legal persons' shares 22.1 21.3 23.1 24.5 24.9 26.7 28.2 29.6 24.9 18.3 
Others 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.2 2.2 3.3 3.4 3.6 1.3 0.8 
Tradable shares 31.9 28.8 32.9 41.3 35.2 34.6 34 35.2 36.6 36.6 
A-shares 
B-shares 
11-shares 
15.4 
16.5 
0.0 
16.8 
6.4 
5.7 
20.9 
6.1 
6.0 
21.0 
6.7 
7.7 
21.9 
6.4 
6.9 
23 
6.4 
5.2 
24.1 
5.4 
4.5 
26.9 
4.3 
3.9 
29 
4.2 
3.5 
25.7 
3.1 
6.4 
Grand total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: IDE Spot Survey 2003, China Statistical Year Book 2002 
2.3.3 The accounting system 
Listed companies in China are subject to two sets of accounting and disclosure regulations 
issued by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and China Securities and Regulations Committee 
(CSRC). While A-share companies prepare Chinese Generally Accepted Accounting 
Standards-based (GAAP-based) financial statements audited by local CPA firms, B-share 
companies are required to publish financial statements that are based on both the Chinese 
GAAP and International Accounting Standards (IAS). Companies with B-shares must have 
their accounts audited by international accounting firms. Despite anecdotal stories of how 
Chinese accounting is inadequate, a number of recent studies (e. g., Chen et al. 2001, Chen 
and Wang 2004) find that accounting information is value-relevant to investors in the 
Chinese market. This is an important finding as a large part of the analyses in this thesis 
uses accounting data. 
2.3.4 SOE reform 
Many SOEs in China are loss making or non-viable, and a large number have long since 
been in default to their creditor banks. Recent official statistics (State Administration For 
Industry and Commerce www. saic. go} v. cn) suggest that there is an equal split between 
those SOEs that are loss-makers, those that break even though plagued with implicit losses, 
and those that are marginally profitable. Accordingly credit allocation and asset reallocation 
are not as efficient as they could be. As business failures are a universal feature of 
competitive markets, effective insolvency and creditor rights systems are fundamental 
building blocks of sustainable development. The existence of such a framework facilitates 
access to credit and underpins contract enforcement. Therefore effective insolvency and 
creditor rights systems are important to both domestic and international investors and 
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creditors, and are crucial to reducing the risks of financial instability and handling financial 
crises when they occur. 
As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, the conversion of SOEs and COEs to shareholding 
enterprises was the principal mode of SOE restructuring and privatisation in China. During 
the latter half of 1990s many SOEs entered a period of accelerated reform. In 1997, 
Premier Zhu Rongji put China's loss-making SOEs on a strict three-year schedule during 
which they were instructed to implement a "modern enterprise system" and convert losses 
to surpluses. Two quantitative changes are most visible during the latter 1990s: rapid 
declines in the number of SOEs and in the employment level of surviving SOEs. For many 
industrial SOEs, restructuring occurred via merger or acquisition, the conversion of 
ownership status, or in outright liquidation9. While the outright liquidation was largely 
limited to smaller scale enterprises, a substantial number of large and medium-size 
enterprises also exited the class of state industry. 
As part of the government's initiative to reform SOEs, mergers took place extensively in 
six bankrupt industries including sundry. light industry, textile, machinery and chemical 
(World Bank 2000) since mid 1990's. Since the start of 1996, the state has allotted a 
certain amount of the SOE banks' reserves for bad debts to be used in the merger and layoff 
of bankrupt companies. According to State Economic Trade Commission (SETC), in 1998, 
the reserves for bad debts totalled US$1 Obn and more than 6,400 bankrupt companies were 
saved via merger. In 1999,3,098 bankrupt companies were saved via merger. The SETC 
also called for bankruptcy mergers to enter bankruptcy procedures more quickly. (People's 
Daily 1 August 2000). 
As a result of this rapid reform, non-performing loans (NPLs) of the Chinese banks reached 
a record high. To resolve these NPLs, four Asset Management Companies (AMC) were set 
up in 1999 to restructure the pre-96 NPLs. The four AMCs took over US$200bn ofNPLs 
and had resolved around 25% (in value terms) of these NPLs (McKinsey 2003) by 2003. In 
addition to using AMCs, the Chinese government has promoted mergers/acquisitions and 
debt-for-equity swaps10 in an attempt to improve banks' NPLs. 
9 According to the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), between 1995 
and 2002,7,798 SOEs were liquidated. 
10 For example, the SETC issued a document in 2001 promoting debt-for-equity swaps. 
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This section introduced the institutional features of the Chinese corporate sector, including 
the ownership structure and its development between 1980 and 2002. The main feature is 
the reform and corporatisation of SOEs. The Chinese "modern enterprise system" 
- 
the 
PLCs on which the empirical work of this thesis will take place has also been described in 
detail, in terms of their shareholding, capital and governance structures. This section 
provides important background for the introduction of the banking sector in the next 
section. In addition, to put things into perspective, I also illustrate the nature of Chinese 
corporations by describing two PLCs in detail in section 2.5. 
2.4 THE BANKING SECTOR AND COMPANY FINANCING 
SOURCES 
2.4.1 The banking sector 
To better understand this dynamic relationship between the financial sector and SOE 
reform, it is necessary to examine the background of these issues in terms of China's 
financial institutions and their stability, funding`and limited disintermediation. 
In addition to FDI, the banks are the key sources of external finance in corporate China. 
The financial landscape is dominated by "the big four" state owed banks' l: Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Agricultural 
--" 
Bank of China; and they are highly inefficient12. " 
Banks are the primary channel for directing funds from savers to borrowers because of 
disintermediation. Also, since the retail-banking sector in China remains undeveloped 
(housing loans were only 3.4% of total lending in 2000 
- 
according to McKinsey 2003), 
corporate lending (particularly to SOEs) is likely to continue to dominate bank lending. In 
this environment bank reform is inseparable from genuine reform of SOEs. 
"According to The Economist (5th January 2006), Bank of China (BoC) will be the third mainland bank to 
list on the Hong Kong exchange in the near future. So far, Bank of Communications was listed in Hong Kong 
in June 2005, and China Construction Bank was listed in Hong Kong in October 2005. 
'Z The costlincome ratio of mainland Chinese banks is among the highest in the world, averaging close to 
80%, versus 35-45% in Asia and 40-55% internationally (Bank of China International 2002). 
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There was significant government intervention in bank lending prior to 1994. Such 
government intervention could take place either ex ante or ex post of bank lending being 
made (Lu et al. 2001). Since 1994, the Chinese State banks have been granted increasing 
autonomy in their lending decision-making. 
According to Lu et al. (2001), the banks' lending decisions are systematically biased in 
favour of SOEs. They also find that the investment sensitivity to cash flow of the moderate- 
risk firms is substantially higher than that of the other firms, while investment of the worst- 
risk firms is the least responsive to changes in cash flow. This pattern of investment-cash- 
flow sensitivities suggests that, although banks do ration credits to some extent, they tend 
to provide liquidity to keep the borrowers in financial distress afloat 
- 
the so called "soft 
budget constraint" syndrome. 
Due to the ailing state of many SOEs, banks' aggregate NPLs amounted to 44-55% of GDP 
at year-end 2001, or US$480-600bn. Worse still, bad debt is dampening economic growth: 
capital is tied up in defaulted borrowers and insolvent companies continue to operate rather 
than face liquidation. 
t 
The Chinese Central Bank 
- 
People's Bank of China (PBOC) has a great influence in 
corporate financing. Firstly one tool in implementing the government's monetary policy is 
through the setting of interest rates. Regulation then limits the range within which the banks 
can lend around this central rate (Lu et al. 2001). The lending decisions to the SOEs are 
thus politically influenced although this force is diminishing. The banks have limited 
capability13 to perform a credit risk analysis thus lending decisions are not based on risk. 
Neither, in the main, are the banks able to monitor the borrower and assess performance. 
The high level of NPLs renders the financial system as technically insolvent, although a 
financial crisis is unlikely in the short-term. As we can see in Panel A of Table 2.10, banks' 
net interest income is RMB381bn, assuming 0% NPL levels. Panel B in Table 2.10 
calculates the different net interest income level at different NPL levels. Because of 
13 Lending decisions were centrally controlled by the government historically until 2001 and as a result 
there is a lack of commercial approach in the banks' current lending decision making process which is 
further worsened by a lack of trained staff. 
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sufficient deposits14, disintermediation is not yet a concern and banks' interest 
income/expenses would still be positive with a NPL level of 50%. Therefore the Chinese 
banks are very liquid with loans to deposit ratios below 80, plus massive new savings 
continue to enter the banking system due to lack of other investment options. Furthermore, 
importantly, there is in place an implicit guarantee of the banking system by the 
government 
- 
supported by the world's second highest foreign reserves. 
However a liquidity crisis is not improbable in the long term as less than 1% of the urban 
population controls 50% of all deposits. One result of this is that it would take only a small 
segment of customers to migrate to create a liquidity problem for banks. Furthermore, if 
China's economy slows down, the underlying banking weakness would be exposed. 
Foreign bank RMB lending is now available, but in this respect these banks are also heavily 
regulated with scope and geography restrictions. 
14 McKinsey (2003) estimates that the *average savings rate in China between 1997 and 2005 is 40%, 
versus 14% in the US and 27% in Japan. 
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Table 2.10 The aggregate balance sheet of Chinese banks 2000 
Panel A. The ag gregate balance sheet of Chinese banks 2000 
(RMB bn) Balance Yield/cost of Interest income/expenses 
funds 
Loans 
Short-term loans 6,575 6.29% 413 
Medium- to long-term loans 2,793 6.67 186 
Trust loans 241 6.63 16 
Other loans 328 6.63 22 
Total 9,937 6.41 637 
Deposits 
Corporate deposits 4,409 2.07 91 
Fiscal deposits 351 2.25 8 
Govt & org. deposits 222 2.25 5 
Individual deposits 6,433 2.02 130 
Saving deposits 1,819 0.99 18 
Time deposits 4,614 2.43 112 
Agricultural deposits 264 2.25 6 
Trust deposits 287 2.25 6 
Other deposits 413 2.25 9 
Total 12,380 2.07 256 
Net interest income 381 
Panel B Financial disintermediation not vet a concern 
Assume NPL level 0% 381 
( 10% 318 
20% 254 
30% 190 
40% 126 
50% 63 
Source: Bank of China International 2002 
Due to historical reasons, barks are the main channel of funds from savers to borrowers. 
According to Tian (2004) and Allen et al. (2005), China is a bank economy. However, 
unlike other bank economies such as Japan and Germany, the commercial banks in China 
do not have equity holding in listed companies. Taking the Glass-Steagall Act of the US as 
a model, the Commercial Banking Law of China (1994) prohibits commercial banks from 
underwriting, holding or trading securities except for government bonds. 
2.4.2 Soft budget constraints 
The resolution of the issue of the high rate of outstanding NPLs through banking reform 
and the restructuring of SOEs are inextricably linked. These critical issues and their inter- 
relationship will now be reviewed in more detail. 
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Many scholars blame soft budget constraint for China's mounting NPLs (Lu et al. 2001; 
Bai and Wang 1997). The term "soft budget constraints" was first introduced by Kornai 
(1980) and has since become widely used in the emerging market literature. It refers to the 
case when a firm is not concerned with financial losses and expects to be bailed out by the 
government. As stated by Kornai (1986), the budget constraint refers to a behavioural 
characteristic of the decision-maker: the need to covers all expenses from the income 
generated by the firm. However, the "softening" of the budget constraint manifests itself 
when the strict relationship between outgoings and income is relaxed. Ultimately the cause 
of the soft budget constraint syndrome is the demand of society on the State to provide 
welfare, and the self-reinforcing nature of bureaucratisation. Soft budget constraints, 
represent important incentive problems and are a key element of socialist economiesls. 
Tian (2004) believes that the government ownership of both banks and firms bring about 
soft budget constraints. The government, facing the pressure of providing employment 
(Bai and Wang 1997, Wei et al. 203, Chen' and Yuen 2004, Allen at al. 2005), tends to 
maintain inefficient going concerns, and consequently, SOEs in default expect refinancing 
instead of bankruptcy. Banks are without incentives to monitor their credits and managers 
are 
without incentives to avoid default and creditor dissatisfaction. Therefore, Tian (2004) 
argues that under soft budget constraints debt cannot reduce managerial agency costs. On 
the contrary, debt financing expands the resources managed by firm managers and 
facilitates managerial exploitation. This argument is consistent with the theory of 
politicians and the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). 
2.4.3 Sources of financing 
With an underdeveloped legal system and financial sector, the fact that China has small 
external capital markets (albeit developing rapidly) comes as no surprise. Allen et al. 
(2005) compare China's financial system to both the USA system which is dominated by 
financial markets, and the German system which is dominated by the banking sector. By 
adopting the measures used by Levine (1999) and Beck et al. (2002), Allen et al. (2005) 
find that China has a largely dominant but inefficient banking sector, while its stock market 
is smaller than most of the Levine (1999) countries both in terms of market capitalisation 
IS As stated by Roland and Qian (1998), there are also instances of soft budget constraints in market 
economies such as bailouts of banks (e. g. the S&Ls) and corporations (such as Chrysler). 
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and the total value of equity traded in the market, weighted by GDP. In addition, Allen et 
at. (2005) find that most of the bank credits are issued to SOEs (listed and unlisted) and this 
view is shared by Lu et al. (2001). By using a panel data set of PLCs, Lu et al. (2001) 
demonstrate that bank lending decisions are systematically biased in favour of SOEs. 
Table 2.11 is constructed using the methodology in Allen et al. (2002). It illustrates the 
total size of "investment in fixed assets" which is a proxy for total financing needs, and the 
sources of these funds, for all types of companies. 
Table 2.11 Sources of financing 2001 
SOE COE 
Share- 
holding 
Other 
domestic FIE Sourceltotal 
State Budgetary 12.5% 5.5% 1.4% 0.0% 0.1% 6.7% 
Domestic Bank Loan 23.7% 11.0% 25.3% 7.3% 18.3% 19.2% 
Foreign Investment 2.0% 3.3% 2.5% 0.1% 30.8% 4.6% 
Self-raised funds & Other 61.8% 80.3% 70.8% 92.5% 50.8% 69.5% 
IPO and SEO* 0.2% 
Bond* 0.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Type of companies / 2001 47.5% 14.3% 
, 
15.2% 15.0% 8.1% 100% 
Total investment in 
fixed assets 2000 50.3% 14.7% 12.3% 14.7% 7.9% 100% 
* Available only to publicly listed and traded companies. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2002 
From the table we can see that the four most important financing sources are: 
V Self-raised funds, this includes proceeds from capital raised from the local 
government and communities, and internal financing channels such as retained 
earnings. This is not unusual, even in markets with strong stock markets like the 
UK, where retained earnings are the main source of funds. 
"'" Domestic bank loans 
V State budget 
V Foreign investment 
On the aggregate level, state budget provides 6.7% of corporate funding needs, whereas 
bank loans provide 19.2% and foreign investment provides 5%. Self-raised funds are by 
far the most important source of financing for almost all types of firms 
- 
overall they 
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provide 70% of corporate financing. On the other hand only 0.6% of total financing is 
provided by the external capital market (equity plus bonds). 
Having presented how the four most important sources contribute to firms' financing 
overall, the financing decisions of the different types of companies will now be examined. 
For SOEs, bank loans16 provide 24% of firms' financing requirements, while self-raised 
funds provide 62% of financing. Similarly, for the shareholding companies, bank loans 
provide 25% and self-raised funds provide 71% of firms' financing requirements. 
The "Other domestic" category includes mainly private and individual enterprises. For 
them, bank loans provide merely 7.3% of their financing needs, the remaining 93% 
financing needs come from self-raised funds. According to an article published by the 
Centre for International Private Enterprises (CIPE) on 1' November 1995, it is very 
difficult for China's private enterprises to secure a bank loan. This is because the 
government-controlled interest rate is much lower than the equilibrium rate, usually 12% 
p. a., so demand for funding is much higher than supply. To make the situation more 
difficult for the private sector, credit deci§ions are usually made by the government, which 
cirectly 
allocates most bank quotas to the SOEs. As a result private enterprises may only 
obtain bank loans outside the official plan, where they face much higher interest rates 
(around 20%) and shorter loan periods, often only three to six months. When private 
enterprises need more funding they must borrow from friends, relatives or neighbours at a 
much higher interest rate (25-30%)17. 
Providing 19% of total corporate financing, bank loans are the second most important 
financing source. Important determinants of the bank lending include borrower risk, 
collateral and relationships (Lu et al 2001, Gregory and Tenev 2001). Due to government 
intervention (although decreasing) through policy loans and interest rate control and the 
implicit guarantee to SOEs, lending bias towards SOEs leads to soft budget constraint and 
16 It is worth noting that, bearing in mind the banking sector is dominated by the State, it is possible that bank 
loans are made to SOEs as a disguised form of subsidy. Therefore the author believes that for SOE financing 
needs, official statistics on state budget may be deflated. 
"In the same report, C1PE states that a survey of 38 private enterprises in Luzhou city, Sichuan province, 
found that almost half these firms' funding (totalling RMB12.41mn) came from their own capital 
accumulation. The firms borrowed another 20% (RMB5.35mn) from their neighbourhood, and the 
remainder from bank loans (RMB8.37mn), which were obtained by only 22 of the 38 enterprises 
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Non-performing loans (NPL). According to Gregory and Tenev (2001), there is ample 
evidence that local governments continue to encourage bank lending to SOEs by extending 
explicit or implicit guarantees. They also find that although a number of assets qualify as 
acceptable collateral in theory, in practice real estate assets (in most cases land use right 
- 
LUR) appear to be the most common (in some cases the only kind of) collateral accepted. 
However, as will be discussed in detail in section 3.1, LURs are often used for employment 
settlement and are excluded from bankruptcy assets. This in effect renders the lending 
banks unable to recover their claims through collateral in the case of bankruptcy. These 
structural problems in the banking sector lead to a vicious circle of lending bias towards 
SOEs, soft budget constraint and NPLs. 
2.5 TYPICAL CHINESE FIRMS IN DISTRESS 
- 
TWO CASE 
COMPANIES 
By describing and analysing two distressed listed companies 
- 
one SOE and one non-SOE, 
this section illustrates the nature of Chinese corporations in the context of distress. The two 
distress cases were selected from the 100 companies that constitute the full population of 
distressed companies listed in China between 1999 and 2003, as documented in chapter 5 
of this thesis. The first case, Shandong Jintai is a non-government controlled 
pharmaceutical company operating in a growing and liberalised industry consisting of 60 
listed firms; the second case, Sichuan Joint-WIT Medical, on the other hand, is a SOE in 
the State controlled clothing and fabric industry consisting of five listed SOEs. Data for the 
two cases' operating performance, capital structure, and industry performance controls are 
from Thomson Financial Analytics Database 
- 
same source for the data in chapter 5, as well 
as from the two companies' annual reports. I also collect the two companies' restructuring 
announcements from the two official websites'8: www. cnlist. com. cn and 
www. cninfo. com. cn. Details of the announcements are presented chronologically in 
Appendix 4 and 5 respectively. These restructuring announcements will also be used to 
illustrate the types of distress restructuring mechanism in China in chapter 4. 
2.5.1 Case study one: Shandong Jintai Group 
surveyed. It is a general consensus that poor access to conventional bank finance is one of the chief 
constraints to private-sector growth in China. 
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Shandong Jintai (Jintai hereafter) was formerly a state owned enterprise and was 
restructured to be a shareholding company in 1989. The group's principal activities are the 
research, manufacture and sale of chemical raw material medicines, chemical medicinal 
preparations, Chinese medicinal preparations and biological medicines. It is also engaged j1 
the wholesale and retail of Chinese and Western prepared medicines. Other activities 
include manufacturing and marketing of biological products, medical intermediates and 
medical apparatus, importing and exporting goods, developing and transferring 
technologies and providing technical services. 
The pharmaceutical industry is a high growth industry in China. As at 2003, there are a 
total of 60 listed companies within the industry. According to China Econorric 
Information Network (CEINet), a leading industry studies expert, the pharmaceutical 
industry enjoyed a growth of 15.5% from 2001 to 2002, with RMB94.55bn output in 2002. 
The company's accounting performance versus its industry between 1999 and 2003 is 
presented in Table 2.12 below. As the table'shows, the industry's median asset size grew 
over time from RMB608mn in 1999 to RMB139lmn in 2003. 
f. 
A 
18 The announcements are made in Chinese and are translated into English by the author. 
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As will be discussed in detail in section 4.1 and 5.3.1, consistent with the existing literature, 
in this thesis I measure "financial distress" by interest coverage ratio, i. e. a firm is as 
distressed if its earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) are 
less than its reported interest expense. Using this definition of distress, between 1999 and 
2003, five of the 60 firms were in distress in the sector, including Jintai. Of the five 
distressed companies, two are non-SOEs, and three are SOEs. Jintai is a non-SOE firrri 
with zero government shareholding. It is also a small company measured by total assets. 
Jintai started its application for listing in 1993 and was eventually floated on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, eight years later, on 23`d July 2001. This lengthy process is mainly a 
result of bureaucracy and the extreme demand outstripping supply (Jiang et al. 2005). 
Table 2.12 shows some key accounting information for the company between 1999 and 
2003.2002 is the first year the company suffered interest cover shortfall (t=0). In terms of 
company size measured by total book assets, prior to its distress in 2002, Jintai's total 
assets between 1999 and 2001 were approximately 50-60% of industry median, and 
therefore was a relatively small company. Jintai's 2002 year-end book value assets were 
RMB316mn, representing a decrease of 30% from 2001. In 2003, there was another 
decrease of 24% and the company's total assets were only 17% of industry median. In 
other words, while the industry's median firm level total assets increased year on year, 
Jintai's total assets adjusted by industry median decreased in the same period, and such 
decrease accelerated in 2001. 
Furthermore, Jintai's equity decreased from RMB181.85mn in 1999, to a negative 
RMB31.72mn in 2003. Its total liabilities to total assets ratio increased from 52% in 1999 
to over 110% in 2003, due to the large written offs of its bad accounts receivables and non 
performing assets. According to an article published on the official Stock Exchange 
website (www. cnlist. com. cn) on 10 November 2004, since Xin Hong Ji Group's takeover 
of Jintai, the company was sued over 100 times for defaults on debt payments. 
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In fact, around the time of listing in 2001, it had come to light19 that the company was 
starting to become exposed to a variety of issues, such as high level of bank debts; obsolete 
technology due to a lack of investment over the years and management devoting 
considerable amount of efforts in its listing application; and only about 10% potentially 
realisable accounts receivables of a total of RMB100mn. Table 2.12 shows accounts 
receivables (days) increased sharply from 82 days in 2001 to 305 days in 2002 and again to 
350 days in 2003 
The company also suffered a sharp decrease in sales in 2002. Table 2.12 shows its 
sales/assets ratio decreased from 0.40 in 2001 to 0.09 in 2002. According to its 2002 
annual report, the company discontinued the operation of one of its major subsidiaries 
because of liquidity constraints on working capital. The sharp drop in sales (RMB 171.4mn 
in 2001 to RMB28. Omn in 2002) suggests it discontinued 80% of its operations. As the 
pharmaceutical industry was being liberalised, companies faced increased competition, and 
pressure on pricing. 
All in all, the company's 2001 accounts 'show the company performed poorly relative to 
industry in all aspects. Table 2.12 also shows that the company's operating and financial 
performance continued to deteriorate from 2002 to 2003. Its 2003 sales/assets ratio was 
only half of that in 2002. Although its EBITDA/assets ratio improved slightly from -0.37 
in 2002 to 
-0.25 in 2003 due to the sharp decline in total book value assets. Its gross profit 
margins improved from 0.12 in 2002 to 0.26 in 2003 but its operating profit margin 
deteriorated from 
-0.04 to -0.058. In addition, its bank debts/total assets continued to 
increase and in 2003, its total liabilities exceeded its total assets in 2003. The company was 
in effect bankrupt although was ktpt alive for the reasons discussed in section 2.2. The 
company's absolute bank debt level was relatively stable, and it had managed to take a new 
loan of RMB20m on 13 December 2002 (announcement No. 19 in Appendix 4), despite its 
poor credit condition and deteriorating operating and financial performance. On 10 
August 2003, the company also managed to renew the RMB20mn loan (announcement No. 
20 in Appendix 4). Although detailed information on these loans such as interest rates and 
covenants are not publicly available, the company's ability to obtain and renew loans with 
banks in such adverse conditions is a testament that the debt contracts are incomplete since 
19 According to articles published on the official stock exchange website. 
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banks are unable to monitor borrowers. In addition, as discussed in detail in section 2.4, 
banks are only able to set interest rates within specified range around a centrally regulated 
rate, the risk of lending is not appropriately reflected in interest rates. 
2.5.2 Case study two: Sichuan Joint-WIT 
Sichuan Joint-Wit Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry Company Limited Formerly 
known as Sichuan No. I Textile Stock Company Limited. It was a SOE with 65.6% State 
shares. It was listed on 16 June 1998 at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The Group's 
principal activities were the manufacture and sale of yarn, thread, base cloth, dyed cloth, 
knitwear, garments, beddings, adornments, machinery equipment, apparatus, meters and 
spare parts. Other activities include import and export trade, purchase of raw cotton and 
manufacture of chemical fibre yarn. Major products of the Group are cotton cloth and 
cotton yarn. The textile industry included five listed companies, all under the control of the 
State. In addition, there is a large number of non-listed non State-owned small to mediurrj 
size companies within the industry. The industry has been growing rapidly and the 
increased production and sales was a manifestation of brisk consumer spending and 
growing exports. Similarly Table 2.13 presents the company's accounting performance 
versus its industry during 1999 and 2003. As Table 2.13 shows, among the five listed 
companies, the median industry book value assets increased year-on-year from RMB608mn 
in 1999 to RMB 1.19bn in 2003. Sichuan Joint-WIT was the smallest listed company in the 
industry in 1999. 
0 
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The company suffered interest cover shortfall in year 2001 and 2002. The company's book 
value assets were relatively stable prior to and during the first year of coverage shortfall. 
However, its book value assets more than halved from RMB451mn in 2001 (t=0) to 
RMB189mn in 2003 (t=+2). In terms of operating performance, the company's 
EBITDA/assets ratio was similar to industry median prior to distress, but became negative in 
2001 and 2002. The main cause of distress is operational as shown by the negative EBITDA in 
2001. The company's financial structure did not look bad 
- 
its debts/assets ratio was actually 
low, so its negative interest cover was due to poor operating performance but not to 
excessively, high interest payments. This underlines the problems of operational inefficiency in 
SOEs. In 2003, the company's EBITDA/assets recovered to the industry median level. 
. 
However, its sales/assets ratio outperformed the industry 2000-0320. 
In terms of financial performance, the company's leverage was similar to industry median 
although it had higher accounts payable/assets and accounts payable/sales ratios. Its liquidity 
ratio of 1.101 was less than half of that of industry median in 1999, two years prior to the onset 
of distress, the ratio dropped to 0.546 in 2000 which was less than a third of that of industry 
median in the same year. Similarly, its capital expenditure/assets ratio was very poor 
compared to industry prior to distress. Two year prior to the onset of distress, its capital 
expenditure scaled by assets was only 3% of that of the industry median. The percentage 
improved slightly in 2002-03. 
Low debts/assets ratio, high accounts payable/assets and accounts payable/sales ratio, and 
very low capital expenditure/assets ratio suggest that although the company was not highly 
leveraged, it relied on trade credits for liquidity and its liquidity was poor. Poor liquidity 
restricted the company making adequate capital expenditure investments. The main cause 
of distress was operational and this underlines the problems of operational inefficiency in 
SOEs. 
20 Its sales/assets ratio in 2003 was very strange, 140%. Reason being that the company signed agreement to buy 
81% holding of a pharmaceutical company on 19`h August 2003and the transaction was completed on 31" Dec 
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The company's sales/employees ratio and the total number of employees show the company 
had a relatively large workforce and extremely low sales per employee ratio, indicating its 
inefficiency, even compared to other SOEs in the same industry. Assets/employee ratios were 
also low. Employee numbers continued to grow substantially in the first year of distress 
despite the falls in both assets and sales. The total number of employees was over 6560 in 
2002, this figure then dropped to only 709 in 2003. The company's announcements in 2003 
confirmed such large-scale redundancy. As Appendix 5 shows, the 27/08/2003 announcement 
mentioned the total compensation involved in redundancy was in the region of RMB13bn. 
This dramatic drop in headcount is the consequence of the company's exit strategy of the 
labour-intensive textile industry. As I will discuss further in section 4.2.1, in 2001, during the 
first year of distress, the government attempted a number of restructuring strategies including 
transferring State shares from an asset management SOE to a textile SOE who supposedly had 
industry-specific expertise management; and operational restructuring; but in vein. In 
December 2002 the company had to discontinue operations due to deteriorating cash flow 
problems. Eventually, the company had to lay off its extremely large labour force which seems 
tobe the source of inefficiency, and initiated its exit of the textile industry in 2003. 
Despite being the smallest listed firm in the industry, Sichuan Joint-WIT had extremely high 
number of employees. This could be an important cause of the firm's inefficiency. When the 
company was no longer able to operate due to lack of liquidity, government was involved in 
the settlement of employees, implying that social stability and employment were an important 
item on the government's agenda. However the government at the same time also tries to act as 
a shareholder and play an important role in the corporate world. The role of government in 
distress resolution will be explicitly tested in chapter 6. 
In summary, Sichuan Joint-WIT started to experience lack of profitability and interest coverage 
shortfall in 2001. Its controlling government shareholder attempted a number of restructuring 
strategies, including transferring the State shares to a textile SOE, and operational restructuring 
but unsuccessful. The company's performance continues to deteriorate in 2002 and the 
2003 (p32 of 2003AR), and this subsidiary's accounts was incorporated in Sichuan Joint-WIT's 2003 annual 
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company had to discontinue operation due to a lack of cash flow for working capital 
requirements. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
China is the most important emerging market in the world. It is in transition from a command 
economy to a market oriented economy through the reform of its large but unproductive SOEs. 
In addition, the Chinese government retains a continued interest post privatisation ill 
corporations which is different to many emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia. 
China's financial system is dominated by a large but inefficient state-owned banking sector. 
Government ownership of both banks and firms distorts fund allocation and brings about soft 
budget constraints. While bank loans are necessarily incomplete, government's control of 
interest rates and the implicit guarantee to SOE and sometimes even distressed non-SOE firms, 
exacerbates the structural problems in the financial 'sector of lending bias, soft budget 
constraint and NPLs. The external capital market has developed rapidly in the past ten years 
but the growth is constrained by the underdeveloped legal and regulatory framework, as well as 
the political agenda. The publicly listed companies, on which the empirical studies in this 
study are based, represent the "modem enterprise system". This "modem enterprise system" is 
the model for future corporate China. 
The description of two distressed listed companies provided some insight on the nature of 
Chinese corporations and on the role of government in corporate China. Both companies 
suffer from poor operating and financial performances relative to their respective industries, 
including low gross profit margins, high leverage and deteriorating sales, pre and during 
distress. The SOE case is also associated with extremely high employment headcount relative 
to its industry, suggesting the acute conflict of interest between profit maximisation and 
providing employment by government ownership. Both firms also suffer from poor liquidity 
and this liquidity constraint restricts them from making adequate capital expenditure 
investment. 
report 
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Having outlined the economic, political and financial institutional background of China, I will 
now go on to describe the Chinese bankruptcy code and its legal institutional environment. 
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CHAPTER 3- THE CHINESE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
AND AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CODES 
In economic terms, "corporate bankruptcy" is important because it is the legal mechanism 
through which inefficient firms are eliminated or restructured. An efficient corporate 
bankruptcy code is important in that it should serve to lay down the rules of the game, and it 
should provide legal procedure for distress resolution. In addition, a corporate bankruptcy 
code should act as a motivation for companies to restructure prior to the onset of distress. The 
1997 Asian financial crisis sparked much academic interest and initiated a number of studies. 
These studies add to the existing legal and finance literature on bankruptcy in emerging 
markets, and provide the foundation for a comparison of the codes between China, US, UK and 
five Asian countries, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines. The proposed 
comparison provides the context within which the existing Chinese bankruptcy regime is 
described in detail. 
The Chinese bankruptcy law was initially promulgated to restructure or liquidate the insolvent 
state owned enterprises. As China began to move towards a more market driven economy 
additional bankruptcy legislation was enacted. The term "Bankruptcy" follows the US 
definition and refers to the corporate bankruptcy process of court supervised restructuring or 
liquidation, and is used interchangeably with "insolvency". Figure 3.1 has been constructed to 
generalise the bankruptcy roadmap in many countries, including China. As we can see in the 
figure, similar to companies in other countries, when a Chinese company is in distress, there 
are two possible routes for distress resolution: 1. private workouts; 2. bankruptcy process 
during which the company may be restructured under court supervision or liquidated. 
Figure 3.1 also provides a road map for the structure of this chapter and the next chapter. The 
Chinese bankruptcy code will firstly be described in section 3.1, to set the background 
framework for the next section; section 3.2 reviews literature on bankruptcy and highlights 
important characteristics of bankruptcy against which I compare the Chinese code with US/UK 
and other five Asian economies; section 3.3 concludes. 
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3.1 THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF CHINA ON ENTERPRISE 
BANKRUPTCY 
The sources for this section and the next section (section 3.1 and 3.2) include a variety of 
research projects. All the information on bankruptcy law, creditor rights and judicial systems 
for China, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia is compiled based on detailed 
reports prepared for the Asian Development Bank as background for reform of the insolvency 
laws in the respective countries. These reports were prepared by law firms in each country 
using an identical methodology and reviewed by a regional team to ensure the comparability of 
results. All reports are published on www. insolvencyasia. com and the website of Asian 
Development Bank (hereafter refer to as ADB (1999,2000). Additional sources include the 
World Bank (2000). 
The first bankruptcy law was introduced in China in 1906. After the founding of the Peoples 
Republic of China in 1949, the new government abolished all the laws. As a consequence, 
China did not have an insolvency law for more than 30 years. Business enterprises could not 
declare bankruptcy since all enterprises were SOEs. 
In 1986 the Chinese Government promulgated the Law of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy 
('LEB' hereafter), which was put into effect as `trial implementation' in 1988. For a number 
of years it remained rarely applied but this started to change in 1994 when the concept of 
bankruptcy began to emerge in reality following the rapid restructuring and privatisation of 
SOEs, as discussed in section 2.3.1. 
Figure 3.2 provides the number of corporate bankruptcies filed between 1989 and 199721. We 
can see bankruptcy cases more than doubled from 710 cases in 1993 to 1,625 cases a year later 
in 1994. Of the 1,625 cases in 1994,1,232 cases (76%) were SOEs. Three years later, in 
1997, the number of SOE cases decreased to 1,000 cases (19%), with the remaining 81% of 
cases mainly being private companies and joint ventures. The first foreign related company, 
`ý Latest available data. 
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International Commercial Credit Bank filed for bankruptcy in 1992. However, according to 
the World Bank (2000), the bankruptcy case with largest scale, greatest debts, largest number 
of employees and arguably the worst negative influence to the economy is a state-owned 
bankruptcy case. 
Figure 3.2 Bankruptcy statistics 
N 
Source: ADB (2000) 
3.1.1. Relevant laws 
The LEB comprises of six chapters, including General Provisions, Proposal and Acceptance of 
Bankruptcy Applications, Creditors' Meetings, Conciliation and Consolidation, Bankruptcy 
Declaration and Liquidation. The LEB, together with another two national laws, i. e. Chapter 
19 of the Code of Civil Procedures (, Effective April 1991), and Chapter 8 of the Companies 
Law (Effective July 1994), contains provisions for court-supervised restructuring and 
liquidation. 
However, they are not the only basis for bankruptcy practice in China. The governments of the 
Localities have also promulgated their own regional bankruptcy laws to promote bankruptcy 
work. The major ones are listed in Box 1. 
Page 56 
Box 1. 
Shenzhen 
Bankruptcy of Foreign-related Companies (July 1987) 
Bankruptcy of Enterprises (March 1994) 
Liquidation and Dissolution of Enterprises (October 1995) 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Foreign Company Insolvency Regulations (November 1996) 
Shanghai 
Liquidation Procedures for Foreign Investment Enterprises (October 1991) 
Beijing 
Liquidation Measures for Foreign Investment Enterprises (June 1992) 
Dissolution of Foreign Investment Enterprises (July 1995) 
Guangdong Province 
Bankruptcy of Companies (August 1993) 
In addition, there is one important policy of the State Council (cabinet) regarding bankruptcy, 
applicable to SOEs, and this policy supersedes previous provisions. This is Document Guo Fa 
No. 59 (1994) which stipulates that the land use rights of an insolvent SOE were to be sold and 
the proceeds used to meet employee requirements and the primary focus of any restructuring is 
the costs on employee pension obligation And redundancy, but not the payment to creditors. 
r 
3.1.2. Bankruptcy procedures 
The general procedure is as indicated in Figure 3.1. When a company is in distress, it may 
restructure voluntarily (out-of-court), or file for bankruptcy. Once an application for 
bankruptcy is made either by the debtor or the creditors, the court has ten days to determine 
whether to proceed with the case. If the court determines to proceed, it must call for a meeting 
of creditors to consider the financial position of the debtor. Within three months of the court's 
acceptance of the application for bankruptcy, the debtor may submit a proposal for 
reorganisation (restructuring). If creditors with more than two thirds in face value accept the 
proposal, the court will suspend the bankruptcy proceedings for up to two years. During the 
two years, the reorganisation is supervised by a committee of creditors and employees. If the 
debtor is a SOE, it is supervised by the entity's controlling body. 
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In the event that a restructuring proposal is not submitted, fails, or is not accepted by creditors 
then the court may declare the entity bankrupt, i. e. the entity is deemed insolvent by law. 
Within fifteen days of the bankruptcy declaration, the court must establish a Liquidation 
Committee to handle the winding up of the affairs of the entity. Members of the Liquidation 
Committee are selected from the local government financial agencies (including the Valuation 
Bureau (Gu Jia Gu)), government departments and creditors. If the debtor is a SOE then the 
committee will also consist of members of the enterprises' supervising body. 
The following subsections consider the restructuring and liquidation alternatives in more detail. 
A. Restructuring 
In-court restructuring plan can be presented by either the debtors or the creditors. Note that in 
the case of in-court restructuring, the law does not stipulate that the objective of the plan is 
primarily to benefit creditors; instead the motivation is for the pension and redundancy 
payments of employees, especially for SOEs, as stated in the Document Guo Fa No. 59 
mentioned above. 
According to Asian Development Bank (2000, hereafter refer to as ADB 2000), the main 
means of restructuring in China include: 
(1) Debt restructuring. This includes debt-for-equity-swaps, debt compounding (debt 
composition) and debt forgiveness. 
(2) Asset restructuring including acquisitions, sell-offs or divestitures. 
(3) Ownership restructuring including spin-offs, split-ups and equity carve-outs. 
(4) Enterprise entrusting and leasing. Enterprise entrusting refers to enterprises which are 
poorly operated and are entrusted to specialised agencies to reorganise and operate. 
Enterprise leasing is when part or the whole assets are leased to other enterprises to 
operate during a fixed period. 
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However, existing laws restrict the application of these restructuring measures. For example, 
according to Article 8 of Doc. No. 59 (1994) of the State Council, the spin-off of an enterprise 
for reorganisation must obtain the consent of creditors which own more than two thirds of the 
claims in face value, as well as the approval of city or county governments where the enterprise 
is located. Another restriction comes from Article 12 of the Company Law, which states that if 
a company makes an investment in other limited liability companies (LLC) or companies 
limited by shares (CLS), the aggregate investment shall not exceed 15% of the net assets of the 
company itself. 
It is very important to note that, according to the World Bank (2000), there have been so far, 110 
known cases of in-court restructuring in China. This World Bank study reviews the principles 
and actual implementation of China's bankruptcy system for SOEs by 15 case studies i 
addition to interviews in five major cities, as well as at the national level with representatives 
of government agencies (responsible for SOEs, banks, labour/social security, and land), the 
judicial and legislative system, banks and other creditors, service professionals (valuators, 
accountants, lawyers, etc. ), and debtor enterprises., The study states that out-of-court, the mail, 
r1structuring option for an insolvent SOE is debt-for-equity swaps and merger. Such mergers 
are subject to debt writing off quotas specified by the government and therefore are limited 
because of a lack of funds. They also find that creditors in practice have very limited influence 
in the process. This issue will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2. 
B. Liquidation 
The Law stipulates that the priority for distributing the bankruptcy assets is as follows: 
V Costs and expenses of the bankruptcy process; 
V Employee wages and labour insurance; 
V Provincial and government taxes; 
V All other claims in the bankruptcy including unsecured creditors and trade 
creditors. 
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In theory, an asset that already constitutes security collateral is not a bankruptcy asset; only the 
portion of the value of the security collateral exceeding the amount of the debt that it secures is 
a bankruptcy asset. The implication is that secured creditors have the legal rights to take 
possession of their security interests, although this must be done through litigation. 
However in practice, two main principles are adopted in the liquidation of an enterprise: 
V Land Use Right (LUR), in many cases the most valuable asset, is specified to be taken over 
by the municipality (Document Guo Fa No. 59), despite the fact that in a majority of 
bankruptcy cases the LURs were used as collateral for bank borrowing. 
V With the remainder of the assets, the debtor must pay for the `rehabilitation' of its workers 
before any other claims. The `rehabilitation' fee aims in part at maintaining average rather 
than minimum living standards of the city concerned. The presence of well-paying 
national or provincial SOEs can drive the fee up to a level that prevents bankruptcy filing 
for smaller local SOEs. 
t 
As stated in section 2.2, two primary concerns of the government are social stability and bank 
NPLs. The unemployment problem forces us to understand the relationship between 
bankruptcy and political stability. Unrecoverable loans force us to understand the relationship 
between restructuring SOEs and banking system stability. If SOEs went into bankruptcy on a 
large scale, the national banks who are the major creditors of these SOEs would be forced to 
write off large amount of loans which would lead to bankruptcy of the banks and eventually 
lead to financial crisis and economic recession. Therefore, unemployment and unrecoverable 
loans are two major problems of bankruptcy practice22 in China (WB 2000, Gamaut et al. 
2004, Tian 2005 and Allen et al. 2005). 
22 According to Tian (2004), Huarong Asset Management Company and other two creditors requested in 2001, 
that Monkey King PLC to be liquidated. This is expected to be the first bankruptcy case of a public listed 
company in China. 
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3.1.3. A mini case study 
To put the procedure of the Chinese insolvency code and related issues in perspective, I cite a 
case study of the bankruptcy of an SOE given in World Bank (2000, p11). 
A small municipal SOE, while maintaining a headcount of over 200 employees was only 
utilising 5% of the available capacity. At the time the bankruptcy petition was finally filed in 
1996, the banks were exposed to 80% of the RMB 15 million debt, while the assets were valued 
by the Valuation Bureau at less than RMB7.5 million. After lengthy debate on the workers' 
compensation and the value of the assets a deal was closed by the municipality for another 
SOE to absorb these assets. The SOE acquiring the assets already had excess headcount and 
did not want to take on liability for the existing workforce. Through an in-court agreement the 
sale of the assets was completed against a cash payment of a little more than half of the price 
originally desired by the Liquidation Commission. A compensation agreement was structured 
with the employees. In addition social security and tax arrears were settled using the proceeds 
of the sale, while the creditors, who were for the most part the banks, only received 1.5% of 
their original claims. 
Post acquisition, the buyer SOE leased the facility on a six-year contract for a fixed fee (with a 
provision for an annual percentage increase) to a private individual. The lessee was in turn 
entitled to the retained profits and right of first refusal-on the-lease renewal: ''The lessee 
employed 17 of the original workforce on a six-year contract plus employing a further dozen 
additional personnel. This was a radical downsizing compared to the number of initial 
employees, although the preserved opportunities for employment appeared to be sustainable 
and financially viable. 
Despite recognising the potential revenue streams in the new business, the lessee did not have 
access to the capital resources needed to acquire the assets. However the lessee was able to 
rehabilitate the assets, and provide working capital funded through an initial capital injection 
and maintained with the retained earnings. The performance of the facility at the time of 
bankruptcy was 20,000 tons/year employing a workforce of 216. By 2001 it was a profitable 
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entity, selling over 100,000 tons/year only with 30 employees. As of 2001, despite the 
turnaround of this business operating as a going concern, the banks had not yet resumed 
lending to the private lessee. 
This mini case study highlights a number of issues. Firstly, the bankrupt SOE had an over 
employment issue and was highly inefficient; Secondly, the company was kept afloat after it 
was already bankrupt. By the time the bankruptcy petition was finally filed and accepted by 
the court, the SOE's book value assets were only less than half of the amount of its total debt, 
majority of which was owed to its banks; Lastly, the settlement of the redundant workforce, 
added further difficulty to the liquidation process and severally damaged the interests of the 
banks, who in the end only recovered a mere 1.5% of their original claims. 
3.1.4 Chinese bankruptcy regime 
- 
summary 
World Bank (2000) highlights a number of issues in the existing Chinese bankruptcy regime: 
r (i)" SOE bankruptcy has been an administrative process, with little creditor involvement and 
transparency. Creditors' rights were severely damaged in order to pay-off employee 
wages and taxes, despite the specified priority order in payout by the law. The process can 
hinder the unfolding of market-based lending and borrowing; 
(ii) The incentives of key stakeholders in theeadministered bankruptcy process can cause a 
bias against creditor interests and against timely reallocation of assets to their best 
alternative uses; 
(iii) Effective reorganisation alternatives once bankruptcy has been chosen and filed, and 
mechanisms to provide credit to viable but insolvent firms, have been few. This has 
limited the options for rescuing potentially viable firms as going concerns and so obtaining 
better results for creditors. 
3.2 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF THE CODES 
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Having described the Chinese code, this section conducts the comparisons. The motivation for 
the comparison is to bring out differences in codes between various regimes, and thereby 
highlight their relative strengths and weaknesses. In addition, this is the first study to compare 
the Chinese code with any other codes. 
Section 3.2.1 reviews literature on bankruptcy and highlights important characteristics of 
bankruptcy against which I compare the Chinese code with US, UK, and five Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,. Thailand and Philippines); section 3.2.2 discusses the 
' 
implications of the findings in the context of China. 
3.2.1 Corporate and legal characterastics affecting bankruptcy 
Existing literature states that firm characteristics such as capital structure, and country, 
characteristics such as legal standards and regulatory frameworks affect the way corporate 
financial distress is resolved. Two international comparisons provide important insights for 
tljis study. The first is Franks and Torous (1996) which compare the US and UK codes. The 
US and UK insolvency systems23 provide fundamental insolvency frameworks for inane, 
countries especially emerging markets, and the comparison of these two systems initiated the 
on-going debate on the cost and benefit of debtor- versus creditor-friendly systems. M3, 
motivation to choose the US and UK for this comparison is to continue this existing debate 
using experience from six emerging markets including China. The US code is debtor- 
friendly, lengthy, expensive and encourages complex bargaining which leads to deviation from 
absolute priority rule (APR)24. Also management has strong incentive to over-invest. The L 
code, on the other hand, is creditor-oriented and speedy. Because creditors generally obtairi 
control of the debtor firm, greater adherence to APR is obtained. However this may be 
achieved at the costs of premature liquidations and underinvestment. 
23 The UK observations and references of the UK system throughout are based on the system prior to the 
introduction of the Enterprise Act (2002) which aimed for a more debtor-oriented insolvency system. 
24 Absolute Priority Rule is an allocation rule based upon the relative priority of the contractual entitlements held 
by all of the firm's claimants. It dictates that, once the court establishes the hierarchy of claimants, a junior claim 
- 
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The second study is Claessens et al. (2003) whose research focuses on the resolution of distress 
in five East Asian economies (excluding China) in 1997-1998. The institutional features of 
these five codes before the onset of the Asian financial turmoil in 1997 were very similar, the 
insolvency laws of these economies were out of date and irrelevant to modem commercial 
needs. Related laws and practices, such as the ones relating to debt recovery and security 
enforcement, were similarly defective and these often have the unintended result of creating a 
`debtor-friendly' system (ADB 2000). In their descriptive analysis, Claessens et al. (2003) 
state that in the first two years following the onset of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
out-of-court resolution was the prevalent method for corporate distress resolution. As of 
August 1999, of the total 322 distressed Indonesian companies, 38% filed for bankruptcy while 
the rest attempted out-of-court resolution. More strikingly, of the total 887 distressed Thai 
companies, only 62 applied for bankruptcy while the remaining 825 entered out-of-court 
restructuring. 
By studying a sample of 644 financially distressed firms in five East Asian countries between 
11996 and 1998, Claessens et al. (2003) show that tfie reason for the frequent use of out-of-court 
resolution is in part due to the relative weakness of the bankruptcy systems. They also fmd that 
bank-owned and group-affiliated firms are less likely to file for bankruptcy. This suggests that 
informational advantages and preferential sources of credit from internal markets encourage 
informal restructuring. 
My motivation to choose the other five Asian countries for this comparison stems from the 
following reasons: a). China and these five Asian countries have similar corporate 
environments; b). The five countries'have in the past few years had rapid developments in their 
insolvency systems following the onset of the 1997 Asian crisis. These developments set 
precedents for China and provide important implications to the debate of the debtor- versus 
creditor-friendly systems; c). Information on their insolvency systems is available. 
can receive no payment until all senior claims are fully paid (Jarrow et al. 2001). Therefore deviation from APR 
indicates a diminishing effect of senior creditors. 
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These two studies show that the determinants of bankruptcy and the means for resolving 
financial distress depend on the relative strengths of the critical agents (creditors, equity 
holders and managers) in the resolution. The two studies also highlight important issues 
reflecting the main features of a bankruptcy process. These important issues include cost of 
bankruptcy, control rights in the bankruptcy process, creditor treatment, the availability of new 
financing in reorganization, as well as the enforceability of the laws in practice. 
Table 3.1 characterise bankruptcy codes across nine prominent features. It has been constructed 
by the author extending the framework of Franks and Torous (1996) and Claessens et al. 
(2003). For US and UK, features (1) 
- 
(4), (7) 
- 
(9) are from Franks and Torous (1996), 
features (5) 
- 
(6) are based on the thesis author's own analysis. For Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, features (1) 
- 
(3), (5) and (6) are from Claessens et al. 
(2003), features (4), (7) 
- 
(9) are from ADB (1999,2000). Information on China is analysed 
by the thesis author in the Franks and Torous framework based on information from ADB 
(1999,2000) and World Bank (2000). Each of the features will now be discussed in turn in 
more detail. 
D 
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A. Cost of bankruptc 
Hart (1999) argues that three measures are of primary importance in the evaluation of a 
country's bankruptcy procedure: cost, time and efficient outcome. Cost of bankruptcy is 
also an important determinant between formal and informal restructurings. Gilson et at. 
(1990) state that for the US, out-of-court resolution is less costly than formal bankruptcy 
because it takes less time, generates lower professional fees, and causes less disruption to 
the firm's business. Jensen (1989,1991) believes that bankruptcy will be taken out of the 
courts and `privatised' because large potential costs of formal reorganization provide 
incentives for the parties to accomplish reorganisation more efficiently outside the court. 
So an important question is whether bankruptcy is costly. Extensive empirical studies have 
been conducted in the US context, to quantify both direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy. 
Direct costs include legal, administrative, and advisory fees paid by the debtor firrrz- 
Indirect costs can be viewed as opportunity costs including costs that arise because of inter- 
or intra-group conflicts in interest, asymmetric information, free-rider problems, lost sales 
and competitive position, higher öperatirig costs; and ineffective use of management time. 
r The measure of indirect cost is problematic and under debate in the existing literature., 
Wruck (1990) summarises previous findings and concludes that the direct costs average' 
3.5% of market value of the firm, and indirect costs are in the range of 9% to 15%. 
In China, the direct bankruptcy cost is minimised because there are no'professional 
bankruptcy practitioners involved in the process. The court process sometimes is delayed 
due to difficulty in valuation or agreement on employee compensation. Although there are 
no sufficient figures available to make affirmative judgement, the cost is believed to be 
sufficiently lower than that in the US. However the irony is that the scarcity of professional 
bankruptcy practitioners is detrimental in building an efficient insolvency system and this 
phenomenon leads to the classic debate of "the chicken and the egg". In this context, are 
the costs of bankruptcy practitioners outweighed by the benefit of the savings that could be 
gained by following their advice? 
A comparison of the eight countries in cost of bankruptcy is shown as feature (1) in Table 
3.1. 
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B. Control rights and creditor protection 
In the world of Modigliani and Miller (1958), securities are recognised by their cash flows: 
debt has a fixed promised stream of interest payments, equity holders receive dividends. 
However recent financial research shows that this is not the complete story and that the 
defining feature of different securities has been shifted to the rights these securities entail 
(Hart 1995). For example, shareholders have the right to vote for directors of companies, 
while debt entitles creditors to repossess collateral when the promised payments are not 
delivered by the company. Control rights provide creditors and the debtor company with 
prespecified rights over a firm's assets in bankruptcy and reflect the different characteristics 
of a debtor- and a creditor-friendly system. 
As pointed out by Franks (2000), the UK insolvency system has a highly creditor- 
controlled procedure. In contrast, in the US under Chapter 11 (restructuring), the debtor-in- 
possession usually remains in control of the business. Although in many cases 
management stays during the restructuring process, they are subject to court supervision 
v'hich potentially limits its discretion to raise financing and sell assets. Empirically, Gilson 
(1989) finds 50% of financially distressed firms' top management remains in place 
throughout the Chapter 11 process. As for Asia, as stated previously, the ineffective laws 
and enforcements have the unintended result of a'debtor-friendly' system regardless of the 
content of legal rules. 
White (1996) shows that the differences between debtor- versus creditor-friendly regimes 
influence whether firms in financial distress use in or out-of-court reorganisations. She 
also argues that the pros and cons of a creditor- versus debtor-friendly systems are 
controversial. On the one hand, in creditor-friendly regimes, the threat of being fired gives 
managers ex-ante incentive for less risky investments although a new manager may be 
unable to ensure a smooth transition and hence cause the creditors to suffer higher costs of 
resolution during distress. On the other hand, in most debtor-friendly regimes, although 
some incompetent managers are able to keep their jobs, in general managers are encouraged 
to seek bankruptcy protection earlier from their creditors, and as a result the likelihood of 
the firm surviving distress is increased. Using data from Finland, Ravid and Sundgren 
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(1998) support White's (1996) view that the harsh treatment of managers may lead them to 
delay filing for bankruptcy, hence higher bankruptcy cost for creditors. 
So how can creditor protection be measured? Focusing on the protection of secured 
creditors in both liquidation and reorganization processes, La Porta et al. (1998) construct a 
creditor protection index to indicate the extent a legal system (company law and bankruptcy 
law) assures creditor rights in insolvency.. Using this methodology, I compile and construct 
the creditor rights for the eight countries in this comparison study and present these figures 
in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Creditor rights 
Country Management 
does not 
stay in 
No automatic Secured Creditors' Overall 
stay on assets creditors paid consent for creditor 
first going into rights* 
United States 
.00101 United 1I114 
Kingdom 
Indonesia 11013 
Korea 11114 
Malaysia' 11114 
Philippines 00011 
'thailand 11013 
China 10012 
* Creditor rights are presented as the summation of 4 dummy variables (the four categories in the table), 
where I= the variable is in the Law and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Creditor rights of US and UK are from La Porta et at. (1998); Creditor rights for the other six 
countries are constructed by the author using data from ADB (1999,2000). 
"-This creditor protection index should be treated with caution as-it is only a crude measure. 
The issue of creditor rights is multi-faceted. Firstly there may be different classes of 
creditors with different interests, so protecting rights of some creditors may hinder the 
rights of others. In the case of a default, senior secured creditors may have a simple interest 
in getting possession of collateral, whereas junior unsecured creditors may wish to preserve 
the firm as a going concern. Secondly, there are generally two creditor strategies of dealing 
with a defaulting firm: liquidation and reorganisation. The most basic right of a senior 
collateralised creditor is to repossess collateral when a loan is in default. Some 
jurisdictions dictate a provision of automatic stay against creditors' claims, partly because 
the collateralised assets may be essential to keep the business running, which is perceived 
as desirable socially. In these countries, creditors may still have powers against the debtors 
by voting against such reorganization. 
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According to this index with a scale between zero and four, UK, Korea and Malaysia 
provide the strongest creditor protection while the US, the Philippines and China provide 
the weakest creditor protection. The complication in presenting level of creditor protection 
is demonstrated by the major difference in creditor rights index for US and UK. Although 
the UK regime provides the ultimate creditor protection to the secured creditors, such 
protection comes at the expense of the other classes of creditors, including trade creditors 
and other unsecured creditors. As argued by Franks (2000), in UK insolvencies the 
unsecured creditors usually recover very little of their loans. In contrast, the US regime is 
strongly biased toward maintaining the debtor as a going concern. Because any consensual 
reorganisation plan requires the approval25 of all classes of creditors and equity holders, 
junior creditors and equity holders often receive a share in the reorganised firm, and in 
many cases to the extent where APR is violated. Further elaboration of these variables for 
each country is given in Table 3.1 as features (2), (3) and (4). 
Another interesting pattern appears in the efficiency of the liquidation and restructuring 
processes. The US code provides a collective procedure which brings with it a lengthy 
bargaining process and so it is comparatively inefficient. The fact it is a collective process 
is reflected in its low creditor protection index shown in Table 3.2. On the contrary, the 
UK system is based on "freedom of contracts" (Franks 2000) and as a result secured 
creditors are provided with ultimate protection (creditor protection index = 4). In this 
system the restructuring process is efficient and straightforward. A comparisön'of the eight 
countries in this regard is shown in Table 3.1 as features (5) and (6). 
C. Solvency requirements a 
Solvency requirements represent the threshold above which a firm can enter bankruptcy. In 
the US, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines firms need not be insolvent to enter 
bankruptcy. In Indonesia and Malaysia firms may enter the bankruptcy process if they are 
expected to be unable to pay debts due. This allows firms to initiate their restructuring 
processes as early as possible and so have a better chance to recover. However in the US 
25 In the case of cram-down, consensus is not required as the court can overrule creditors' objections to a 
restructuring plan, although this discretion is not often exercised by the court. 
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and the Philippines, because management may retain control during the restructuring 
process, this situation may be used by management for strategic reasons. 
In the UK, the creditor can appoint the receiver when there is a default on the covenants or 
on the payments due. In practice creditors may not wish to precipitate a firm moving into 
insolvency. For example, Eurotunnel is a classic case where creditors preferred not to take 
control of the company. In administration, the order can only be granted by the court if the 
company is unable or will be unable to pay its debts. The creditors and the company (by its 
director) may apply for the appointment of an administrator. However the company may 
not wish to do so unless it really is insolvent, because in administration management must 
step down immediately. 
- 
In China and Korea, firms may enter bankruptcy when there is a default and voluntary 
bankruptcy is possible (i. e. company files for bankruptcy petition). However in Thailand, 
entering the bankruptcy process proves to be extremely difficult and companies are. not 
allowed to enter bankruptcy voluntarily. If creditors wish to file a bankruptcy petition 
against the firm, the court requires an "asset/liability" test and valuable time could be 
wasted. A comparison on this feature is provided as feature (7) in Table 3.1. 
D. Management of liabilities 
Management of liabilities-is an important issue in restructuring and feature (8) in Table 3.1 
summarises the different practices from the eight countries. In the UK receivership 
process, the receiver only represents the interests of one of the secured creditors, he 
therefore has very little discretion in renegotiating the debtor's liabilities. For example, if 
the receiver wishes to raise further debts he could not do so without the agreement of other 
creditors. In comparison, the court-appointed administrator has discretion in managing 
liabilities, but the approval of the court is still required. Discretion for management of 
liabilities in the restructuring process is allowed in the US and all Asian countries. 
However in the Philippines, the rehabilitation receiver is empowered to renegotiate or even 
relieve debts to the detriment of creditors' interest (ADB 1999). 
1 
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E. New financing (supra priority financing) 
New financing for the distressed firm's continued operations during bankruptcy may be 
required to maintain the firm as a going concern. The US Chapter 11 recognises such 
requirement explicitly by allowing the debtor-in-possession to raise senior new financing. 
Distressed firms under this condition stand a better chance of distress resolution, although 
Franks and Torous (1996) argue that such financing provides strong incentives for the 
debtor company to over-invest, since the equity-holders benefit in the event that the project 
pays off but do not contribute to the costs. 
On the contrary, the UK code does not provide for such supra priority financing. However, 
the absence of supra priority financing in the UK may be the reason for new equity infusion 
to be frequently used for distress resolution. 
- 
Franks and Sanzhar (2003) find that a large 
number of distressed UK companies use new equity infusion while this restructuring 
technique is rarely used in the US (Weston et al. 2001). Therefore it may be argued that the 
absence of supra priority financing provision and the automatic stay provision provides 
incentive for large UK companies to remain outside the legal process and to use market 
solutions 
to resolve distress. In addition, Carapeto (2004) finds that although post-petition 
loans are associated with more successful reorganisation, such positive impact is reduced 
when the loans are in very senior forms. As summarised in feature (9) of Table 3.1, only 
Korea and Thailand among the Asian countries sanction the possibility of new money but 
the new money does not enjoy a supra priority status over existing obligations. In China, in 
the absence of the supra priority financing, the underdeveloped capital markets restrict 
other potential solutions thus companies are not given opportunity to resolve distress. As a 
result the bankruptcy process does not promote efficient economic allocation of resources. 
-ý> F. Enforceability of the law 
So far, I have discussed the issue of creditor protection provided by the laws on paper, not 
in practice. As point out by La Porta et al. (1998), enforcement of laws is as crucial as their 
contents. La Porta et al. constructed an enforcement index based on: efficiency of judicial 
system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of cot: tract repudiation, and 
accounting rating on accounting standards. Using their methodology, Allen et al. (2005) 
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find China's measures on enforcement significantly below the average measures of the 49 
countries in La Porta et al. (1998). The measures for the eight countries in this comparison 
are presented in Table 3.3. As we can see that both of the only two available measures for 
China, on rule of law and corruption, are significantly below those of the US/UK. These 
two measures for China are also below the corresponding average scores for the eight 
countries. 
Table 3.3 Enforcement indes 
Enforcement Variables* 
Efficiency Risk of Accounting: Reh 
of Judicial Rule of Risk of Contract on Accounti 
US 10.00 10.00 8.63 9.98 9.00 71 
UK 10.00 8.57 9.10 9.71 9.63 78 
Indonesia 2.50 3.98 2.15 7.16 6.09 7a 
Korea 6.00 5.35 5.30 8.31 8.59 62 
Malaysia 9.00 6.78 7.38 7.95 7.43 76 
Philippines 4.75 2.73 2.92 5.22 4.80 65 
Thailand 3.25 6.25 5.18 7.42 7.57 64 
China n/a 5.00 2.00 n/a n/a 
Average" 6.50 6.24 5.81 7.96 7.59 69 
* The explanations of the enforcement variables and information regarding relevant international ratin 
agencies providing the measurements of these variables can be found in La Porta et al. 
g (1998, p1124- 
1125). 
** The average scores do not include China. 
Source: Allen et al. (2005) for China and La Porta et at. (1998) for the rest. 
The views of La Porta et al. (1998) are shared by Claessens and Klapper (2002), who 
analyse a panel of 35 countries to investigate how bankruptcy use relates to creditor rights 
and judicial efficiency. They find that the relative use of bankruptcy around the world is 
higher in countries with strong creditor rights, but the combination of stronger creditor 
rights with greater judicial efficiency leads to less use, suggesting some substitution 
between strong rights and greater judicial efficiency. They believe that insolvency systems 
with stronger rights combined with good judicial systems encourage less risky behaviour 
and more out-of-court settlements. They suggest that strong creditor rights are more 
necessary in countries with weak judicial systems to compensate for weaknesses in legal 
enforcement. In addition, Raj an and Zingales (1995) find that contractibility (the so called 
"freedom of contracts" by Franks 2000) is enhanced by legal systems that protect creditor 
rights and punish management and equity holders in the case of financial distress. 
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Creditor rights assured by the law and the enforceability of such rights can be directly 
compared by employing empirical studies measuring deviation from APR and creditor 
recovery rates. Franks and Torous (1989) argue that the institutional features of Chapter 
11, grant the debtor-in-possession valuable rights which in effect provide management with 
a valuable option. For example, under Chapter 11 management is allowed to obtain new 
senior financing and to exclusively propose a restructuring plan for the first 120 days. 
These rights can decrease the exercise price and extend the maturity of the firm's pre- 
bankruptcy liabilities, and as a result diminish the value of the pre-existing claims held by 
the creditors. 
Empirical studies on the US bankruptcy system reveal that deviation from APR 
consistently exists. Weiss (1990) studies 37 firms under Chapter 11 between 1980 and 
1986 and finds that absolute priority is only enforced 22% of the time. 78% of the 
reorganizations violate APR. Weiss also shows that APR is violated more frequently for 
relatively large firms. In his sample set, the implied recovery rates for secured creditors, 
unsecured creditors and equity-holders are: 97.1%, 63.6% and 34.5%, respectively. 
Eberhart et al. (1990) find 23 APR deviations for 30 cases examined. In their sample set, 
the mean violation was 7.5% of total awards to claimants, and the highest violation was 
35.71%. 
Deviation from APR is not present in receivership in the UK. Although there is no 
systematic empirical study on APR using UK data for the administration process, there is a 
general consensus among legal and finance scholars that such deviation is very small 
(Olsen 1996). 
As for China, World Bank (2000) shows that secured creditor recovery rate for SOE 
bankruptcies range between 3- 10%, versus over 95% in the US. The extremely low 
recovery rate in China reflects the bias in its liquidation process, against creditor rights for 
the political concern of maintaining social stability. 
Direct comparison for the other five Asian countries is not possible due to lack of empirical 
studies in this regard. 
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3.2.2 Discussion 
The objective of corporate bankruptcy should be the maximisation of the value of the assets 
of a firm and the process should represent all creditors' claims. In addition, sortie 
consideration should be given to improving the possibility of a workout. 
The comparisons highlight the fact that most Asian countries' corporate bankruptcy law 
regimes are conservative and tend to focus on liquidation, rather than restructuring. As 
Table 3.1 shows, out of the six Asian countries, only Korea and Thailand expressly provide 
for the possibility of `new money'. Although such financing may provide an immediate 
solution for much needed funding in distress, empirical evidence from the US and the LTX 
suggests that it discourages the use of the capital markets for restructuring. In the context 
of China, the underdeveloped external capital markets provide future potential for the much 
needed funding in restructuring. Therefore a supra priority financing provision in the code 
may not be desirable. 
There is a contrast between the comparisons injable 3.2 and 3.3. When we look at the 
6reditor Rights Index presented in Table 3.2, there is no clear difference between 
developed and emerging markets. However in Table 3.3, the Enforcement Index measures 
illuminate the weakness of enforcement in the legal system in the six Asian countries, 
including China. As suggested by ADB (2000), such lack of efficiency in the legal systems 
is due partly. to laclc, of funding and resources-This clear difference between laws on paper 
and in practice suggests that an alternative for distress resolution in China is to adopt a 
regime that encourages out-of-court renegotiation. Empirical experience from the five East 
Asian countries indicates that regirpes that encourage ex-ante information efficiency, or that 
provide access to preferential credits, limit the use of bankruptcy and encourage out-of- 
court renegotiations. Research on this topic in China could provide important policy 
implications. 
The US approach assumes that contracts are necessarily incomplete, with Chapter 11 
providing a bargaining process to mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual 
incompleteness. However, this has led to, as argued by a large number of empirical and 
theoretical studies, a bias towards debtors (debtor-friendly). On the other hand, the UK 
Page 77 
approach is based on the concept of "freedom of contracting", to an extent assumes contract 
completeness. Based on the comparison between US and UK, Frank and Torous (1996) 
believe that an efficient bankruptcy code should remain essentially creditor controlled. In 
addition, empirical evidence drawn from 35 countries suggests that strong creditor rights 
are necessary to compensate for weaknesses in legal enforcement (Claessens and Klapper 
2002). From Table 3.1, the bankruptcy codes of two of the most serious victim countries of 
the Asian crisis, Indonesia and Korea, are developing towards a creditor-friendly system 
(management do not stay and no automatic stay clause). 
Although both the UK and the US codes have deficiencies, they provide a framework for 
the current debate on what is the best practice. In light of this, the Chinese bankruptcy code 
requires much improvement. The current bankruptcy code was devised primarily to 
minimise the risk of social unrest. Consequently the decision to declare bankruptcy is a 
political decision and controlled centrally. The shroud around this central decision makes 
the proceedings unwieldy and impenetrable to other stakeholders. There is little or no 
motivation to seek out restructuring plans for the debtors or to service the needs of the 
creditors. The management teams often remain incumbent during the proceedings 
increasing the likelihood of moral hazard. With the State and the existing management 
retaining a major influence, the opportunity of benefiting from the inclusion of creditors 
and the impartiality of the courts is lost. Overall the effectiveness and transparency of the 
bankruptcy in practice would be increased with the reduction in administrative intervention, 
the reduction in incumbency, and the greater involvement of the creditors. This thesis uses 
data from China to empirically examine this issue, hypothesising the lack of creditor 
participation and testing its consequences in the restructuring processes. 
Finally, experience from China also suggests that the creditor- versus debtor-friendly 
framework should be extended to include a further dimension: the employees. The so- 
called "debtor-friendly" system that has evolved in China is caused by the intention of 
being "employee-friendly" at the expense of creditor interests. This is different from the 
Franks and Torous' "debtor = shareholder" bias demonstrated by the US process. In the 
China case, debtor friendly is not the consequence of mitigating inefficiency due to contract 
incompleteness, rather, it is due to political and social motivations. In addition, China's 
weak enforcement mechanism adds additional cause for its contract incompleteness. In this 
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three-dimensional model, while the US system has a bias to preserve unviable firms for the 
interests of the debtor/shareholders, and consequently for the interests of the employees, the 
Chinese system is biased purely towards employees to the detriment of the creditors. In 
both cases the interests of creditors are hindered but the damage in China is more severe. 
Therefore it would be inappropriate to directly adopt the either system from the existing 
US/UK framework. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter describes the Chinese bankruptcy regime and compares the major 
characteristics of its bankruptcy code with those of seven other countries. The Chinese 
bankruptcy code was initially enacted-to liquidate bankrupt SOEs and is featured with 
government intervention, lack of transparency, lack of creditor participation and protection, 
as well as the lack of timely restructuring mechanisms. Following China's recent 
privatisation and rapid economic development, the original code is no longer suitable and 
needs improvement. Furthermore, due to the government's political motivation and 
China's weak enforcement systems, the formal bankruptcy procedures are rarely used jr, 
practice. This view is shared by Allen et al. (2005). They believe that the ineffective 
bankruptcy implementation makes the threat and penalty for bad firm performance norl_ 
credible. 
Given the relatively early stage of development of the Chinese formal bankruptcy 
procedures and the discussed weaknesses of the formal system, plus its infrequent 
application, this thesis focuses on the informal processes in order to gain understanding of 
distress resolution in China. Chapters 5 and 6 are designed to empirically test- the 
consequence of the lack of timely re-organisation mechanisms, of bankruptcy threat, and of 
creditor protection and participation in distress resolution in China, as highlighted by this 
chapter. By examining the nature and source of distress prior to and during distress it, 
chapter 5, I shed light on' the important question on whether financial distress has 
consequence and whether financial distress leads to economic distress. By examining how 
distressed firms actually restructure and which restructuring processes add value, I provide 
insights on the effectiveness of the Chinese bankruptcy code and on the role of the 
government in this process. 
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CHAPTER 4- LITERATURE REVIEW: CORPORATE 
DISTRESS AND RESTRUCTURING 
Extensive studies have been conducted on corporate restructuring strategies, particularly in 
the context of financial distress. From a broad perspective, the drivers for these 
restructuring activities stem from three main forces (Weston at al. 2001, p346). The first 
force is for a better alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. The second 
force is to re-assign assets to a more effective use (change of ownership). The last force 
comes from financial distress resolution, which is the primary focus of this thesis. 
This chapter will review some important and influential literature on corporate restructuring 
with the aim to provide a platform for the empirical work carried out in the thesis. I will 
also use restructuring announcements made by the two distressed companies, studied in 
section 2.5, to illustrate the types of restructuring strategies employed in China and 
compare them to what's documented in the existing literature. The structure of this chapter 
follows the "Types of restructuring" part in Figure 3.1. Specific literature relevant for each 
empirical chapter will be reviewed in the chapter itself. In particular, chapter 5 focuses on 
the characteristics of distress and reviews important studies in the literature on the topic of 
nature of distress (economic vs financial) and its impact on operating and financial 
performances; chapter 6 reviews empirical papers investigating restructuring strategies 
recorded elsewhere that are also chosen by my sample companies, in order to compare and 
contrast the empirical findings. 
Before the literature on the commonly employed restructuring methods is reviewed, the 
term "financial distress" itself needs to be defined. 
4.1 DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
What is financial distress? Altman (1998, p3-6) defines four commonly used terms as: 
Failure 
- 
The realised rate of return on invested capital is significantly and 
continually lower than prevailing rates on similar investments. 
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Insolvency 
-A firm's total liabilities exceed a fair valuation of its total assets and the 
real net worth of the firm is negative (this should not be confused with 
negative net worth in an accounting sense). Technical insolvency exists 
when a firm cannot meet its current obligations, signifying a lack of 
liquidity. 
Default 
- 
Usually this refers to as technical default. Technical default takes place 
when a debtor violates a condition of an agreement with a creditor that can 
be grounds for legal action. For publicly held bonds in the US, when a 
firm misses an interest payment or principal repayment and the `problem' 
is not cured in 30 days, legally the security is then `in default'. 
Bankruptcy26 
- 
One type of bankruptcy is described above as insolvency and refers to the 
net worth position of a firm. A more observed type is a firm's fornIal 
declaration of bankruptcy in a court. 
Wruck (1990) defines financial distress on two bases: 
t 
Financial distress on a flow basis 
-A situation when cash flow is insufficient to cover 
current obligations (similar to Altman's "technical 
insolvency"). Interest cover provides a flow 
measure on an income (as oppose to cash flow) 
-basis-and*is ä popular proxy for an indication of 
financial distress in the corporate finance literature. 
This measure will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
5. 
Financial distress on a stock basis 
- 
Refers to the net worth position of a firm (similar to 
Altman's "insolvency"). 
26 It is also worth noting that in the UK, `insolvency' is used to describe the net worth position of a firm 
whereas `bankruptcy' is for that of the individuals. 
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Table 4.1 presents different types of measurements for distress employed in the current 
literature and shows that interest coverage has been frequently adopted to investigate the 
situation of financial distress. 
Table 4.1 Some measures of distress in the literature 
Measures Reference 
Interest coverage Asquith et al. (1994) 
Claessens et al (2003) 
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) 
Haugen and Senbet (1978) 
Hoshi et al. (1990) 
Kahl (2001) 
Rajan and Zingale (1995) 
Wruck (1990) 
Accounting loss (negative Zimmerman (1989) 
earnings) DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) 
John et al. (1992) 
Market return Clark and Ofek (1994) 
Franks and Sanzhar (2003) 
Gilson (1989,1990) 
Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) 
Ofek (1993) 
Others including debt Brian et al (1992) 
downgrading and Brown et al. (1993) 
restructuring such as Franks and Torous (1994) 
exchange offers, and Z- James (1996) 
(score Kahl (2001) 
Lasfer et al. (1996) 
Olsen 1996 
In the context of China, there have not been any studies known to the author in the financial 
distress literature. However some indications of the perceived definition of distress in the 
Chinese context can be drawn: (1) According to ADB (2000), the legal literature states that 
the reason for a formal restructuring in China is generally due to the debtor's inability to 
pay off the due debts, (2) In addition, according the Company Law (Article 157 and 158), 
listed companies which have been raking losses (negative net profit) for two consecutive 
years are categorised as "special treatment" (ST), whereas companies that have been 
making losses for three consecutive years are to be put into "Particular Treatment" (PT) 
status and are suspended from the Exchanges. In essence, firms suffering from a lack of 
profit are also perceived by the capital market regulator to be in financial distress. The 
ST/PT status has implications on the stock prices movements and will be discussed further 
in chapter 6. 
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In this thesis I will use the term "financial distress" to describe the situation of financial 
distress oa flow basis, which is measured by interest coverage ratio. This ratio is similar to 
the CSRC criteria for the ST/PT status. It has also been widely used in the financial 
distress literature (as shown in Table 4.1). 
4.2 TYPES OF RESTRUCTURING 
There are many ways to categorise restructuring. Weston et al. (2001, pp345) separate 
restructuring into four categories: 
(a) Reorganisation of assets including acquisitions, sell-offs or divestitures 
(b) Creating new ownership by spin-offs, split-ups and equity carve-outs 
(c) Reorganising financial claims by exchange offers, dual-class recapitalisations 
leveraged recapitalisations, financial reorganisation (bankruptcy) or liquidation 
(d) Other strategies including joint ventures,. going-private transactions, using 
international markets and share repurchase programs. 
Gilson (1998) focuses on firms using restructuring as a response to severe financial stress 
and categorises restructuring into three main types (excluding restructuring under Chapter 
11): 
- 
V Debt contracts restructuring 
V Equity contracts restructuring such as spin-offs, targeted stock offerings 
V Employee contracts restructuring 
As suggested by Jensen and Melding (1976), a firm can be viewed as a collection Of 
contracting relationships among individuals (nexus of contracts). These contracts represent 
claims on the cash flows generated by the firm's assets and operations. Economically 
restructuring affects the level and timing of the firm's cash flows and how these cash flows 
are divided up among the firm's claimholders. The list of claimholders includes 
shareholders, debt creditors, managers, employees, and suppliers. In essence, therefore 
restructuring is the process by which the firm changes the terms of its contracts with one or 
more of its claimholders. Based on this argument, it is more convenient to separate 
restructuring into financial and non-financial restructuring (as shown in Figure 3.1): 
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V Financial restructuring where the firm renegotiates the existing contract with its 
creditors and shareholders (debt and equity restructuring). 
V Non-financial restructuring where the firm renegotiates its existing contracts with 
all other stakeholders including managers, employees and suppliers. 
Many of the restructuring mechanisms employed by distressed firms in China fall under 
these two headings, as listed in section 3.1.2. Whereas section 3.1.2 lists restructuring 
categories in China described by the ADB study, in this section, I describe the main 
categories of restructuring methods documented on the official disclosure websites by listed 
companies. I also illustrate the nature of these restructuring strategies using 
announcements made by the two distressed case study companies described in section 2.5. 
4.2.1 Main types of restructuring methods in China 
As discussed briefly in section 2.3.2, listed companies disclose restructuring related 
announcements in accordance with the CSRC requirements (Appendix 3). Below lists the 
main 
restructuring types that are found on the official disclosure websites: 
V M&A. It takes place when there is a change of the controlling shareholder27. In the 
literature this sometimes is classified under asset restructuring (Weston et al. 2001). 
Two points are important for the understanding of the Chinese M&A process. Firstly, 
as discussed in section 2.3.2, shares are classified into tradable and non-tradable shares 
both bearing the same rights for voting and cash flow, with the non-tradable shares not 
floated in the market but still transferable with the approval of CSRC. An acquisition 
usually involves the transfer of non-tradable shares, at a price agreed upon by both 
parties. Such transfer can also be arranged without any payment28 from the existing 
27 In the case of China, the controlling shareholder, being the single largest shareholder, does not necessarily 
own over 50% equity. According to Clark (2003), probably the most common complaint about the current 
Company Law is that it gives too much power to controlling shareholders who do not necessarily own over 
50% of the company's shares. 
28 Note that `without payment" should not be confused with "payment terms". Here the contrast between 
M&A with payment and without payment is entirely different to the usual one found in the M&A literature 
comparing M& with different payment terms such as cash versus share exchange. 
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SOE holding company to the new holding SOE company. These two types of M&A 
present an opportunity for us to study the role of the government in the restructuring 
.. 
process. 
Secondly, because of the strict listing requirements, the listed company's access to the 
capital equity market acts as an attraction to potential buyers, which are in most cases 
non-listed firms (as will be shown in chapter 6). Therefore when a listed company is in 
distress, acquisition provides an attractive solution for both the buyer and the seller. 
V" Asset sales, swap or purchase. Asset includes tangible fixed asset, intangible asset and 
minority equity shareholding in another company (usually non-tradable). To 
restructure by selling, transferring or purchasing equity shareholding in another 
company is rarely observed in other countries in the literature. Asset swap is when the 
distressed company swaps its assets (fixed asset or equity shareholding), for assets from 
another company which is often either the distressed company's major or controlling 
shareholder(s) or another company owned by the same controlling shareholder as the 
distressed company. The difference between the agreed value of the assets being 
swapped is settled, often with cash (or is recorded as accounts payable/receivables 
between the two companies). 
V Debt restructuring including swaps, interest forgiveness/deduction/extension, debt 
.... __--obligation transfer and taking on new 
debt: 
------"- -- 
V Managerial restructuring, i. e. there is a change of senior management such as board 
chairman, directors, CEO, managing director and general managers. 
V Operational restructuring is when the distressed company changes business it is in, 
rents out main operational assets, discontinues or suspends its main operations. This 
type of restructuring does not have immediate cash generating implications. 
Distressed Chinese companies selling and transferring their minority shareholding of 
another company is documented in ADB (2000). Although this strategy does not seem to 
ý4. b 
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be widely adopted by distressed firms elsewhere when they restructure, it is observed in the 
Netherlands (Frederikslust et al. 2003). 
Restructure by reducing capital expenditure, enterprise down-sizing, are not required by the 
Chinese stock exchanges as activities that must be announced by listed companies29. 
I discussed the operating performance of Jintai in section 2.5.1 and categorised the 
company as distressed starting Year 2002. As shown in Appendix 4, the company made a 
total of 36 announcements in compliance with the Stock Exchange requirements on 
information release of public listed companies, between 2001 and 2003. Among the 36 
announcements, four relate to M&A announcement and updates; two relate to asset sales 
and operational restructuring; three to managerial restructuring; and four to new bank loan 
or bank loan renewal. Also, there are six multiple announcements relating to changes of 
senior management, M&A completion, share suspension from the stock exchange and `ST' 
status, loan renewal and court order of due payments. In addition, there are 17 
announcements relate to the release of company annual/quarter reports and to shareholders' 
meeting. 
An interesting point to note is that most of the company's announcements on asset sales are 
accompanied by some form of operational restructuring and new investment. On 20/12/01, 
the company announced the selling of one of its production lines and at the same time the 
setup of a joint venture with the-buyer; again on 24/05/02; the company announced its 
intention to use the fixed assets of its subsidiary to setup a joint venture with one of its 
business partner companies; with the same company. These transactions were carried out 
against the backdrop of deteriorating financial and operating performance such as falling 
sales, increased bank debts and falling interest cover, as discussed in detail in section 2.5.1. 
It seems that despite several liquidity constraints and a mounting debt level, the 
management was still able to experiment with new operating strategies. This provides 
evidence for the lack of a bankruptcy threat to the firm. 
Similarly, as we can see in Appendix 5, Sichuan Joint-WIT made 22 announcements 
between 2000 and 2003. As shown in section 2.5.2, the company went into distress in Year 
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2001 with an interest cover of 
-5.6 times. Among the 22 announcements, four relate to 
M&A without payments; two relate to M&A with payment; four to asset sales and 
operations restructuring; one to debt restructuring (debt transfer), one to managerial 
restructuring, and 10 to the announcements of company quarterly performance reports; of 
"ST"; suspension and re-listing of the share; and the local municipal government's 
involvement in employee settlement and redundancy. In 2003 the company started to go 
through a complex strategic asset restructuring process. It attempted to exit the textile 
industry, by selling its core textile related assets, at the same time acquiring a 
pharmaceutical company. 
In both cases, asset restructuring including M&A (with and without payment) and asset 
sales, debt and managerial restructuring strategies are employed by both firms. Equity 
restructuring is not employed. Because the two Chinese stock exchanges impose strict 
rules on firms wishing to issue further equity, it is very difficult for non-profitable firms to 
issue additional equity. 
Both firms frequently sell assets under distress. The motivation for selling assets does not 
seem to be associated with enabling the two firms to meet overdue debt obligations. 
Instead, it is associated with the two firms' several liquidity constraints and with providing 
liquidity 
_ 
for working capital requirements and, in the Jintai (non-SOE) case, for 
management to experiment with new operational strategies. In the Sichuan Joint-WIT 
(SOE) case, managerial restructuring is observed only once, despite the company's 
continued performance deterioration, while this type of events is more frequently observed 
in the Jintai case. 
Many observed restructuring strategies in the two cases discussed above do not have 
immediate cash, generating implications which are different to what's observed in 
developed economies (Asquith et al. 1994; Lai and Sudarsanam 1997). This finding 
suggests that inefficient going concerns exist and that Chinese firms do not face the threat 
of bankruptcy. Further evidence to support the lack of bankruptcy threat argument comes 
from that fact that during the first year of distress in the first case, management still had the 
time to experiment with new operating strategies. 
29 As a result these strategies have not been included among the restructuring events studied in chapter 6. 
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S 
M&A and asset sales are perhaps a market mechanism to ensure resource mobility essential 
to the effective operation of an enterprise economy. In the light of the difficulties in 
formally liquidating economically unviable firms in the Chinese context, these observed 
mergers and asset sales are perhaps a beneficial outcome in terms of improved use of 
resources (Kahl 2001, Weston et al. 2001). 
The next two sections review our current understanding of these forms of restructuring 
based on prior research. 
4.3 FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING 
4.3.1 Debt restructuring 
Debt restructuring can go in either direction 
- 
increase or decrease firm leverage. 
Increasing firm leverage by taking on debt not only provides the firm with tax shield, but 
also put pressures on the firm for efficiency to meet debt obligations 
- 
i. e. debts provide 
1S9sitive disciplinary role (Jensen 1986, Wruck 1990). 
Exchange offer is a popular measure of debt restructuring and is studied extensively in the 
literature. It provides one or more classes of securities the right (not the obligation) to 
exchange part or all of their holdings for, different class of securities of the firm. Such 
exchange could result in either increased or decreased leverages30. Table 4.2 summarises a 
number of event studies on exchange offers. 
i 
30 Weston et al. (2004, pp338-339)) believe that further potential explanations for the negative or positive 
results include a). Implied increases or decreases in future cash flows; b). Implied undervaluation or 
overvaluation of common stocks; c). Increases or decreases in management share ownership; d). Increases 
or decreases in control of management use of cash; and e). Positive or negative signaling effects. 
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Table 4.2 Exchane offer and market reaction 
Exchange offer with positive returns (increasing leverage) 
Debt for common stock (Masulis 1983) +14.0% 
Preferred for common stock (Masulis 1983, Pinegar and Lease 1986) +8.2% 
Debt for preferred stock (Masulis 1983) +2.2% 
Income bonds for preferred stock (McConnell and Schlarbaum, 198 1) +2.2% 
Exchange offer with negative returns (decreasing leverage) 
Common stock for debt (Masulis 1983) 
-9.9% 
Private swaps of common for debt (Finnerty 1985, Peavy and Scott 1985) 
-0.9% 
Preferred stock for debt (Masulis 1983) 
-7.70/,, 
- Common for preferred stock (Masulis 1983, Pinegar and Lease 1986) 
-2.6% 
Source: Weston et al. (2001) 
Many studies try to explain the observed pattern. In particular, when empirical evidence all 
seems to suggest that the market reacts unfavourably to exchange offers that decrease firm 
leverage, why do firms carry out such restructuring measures? One logical motivation is to 
deal with financial distress when a debt-for-equity swap may be the best available 
alternative at the time to resolve distress. 'Another explanation is the *effect of a hybrid 
announcement. When leverage decreases, the soft claims from the equity holders naturally 
go up, but the disciplinary role of debt may be diminishing. Fearing that the management 
may have too much free cash flow aväilable, `the market may react negatively to the 
announcement. Lie et al. (2001) study a sample of 126 firms that announced debt-reducing 
exchange offers. They seek to answer two questions: why firms perform debt-reducing 
exchange offers and what information is conveyed by this type of events. They believe the 
good news is that firms perform debt-reducing exchange offers to stave off further financial 
-- - -- -- -distress; but the announcements convey negative news on these firms' financial weaknesses 
to the market. 
In addition to equity for debt swaps, other common debt restructuring techniques in 
financial distress include cash for ' debt swaps, tender offers, covenant modification, 
maturity extension or interest rate adjustments, and debt composition (Gilson et al. 1990, 
Asquith et al. 1994, Jarrow et al. 2001). All these procedures are designed to decrease 
pressure on the firm due to leverage and are based on the idea that if the distressed firm is 
given some breathing room to improve operations, the creditors will ultimately receive 
more than they would otherwise. ' This is the fundamental difference between debt 
restructuring under financial distress and under other conditions. 
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In the case of China, due to the high level of non-performing loans, the continued 
government ownership post privatisation and the existence of soft budget constraints, debt 
restructuring may result in patterns that differ from those found in prior research. Neither 
of the two case companies employs debt for equity swaps, but both have negotiated and 
borrowed additional loans from their banks during distress. I will be investigating this 
issue further in chapter 6. 
4.3.2. Equity restructuring 
In addition to restructuring debt contracts cited by the above studies, restructuring equity 
contracts is also used in creating firm value and resolving financial distress. Equity 
restructuring techniques include spin-offs, equity carve-outs, tracking stock, and split-ups. 
These restructuring types focus on restructuring organisation and ownership relationships, 
and represent a process during which diversified companies become less diversified by 
moving toward more focused activities, and in this sense, have something in common with 
asset restructuring. 
1 brief description of each type is given below (based on Weston et al. 2004, p289-290): 
Spin-off. In a spin-off, a company owns or creates a subsidiary which becomes 
publicly listed on its own and whose shares are distributed on a pro 
rata basis to the shareholders of the parent company: The total shares 
retained by the parent company are usually below 20%. 
Equity carve-out: An equity carve-out is the IPO of full or partial of the common stock 
of a wholly owned subsidiary so it is also called a split-off IPO. An 
equity carve-out is similar to a voluntary spin-off because in both 
cases a subsidiary of the parent company is traded separately from the 
equity claims of the parent company (often followed by spin-offs). 
Tracking stock: Tracking stocks are separate classes of the common stock of the 
parent company. They are traded separately with financial results 
reported separately from the parent. Yet still under the control of the 
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board of the parent company, tracking stocks do not represent an 
ownership interest. 
Split-up: 
.A company restructures to create two or more separate entities. 
Several event studies find that there is a positive abnormal return to the parent on the spin- 
off announcement date and that the size of this abnormal return is positively correlated to 
the size of the spin-off (e. g. Copeland et al. 1987, Mulherin and Boone 2000). 
Empirical evidence on split-ups suggests they significantly increase, on average, the market 
value of firms' assets (Schipper and Smith (1983), Berger and Ofek (1995)). Collis and 
Montgomery (1998) find that spin-offs reduce agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. Merton (1987) shows that a firm's market value will increase when investors 
are more "familiar" with the company, and a split-up increases investor familiarity by. 
creating new traded equity claims in the firm's business segments. Equity carve-outs on 
average are associated with positive abnormal returns (Schipper and Smith 1986, Mulherin 
and Boone 2000, Vijh 2002). The stock performances of tracking stocks have been uneven 
and the main determinant is the economic characteristics of the businesses in which the 
tracking stock subsidiaries have been established. Weston et al. (2004) believe that with 
few exceptions, the combined parent-tracking stock performance has been superior to the 
performance of their peer groups. 
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All in all, empirical evidence shows that the market reacts favourably to all the equity 
restructuring measures discussed above. As also discussed in the preceding section, 
distressed equity issues are prevalent in the UK but absent in the US and the determinants 
may be the supra priority financing. In China, the developing nature of the stock 
exchanges, the difficulty in floating new firms and in issuing further equity for the already 
listed ones as discussed in section 2.3.2, may mean that equity restructuring processes that 
involve access to the stock market (such as spin-offs and equity carve outs) may be 
infrequent in China 
- 
this will be examined in chapters 6. 
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4.4 NON-FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING 
Following the route indicated in Figure 3.1,1 now turn my attention to non-financial 
restructuring. Conventional methods in this category cover the restructuring of assets, 
operations and management/employee contracts. 
4.4.1 Asset restructuring 
In this section I will firstly review the asset restructuring literature in general and then 
move on to a more specific review of the issues as they affect firms in distress. 
Asset restructuring includes mergers & acquisitions (M&A) and divestitures (divestitures 
are also called sell-offs or asset sales, this thesis will use these terms interchangeably). 
Both mergers and divestitures represent efforts by companies to adjust to the changing 
economic and political environments but in very different ways. M&A occurs when one 
company is acquired by or merges with another company and divestiture is when one 
company sells a portion of its investments tQ other companies. Examples of their 
applications include 1). Merger: one firm seeks to make use of the strengths in its existing 
product market areas to combine with new capabilities in a new environment 
- 
for example 
entering a foreign market, thus acquisition enables the company to set a foothold in the new 
market by having market access and a customer base. 2). Divestiture: when a company does 
not have the capability to effectively exploit the possible opportunities, divestitures enable 
the company to sell a portion of their business to other firms that can exploit the 
opportunities more effectively (Loh and Rathinasamy 1997). 
i 
Much M&A activity involves moving from industries with unfavourable outlook to 
industries with more favourable opportunities, and divestiture offen goes hand in hand with 
M&A. For example, in many cases, divestiture is used to dismantle conglomerates, 
discarding unwanted business from prior acquisitions, warding off takeovers, and to finance 
major acquisitions (Weston et al. 2001, p349-350). Other main motives include: 
V Abandoning the core business; 
V Selling into a better fit; and 
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"'" Harvest past successes. 
Empirical studies on M&A appear to support the notion that value is created by MBA 
activities. Tor successful M&As, the gains to acquiring firms around the announcement 
date are usually close to zero. The gains to target firms are more substantial, around 20- 
25%. If the takeover is unsuccessful, cumulative abnormal returns for both bidder and 
target firms are generally negative but not economically significant, which may indicate 
that the market slightly penalises the firms for the forgone value-creating opportunity 
(Weston et al. 2001, p221). 
In the divestiture category, assets include tangible fixed assets, intangible assets and equity 
shareholding in another company (usually non-tradable). Studies on divestitures find 
significant positive abnormal two-day announcement period returns of between 1-2% for 
selling firm shareholders, whereas the announcement effects on returns to buyers did not 
appear to be statistically significant (Alexander et al. 1984, Lang et al. 1995). Klein (1986) 
studies the financial effects of divestiture in greater depth. He analyses the announcement 
date effects according to whether the selling firms initially announced the price of the sell- 
off or whether no price was initially announced. When no price was announced, there was 
no statistically significant effect on share price for the seller. When price was announced, 
the size of the effect depended on the percentage of the firm being sold, measured by the 
announced price of the sell-off divided by the market value of the equity on the last day of 
the month prior to the announcement period: Klein's findings are-summarised in Table 4.3: 
Table 4.3 The price effects of asset sales on seller firm 
Sell-off percentage Abnormal return 
<10% No effect 
10-50% 2.53% 
>50% 8.09% 
Further more, Lang et al. (1995) study a sample of 93 significant asset sales during the 
period 1984 to 1989. By separating these 93 firms into a payout sample and a reinvest 
sample, the event study analysis show that the payout sample had positive abnormal returns 
of 2% from day 
-1 to day zero, whereas the reinvest sample had negative event returns of 
0.5% over the same window. Therefore they conclude that the positive price effect comes 
only for firms that planned to pay out the proceeds. As for the reinvest firms, the market is 
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concerned with the agency costs of managerial discretion in the use of the funds. Weston et 
al. (2001) argue, that overall, empirical evidence (mainly from the US) suggests that 
divestitures perform vital economic functions by moving resources from less valued uses to 
higher valued uses and therefore contribute to the resource mobility essential to the 
effective operation of an enterprise economy. 
In sum, a large number of studies have been conducted on asset restructuring including 
M&A and divestitures. Having reviewed these activities in general, I now focus on the 
literature on asset restructuring under financial distress. 
Empirical studies suggest that while divestiture is fairly commonly utilised by financially 
distressed firms, there are barriers to its use. For example, Asquith et al. (1994) document 
that of the bankrupt firms in their sample only 14% used divestitures for restructuring. 
They also believe divestitures often lead to successful resolution of distress. However, they 
argue that there are three potential barriers to use asset sales in distress resolution: 1). 
Managers and equity holders may have very little incentive to sell assets. When a firm is in 
serious financial distress, no matter whether the liquidation value31 of the firm is greater or 
less than the firm's liabilities, the option value of the firm may be an important component 
of equity's value. Selling the assets means the equity is giving up the option value of these 
assets. 2). Consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992), industry factors may limit the ability 
of companies to sell assets at a reasonable price and often managers are unwilling to sell 
assets under their intrinsic value. 3). Debt covenants may put severe restrictions on the 
ability of firms to sell assets as well as on the use of the proceeds. Therefore although 
divestiture may be able to provide the liquidity needed by a financially distressed firm, its 
use is restricted. Different to the findings of Asquith et al. (1994), Lai and Sudarsanam 
(1997) find more frequent use of asset sales as a turnaround strategy in their sample data. 
They document that 27% of their distressed sample firms pursue asset sales during the year 
of performance decline, and 38% during the two post-decline years. 
In many respects, merger is analogous to an asset sale of 100% of the company. However 
there are some differences. Firstly, the incentives of managers to merge may be very 
31 Either as piecemeal liquidation, or the firm being sold as a going-concern. 
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different from their incentives to sell-off a significant fraction of their assets. In some cases 
major sell-offs may be designed for managers to keep their jobs. Secondly, an asset sale 
permits equity holders to maintain some of their option value, but the option disappears 
with a merger. Therefore equity-holders' incentive to maintain their option value acts as a 
deterrent to mergers. Despite what the theory states, Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) find 
M&A is a frequently employed strategy, nearly 50% of their sample firms carried out 
M&A during the year of performance decline. 
To measure the effectiveness of merger in financial distress resolution, Clark and Ofek 
(1994) study 38 takeovers of distressed firms between 1981 and 1988. They find that such 
combinations were more likely to involve firms in the same industry and less likely to be 
hostile takeovers than general patterns. Within the 38 sample firms, Clark and Ofek 
classify 20 as failures, nine as marginally successful, and nine as clearly successful. The 
postmerger performance of the combined and the target firms was evaluated based on cash 
flow, EBITDA, beta excess return industry adjusted and qualitative measures. 
In addition, Clark and Ofek also investigate the relationship between the announcement 
period 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and each of their five performance variables. 
The bidder CAR was positively related to each of the five performance measures. 
Furthermore, they find also that bidder overpays for the distressed target. Much of the 
post-merger performance results appear to be dominated by industry factors. Takeovers of 
. 
target firms that are small in comparison to the bidder yield positive returns to the bidder. 
Clark and Ofek (1994) conclude that in the majority of cases takeovers do not successfully 
restructure a distressed target. They observe, however, that the effort to do so may appear 
to be the best alternative available ttt the time. 
In the context of China, merger has been used extensively to resolve distress (World Bank 
2000) and thus provides an opportunity to test the conclusions from Clark and Ofek (1994) 
in a different political and economic context. This issue will be explored further in Chapter 
6. 
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4.4.2 Other non-financial restructuring measures 
Other main non-financial restructuring measures employed in dealing with financial 
distress include capital expenditure reduction, enterprise downsizing, managerial 
restructuring such as forced senior management departures, and discontinuation of 
operations (Asquith et al. 1994, Lai and Sudarsanam 1997). These measures are also 
employed by the two Chinese companies (Appendix 4& 5). Asquith et al. (1994) find that 
capital expenditures are one of the few discretionary uses of cash for a financially 
distressed firm. They find capital expenditures drop dramatically when a firm finds itself in 
financial distress, and most of the impact appears in the year following the initial interest 
coverage shortfall. They argue that the credible explanation is that financially distressed 
firms are poorly managed so it may be desirable and more efficient to reduce capital 
expenditures. Gilson (1990) believes that labour costs represent the largest single expense 
category for most companies and that senior managers of underperforming companies may 
come under considerable pressure to reduce firms' labour costs. However he argues that 
reduction in labour cost is not the solution for financial distress because of the negative 
effect associated with it such as workplace morale. 
f 
4.5 INFORMAL VERSUS FORMAL RESTRUCTURING 
Jensen (1989) argues that highly leveraged companies that are in financial distress should 
have an easier time restructuring out of court. Because of their high leverage they get into 
trouble before much value is dissipated. Thus creditors realise that there is a lot to lose by 
not restructuring efficiently and have strong incentives to do so. 
0 
However, empirical studies based on US firms with large amount of public debt find that 
there are three potential impediments to the privatisation of financial distress resolution: (1) 
free rider problem, (2) asymmetric information, (3) inter- and intra-group conflicts of 
interest (Weston et al. 2001). For example, Gilson et al. (1990) suggest that firms are more 
likely to resolve financial distress through private workouts when the firm has fewer 
distinct classes of debt outstanding because larger numbers of distinct creditor classes, with 
larger claimants in each, worsen the problem of asymmetric information and increase 
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conflicts of interest, and therefore impeding the efficient renegotiation of an informal 
restructuring plan. 
Asquith et al. (1994) provide additional insights and argue that firms filing for Chapter 11 
are less likely to have completed an exchange offer. Dispersed debt structure creates 
barriers for the success of an exchange offer because of problems associated with 
coordination and free-ridership. 
In addition, Jensen (1989) suggests that one would expect operationally healthy companies 
(measured by operating income and cash flow) that get into trouble just because of high 
leverage to be able to restructure (almost) costlessly out of court. However Asquith et al. 
(1994) argue that no evidence suggests that firms with better operating performance deal 
more successfully with financial distress. They find that in their sample set, operating 
performance does not seem to affect whether or not a company files for bankruptcy. This 
issue also warrants further study. Although I cannot contribute directly to this debate, my 
study hopefully throws light on the pros and cons of a system where formal procedures are, 
in practice, not available. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I define distress and categorise restructuring strategies documented in prior 
research. into financial and non-financial restructuring. Firstly, financial restructuring 
includes debt and equity restructuring. Extensive studies using event study methodology to 
investigate the valuation effect of financial restructuring methods suggest that the valuation 
effect of debt related restructuring is not clear cut due to the effect of debt governance; on 
the other hand equity restructuring almost always results in positive market reactions. 
Secondly, in the non financial restructuring category, discussions on the use and 
. 
effectiveness of asset restructuring (M&A and asset sales) are inconclusive. Restructuring 
announcements made by two distressed Chinese companies described in section 2.5 are 
used to illustrate restructuring methods employed in the Chinese context. Among the 
documented restructuring methods documented in the literature, M&A, asset sales, debt 
and managerial restructuring are employed by both firms. In particular, both firms 
frequently sell assets under distress. On the other hand, equity restructuring is not 
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employed. Because the two Chinese stock exchanges impose strict rules on firms wishing 
to issue further equity, it is very difficult for non-profitable firms to issue additional equity. 
In summary, a large number of theoretical studies have been conducted on corporate 
restructuring and its implications for shareholder wealth. In the context of known 
differences in China such as its recent liberalisation and privatisation, its mounting NPLs 
and lack of formal in-court procedures in practice, its political objectives and government 
partial ownership of PLCs, important questions arise: What is the nature and cause of 
distress? In light what is documented in the literature, what are the frequently employed 
restructuring strategies by the distressed firms in China, given its high level of NPLs, the 
existence of soft budget constraints and the developing nature of its stock exchanges? Do 
debt and equity restructuring assume different patterns to what is documented in prior 
research? How effective are they? How does government ownership impact distress 
resolution? Chapter 5 and 6 address these questions. 
f 
a 
l 
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CHAPTER 5- THE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
CORPORATE DISTRESS IN CHINA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the nature, source and characteristics of corporate distress in 
China. This study sheds light on the understanding of early signs of distress in a recently, 
liberalised economy, and provides implications for the design of an efficient restructuring 
mechanism. The characteristics of distress in China are compared to what is documented in 
the literature, and then within China differences between SOEs and non-SOEs are explored. 
Prior to privatisation, many then SOEs in emerging markets were highly leveraged. 
Claessens et al. (1999) record that most East Asian countries had private claims exceeding 
GDPs and suggest that one cause of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 was corporate 
debt overhang and financial distress. However, the high level of leverage of these former 
SOEs was significantly reduced following privatisation, especially in those privatised 
through share issue privatisation (SIP) (D 'Souza and Megginson 1999, D'Souza et al. 2001, 
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 1999, Barberis et al. 1996). In the new competitive post- 
privatisation environments, inefficient or non-viable firms fail. Important questions arise 
that need addressing. Firstly, what are the characteristics of distressed firms in China? Do 
they exhibit distress across a wide range of financial indicators? Do they exhibit the same 
weak performance in the year prior to distress and following the onset of distress? 
Secondly, is it weak financial structure or poor operating performance that is the main 
contributor to distress? Prior evidence in the inefficiency of Chinese firms and of 
significant continued state ownership interest in firms, even post-privatisation, pointing to 
the likelihood that operating factor will predominate. However, the large amounts ofNPLs 
suggest that firms may be allowed to continue with excessive debt in their funding 
structures without being pressured to restructure their finances on a timely basis. Thirdly, 
the impact of liquidity constraints on distressed firms' investment behaviour is examined. 
Fourthly, by comparing distressed firms' investment behaviour between SOEs and non- 
SOEs, some light is thrown on the continued presence of soft budget constraints post- 
privatisation. 
Page 99 
Finally, those variables providing the strongest prior year indicator of forthcoming distress 
are examined on a multivariate basis. Special attention is paid to variables which maybe of 
particular significance in the Chinese context such as degree of state ownership, proportion 
of tradable shares and geographic location. 
There are a number of key findings. In relation to findings for China compared to what is 
documented in the literature, firstly, at one year prior to the onset of distress, the distressed 
firms are significantly more leveraged than their industry and face severe liquidity 
constraints. Their prior-to-distress liquidity constraint is evident by their median capital 
expenditure (scaled by assets) being only one third of that of their industry. The distressed 
firms also have difficulty paying their suppliers. 
Secondly, the main characteristic of the sample of distressed firms is their poor operating 
performance. Overall, economic distress is responsible for 94% of distressed firms' cash 
flow shortfall and with only 6% caused by the leverage effect. The results confirm those of 
Asquith et al. (1994) for the US, although the economic nature of distress in the Chinese 
context is more dominant than in the US context. Different to my finding and that of 
Asquith et al. (1994), Andrade and Kaplan (1998) study 33 Highly Leveraged Transactions 
(HLT) in the US and they find that financial factor was the primary source of distress. 
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) argue that Asquith et al. (1994) capture firms in both financial 
and economic distress. The different results here reflect the difficulty in empirically 
distinguishing financial and economic distress. 
In addition, I find that for a significant minority of firms, the leverage factor plays a greater 
role in causing cash flow shortfall prior to the onset of distress than it does during distress, 
and this finding suggests that, for these firms, financial distress leads to economic distress. 
This suggests the absence of an efficient financial renegotiation process for companies in 
distress in China and this factor should be taken into account in the design of bankruptcy 
provisions. Furthermore, financial leading to economic distress could potentially explain 
the difference in my findings, to that of Asquith et al. (1994)'and Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998). It is possible that the interest coverage ratio, as a measure of distress in the Chinese 
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context, captures firms at a later stage in their distress, when the symptom of economic 
distress due to earlier financial distress becomes more prominent. 
Thirdly, consistent with Asquith et al. (1994), distressed firms reduce capital expenditure 
dramatically and a credible explanation is liquidity constraints. However, one caution on 
modelling capital expenditure is that although reduction in capital expenditure is employed 
to proxy for firms' lack of liquidity due to distress, firms could also be in distress due to 
lack of investment on capital expenditure prior to the onset of distress. The endogeneity ()f 
this proxy is a limitation of this study. 
A multivariate logit model confirms my results that distressed firms' significant reduction 
of capital expenditure (CAPEX) prior to distress is a precursor of the subsequent distress. 
The multivariate logit regression analysis also confirms that sales, earnings before interest 
tax depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) and total liability scaled by assets also have 
significant influence on the probability of distress. In addition, changes in EBITDA/assets 
and CAPEX/assets have much greater influence than those in total liability/assets on the 
probability of distress, confirming my source ofdistress results that the main contributor to 
firm distress is economic. 
In relation to my findings on SOE versus non-SOE, I separate the 100 distressed firms into 
SOE and non-SOE subgroups and compare their investment behaviour prior to and during 
distress. I find that the non-SOE subgroup experiences a significantly greater reduction in 
capital expenditure and assets, both statistically and economically. One explanation is that 
non-SOEs face hard budget constraints and have no other alternatives than cutting 
investment and firm size, whereas their SOE counterparts face soft budget constraints, with 
the result that the reduction of investment and firm size is less severe. Nonetheless, the fact 
that SOEs significantly reduce investment over and above their industry median level, and 
that their performance overall is significantly worse than their industry, suggests that 
despite the presence of soft budget constraints, the SOE firms selected by my distress 
selection procedure are indeed distressed, albeit with different investment behaviour 
compared with their non-SOE counterparts when facing distress. The existence of soft 
budget constraint does not seem to save the distressed SOEs being distressed, as these 
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SOEs demonstrate deteriorating financial and operating performance relative to their 
industry, similar to the full sample of distressed firms. 
My findings provide a number of implications for policy makers, investors and firm 
managers. For policy makers, it is paramount that the long waited new bankruptcy code 
needs to take into account the existing inefficiency in the distress resolution process and the 
negative consequence of soft budge constraints, in order to facilitate efficient (re)allocation 
of resources, so that viable firms are restructured while inefficient ones are not. Efficient 
bankruptcy code also means that bank loans are not utilised to save non-viable SOEs, 
market led competition is encouraged and maintained. For investors, ' the Chinese 
accounting data seem to provide credible information about the viability of a firm to aid 
investment decisions. As for SOE firm managers, the fact that distressed SOEs are indeed 
distressed despite their facing soft instead of hard budget constraints, suggests that 
investment decisions in adverse conditions need to be proactively managed for the viability 
of the firms. 
The remaining structure of the chapter is is follows. Section 5.2 focuses on these elements 
irr the literature needed to support the various analyses in this chapter that were not 
included in chapter 4; section 5.3 describes the data and methodology; section 5.4 presents 
and discusses the empirical findings; section 5.5 presents my robustness checks; section 5.6 
summarises these findings and concludes. 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON NATURE AND SOURCE OF 
DISTRESS 
Following the review of the literature in chapter 4, this section specifically focuses on the 
elements in the literature that are most relevant to support the empirical analyses carried out 
in this chapter. 
There are two competing views in the literature regarding the effect of financial distress on 
a firm's operating performance. As pointed out by Asquith et al. (1994) and Gertner and 
Scharfstein (1991), frequently, firms in financial trouble also suffer from poor operating 
performance and therefore an empirical distinction is difficult. Simply put, is a firm 
suffering from poor performance because it is not economically viable or because it has an 
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inappropriate capital structure? However, although it is extremely difficult to draw an 
absolutely clear line between the two, especially in individual cases, analyses based on 
large samples gives a good approximate indication. 
- 
Conditional on the successful distinction between financial and economic distress, Haugen 
and Senbet (1978) and Jensen (1986) argue that by applying the Coase Theorem, there are 
no effects of financial distress. Thus if a firm is in financial trouble because it has an 
inappropriate capital structure, creditors will restructure their claims to maximise firm value 
and remedy the situation. However, if the process of renegotiation between the financially 
distressed firm and its creditors is inefficient32, firms facing liquidity constraints will be 
forced to forgo positive NPV investments, and there will be consequences for financial 
distress (Gertner and Scharfstein 1991). If this is the case, appropriate regulation 
facilitating such renegotiation may be desirable. 
Empirical results on whether economic or financial factors are the main contributors to 
distress using US data are not clear-cut. For example, Asquith et al. (1994) examine 102 
US junk bond issuers in the 1970's and '80's and they believe the cause of distress was principally 
economic factors (economic distress). Contrary to their results, Andrade and 
Kaplan (1998) extend the methodology of Asquith et al. (1994) and document high 
leverage as being the primary cause of financial distress in their study of a sample of 31 
Highly Leveraged Transactions (HTL) in the USA in the 1980's. By construct, Asquith et 
al. (1994) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998) have samples-of high leverage'yet*they yield 
substantially different results. Andrade and Kaplan argue that a large fraction of the firms 
in Asquith et al. (1994) have negative operating income and therefore their sample firms 
are both financially and economically distressed. 
Being an emerging market, China has a relatively under-developed financial market with 
associated greater information asymmetry due to market friction and (partial) state 
ownership. Also, as discussed in section 3.1, the existing bankruptcy procedure is rarely 
used so there are no usable formal procedures to facilitate timely restructurings of firms in 
financial difficulties. Given this context I hypothesise that financial distress and liquidity 
constraints lead to poor operating performance. Different to the above-cited US studies, I 
., 
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take a more comprehensive approach by basing my study on an inclusive sample set, not 
restricting the sample to any particular type of distress. Instead, my aim is to include all 
firms that are in financial difficulty in order to provide important insights on the interaction 
between financial and economic distress. 
Capital expenditure is used as an indicator of financial constraints in the literature on 
investment-under-uncertainty. This literature focuses on the importance of uncertainty33 on 
investment, and the real option approach (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) argues that uncertainty 
negatively affects investment. Fazzari et al. (1988) introduced and popularised a 
methodology which compares the elasticity of investment with a measure of internal funds 
for different groups of firms, and a higher elasticity suggests firm uncertainty and more 
severe capital market constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that the Fazzari et al. 
approach is flawed because it is only meaningful to look at differences in the elasticity of 
investment to cash flow if the investment-cash flow sensitivity is monotonically increasing 
with respect to the indicator used to classify firms. There is no consensus on these two 
competing views. However in this study this is not deemed to be a critical issue as I am not 
investigating all possible relationships between -capital market imperfections, uncertainty 
and their effect on investment. Suffice it to say I intend to use capital expenditure as an 
indicator of a distressed firm's liquidity constraints. Because distressed firms face acute 
uncertainty, this context is a particularly appropriate one to use capital expenditure as an 
indicator of liquidity constraints. It is also important that most empirical studies find a 
negative linear investment-uncertainty relationship (Lensink et at. 2001). 
Intuitively, when firms are in financial distress and face financial constraints, capital 
expenditure reduction and asset sales can provide a quick solution to the liquidity problem. 
Asquith et al. (1994) document dramatic capital expenditure reduction in their sample. 
They also argue that asset sales are important in providing much needed liquidity and that 
firms selling a large portion of their assets are considerably less likely to go bankrupt. I 
will address the issue on the effectiveness of asset sales as a distress resolution strategy in 
China in Chapter 6. In the meantime, an investigation of behaviour of the distressed firms' 
32 Due to reasons such as information asymmetry and coordination failure. 
33 With respect to selling price, sales, stock prices, distress, etc. 
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capital expenditure provides a good indication of the level of liquidity constraint these 
firms face when in distress. 
My sample also provides a unique opportunity to empirically detect the existence of soft 
budget constraints. The term "soft budget constraints" was first introduced by Kornai 
(1980,. 1986) and has since become widely used in the emerging market literature. As 
discussed in section 2.4.2, according to Kornai (1980,1986), an enterprise is said to have a 
soft budget constraint when it expects to be bailed out when in financial difficulty. 
-. 
Soft 
budget constraints represent important incentive problems as the managers of the enterprise 
could fail to observe financial discipline. A number of empirical studies provide evidence 
on the existence of soft budget constraints. For example, Lu et al. (2001) find that the 
Chinese banks' lending decisions are systematically biased in favour of SOEs and that 
although banks ration credits to some extent, they tend to provide liquidity to keep the 
borrowers in financial distress afloat; Other work include Tian (2004), Bai and Wang 
(1997), and Yuan (2000). In the light of this, two important questions arise: 1. Are the 
SOEs among my sample of distressed firms indeed in financial distress? 2. If these 
selected SOE firms are kept afloat by the government, do they have no or less liquidity 
constraint 
than their non-SOE counterparts? 
As discussed in section 4.1, although there are no prior systematic studies on distress in 
China, the legal literature and government regulators perceive a lack of profitability as the 
key indicator of distress34. In addition, as argued by Asquith et al. (1994), market return 
measure could include some information about the distressed firm's ability to resolve 
distress, i. e., the stock price reaction reflect the cost of distress resolution and hence bias 
towards relatively costly financial distress. As such I employ the interest coverage measure 
to identify distress (see Table 4.1). My full sample includes 100 financially distressed 
firms. I firstly investigate the nature and source of distress using my 100-firm full sample; 
I then subgroup my full sample into SOE and non-SOE subgroups, and use capital 
expenditure as a proxy for liquidity constraints to detect the existence of soft budget 
constraints; Lastly, as a robustness check, I also define distress using the market return 
measure and the "ST/PT" measure. There is a high overlap between different definitions. I 
1.4 Since the measure the regulators use is net profit, which is an after-interest indicator, the regulations capture 
firms suffering from both financial and economic distress. 
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repeat all analyses on the subsample of my full 100-firm sample as defined by these other 
indicators and find that my results are consistent. 
5.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section I describe my sample selection procedure and present the descriptive 
statistics of the sample. I also describe the methodology and define the variables. 
5.3.1 The sample selection procedure 
My sample selection procedure is designed to identify firms in severe financial difficulty. 
The primary definition of distress is based on interest cover and operating performance, as 
this approach has been widely used in previous research and is in line with the measure 
used by the two stock exchanges to identify firms as ST or PT. The sample consists of 100 
distressed companies listed either on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange or Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. I exclude firms with financial services as their primary SIC code. 
Data for my sample firms' operating performance and capital structure are collected from 
Thomson Financial Analytics Database. The primary data source for Thomson Financial 
Analytics Database for the Chinese listed companies is Compustat, and secondary sources 
include Worldscope and Extel. From the same database, industry performance controls, 
capital structure, and size comparisons are also collected by matching the sample firms' 
principal four-digit code with other public firms with the same principal SIC code for the 
same year. My motivation to construct industry median performance controls is to 
statistically compare the operating and financial performance of my sample distressed firms 
to their respective industry in order to answer the questions on nature and source of 
financial distress, while controlling for industry-wide effects. This methodology is also 
employed by Megginson et al (1994) and Wei et al (2003). 
Firstly, using the Thomson Financial Analytics Database, I examined all the listed 
companies over the period 1999 
- 
2003. Thomson Financial Analytics Database has many 
missing account data points of Chinese listed firms prior to 1999. In fact a total of 270 
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firms were identified as being distressed using my procedure between 199435 and 2003. 
However due to missing data, I am unable to compute meaningful industry performance 
control ratios for the period prior to 1999. Therefore I only include the distress cases 
between 1999 and 2003. The whole population for my sample selection includes 123 8 
firms per year or 6190 firm years. 
A firm is identified as having suffered from financial distress if it meets one of the two 
criteria in at least two consecutive years between 1999 and 2003: (a) The firm's earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) are less than its reported 
interest expense, i. e., interest cover = (EBITDA/interest expenses) <1 (hereafter I refer to 
this as having a interest coverage shortfall); (b). In the case when a firm's debt/interest 
expense=0, the firm's EBITDA is less than or equal to zero. 139 firms (per year) were 
selected using criterion (a) and one additional firm was selected using criterion (b). 
Following the procedure, a total of 140 firms were classified as being distressed. The first 
year in which a firm meets one of the above two criteria is denoted year 0. Year -t (+t) 
denotes t years before (after) year 0. So year -1 is the year prior to the onset of distress, 
year 0 is the first year of financial distress and year 1 is the second year of distress. 
Secondly, using the four-digit SIC code, 18 firms were found to be either in a monopoly or 
in a duopoly industry with both firms in distress, and thus were excluded from my study, 
since industry comparison is impossible. In addition, 19 firms do not have accounting 
information for either t--1 or t=+1 and thus were also eliminated from my sample. This 
leaves 103 firms. Lastly, among the 103 firms, 3 became dormant (sales = 0) during their 
respective distress periods and were also eliminated from the sample. The resulting sample 
consists of 100 firms per year (500 firm years) and these 100 firms all had at least two 
consecutive years of interest cover less than one. The one firm selected by EBITDA being 
negative as its interest expense is zero was eliminated as it had no sales during the year of 
distress. 
Among the selected 100 firms identified as being distressed at some time during 1999- 
2003,51% are controlled by the government, and 3% have foreign investors as their 
35 My data source Thomson Financial has accounting data for some Chinese listed companies tarting 
1994, albeit with significant gaps. 
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controlling shareholder. At the onset of distress (year 0), the average percentage of tradable 
shares to total shares of my sample is 42.6%. In addition, of the 100 sample firms, 73 
suffered interest coverage shortfall for two consecutive years, 26 for three consecutive 
years and one firm for four consecutive years. 
Summary statistics on the sample are provided in Table 5.1. The mean book value of assets 
in year 0 is RMB1,473 million (approx. £100 million) and the median is RBM 1,003 
million (approx. £70 million). The median ratio of total liabilities to total assets is 62%, but 
96% of total liabilities are current. Bank debt proxied by total debt, is 43% of total assets 
(mean), in contrast to the average 25% ratio of bank loans to total assets of all PLCs (Table 
2.7 
- 
Tian 2004). Finally, the median interest coverage in year 0 is 
-2.85, indicating that the 
median firm in my sample was far from capable of meeting its interest payment obligations. 
5.3.2 Research questions, definition of variables and methodology 
My primary objective is to explore the nature and main contributors to distress. To achieve 
this, I firstly use a wide range of accounting ratios to examine the features of the sample of 
distressed firms and adjust these accounting ratios by industry to eliminate any industry 
effect. I then evaluate the relative importance of economic versus financial causes of 
distress. I next examine the investment behaviour of distressed firms to understand the 
extent of their liquidity constraints. Having gained an understanding of nature and source 
of distress, I separate my sample into SOE and non-SQE subgroups in order to answer the 
two questions raised in section 5.2. I firstly compare the two subgroups' investment 
behaviour to confirm the presence of soft budget constraints. I then repeat my analysis 
using accounting ratios on the SOE subgroup to confirm whether or not, in the presence of 
soft budget constraints, these SOEs are indeed distressed. Lastly, I investigate which 
combinations of the variables provide the strongest prior year indicator of forthcoming 
distress on a multivariate basis. 
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Table 5.2 Variable definitions 
This table presents the list of empirical proxies I use in this chapter. The proxies for size, operating 
performance, financial performance, liquidity, employees, ownership, geography, investment and market are 
computed for every sample firm for a three years period: one year prior to the onset of distress (t=-1), the first 
year of cnverave chnrtfall (t=(11 and the cecnn(1 vear of enveraQe chnrtfall ft=+11 
Classification 
Variable name Definition 
Selection criterion 
COV EBITDA/interest expenses, the key measure of distress 
Operating performance 
EBITDAAS (Earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation /assets 
GPM Gross Profit Margin 
EBITDASAL EBITDA/sales 
SALAS Sales/assets 
Financial performance 
IntExpAs Interest Expense/assets 
CLIABTLIAB Current liabilities/total liabilities 
CLIABAS Current liabilities/assets 
TLIABAS Total liabilities/assets (leverage ratio) 
DEBTAS Total debt/assets, proxy for bank loans scaled by assets. 
APTL Accounts payable/total liabilities 
APSAL Accounts payable/sales 
Liquidity 
CASCLIAB Current assets/current liabilities. 
Investment 
APEXAS CAPEX/assets proxy for firm's investment. 
Employees 
SALEMP Sales/number of employees 
ASEMP Assets/number of employees 
Ownership 
DSOE 
Dummy variable for state control, takes the value of 1 if state is the largest 
shareholder (not necessarily over 50% of shares 
- 
relative control), and 0 
otherwise 
DSOEO 
Dummy variable for state control, takes the value of 1 if state owns at least 50% of 
shares (absolute control), and 0 otherwise 
STATE Percentage of equity ownership retained by the state after privatisation. 
Market 
Dumm Ashare 
Dummy variable for type of tradable shares, takes the value of 1 if only A 
shares, 0 otherwise (B/H shares, with or without A shares). 
FLOATING Tradable shares/(tradable + non-tradable shares), proxy for governance. 
Geography 
DLOC 
Dummy variable for geographic location of firms headquarters, equals 1 if in 
major or coastal cities and 0 otherwise. 
Table 5.2 presents the list of empirical proxies I employ for firm performance and 
efficiency. I firstly compute these empirical proxies for every distressed firm in my sample 
and its respective industry median, using the four-digit SIC code, for a three years period: 
one year prior to the onset of distress (t=-1), the first year of interest coverage shortfall (the 
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first year of distress, t--0), and the second year of interest coverage shortfall (t=+1). I then 
calculate the median of each variable for the distressed firms and for the industry medians, 
as well as the difference between firm and industry median values. I employ the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test to test for significance in the difference between firms and industry 
medians. My conclusions are based on the standardised test statistic Z, which for samples 
of at least 10 follows approximately a standard normal distribution. Since most of my data 
are highly skewed with extreme values as demonstrated by the Jarque-Bera. statistic 36 in 
Table 5.1, it is appropriate to use non-parametric tests for my comparison analysis. 
Having gained an understanding of the characteristics of the distressed firms prior to and 
during distress, I then adapt the methodology of Asquith et al. (1994) to assess the relative 
importance of leverage and firm operating performance in triggering distress. Cash flow is 
defined as EBITDA less interest expense; the ratio of interest expense to assets is used to 
proxy for leverage effect; and EBITDA to assets as a proxy for operating performance 
effect. Two distinct changes in firm cash flow are calculated to represent leverage effect 
and firm operating performance effect. First, leverage effect is calculated as the 
improvement that would occur in the firth's cash flow in year 0 if the firm had the same 
ratio of interest expense to assets as the median firm in its industry; Second, firm operating 
performance effect is the improvement that would occur in the firm's cash flow in year 0 if 
the firm had the same ratio of EBITDA to assets as its industry median firm. The sure of 
the above two changes in cash flow is the total cash flow shortfall caused by distress. The 
portion of cash flow shortfall caused by leverage effect is the first calculated cash flow 
change divided by the sum of total cash flow shortfall. The portion of cash flow shortfall 
caused by firm performance effect is the second calculated cash flow change divided by the 
sum of total cash flow changes.. The full details of the calculations are presented in 
Appendix 2. 
Thirdly, I examine my sample firms' capital expenditure in detail to provide insights on the 
issue of firm liquidity constraints. I compute distressed firms' capital expenditure during 
36 The Jarque-Bera test is a goodness-of-fit measure of departure from normality, based on the sample kurtosis 
and skewness. The statistic has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom and can 
be used to test the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution; since samples from a normal 
distribution have an expected skewness of 0 and an expected kurtosis of 3. Any deviation from this increases 
the JB statistic. 
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the three-year window. Following the literature discussed in section 5.2, large reductions in 
capital expenditure indicate that the distressed firms face severe liquidity constraints. 
However, one caution on modelling capital expenditure is that capital expenditure reduction 
could be either a cause or an effect in financial distress. Although reduction in capital 
expenditure is used in the literature and in this study to proxy for firms' lack of liquidity 
due to distress (the effect), firms could also be in distress due to lack of investment on 
capital expenditure prior to the onset of distress (the cause). This endogeneity issue of this 
variable is a limitation in my study. 
Next, I separate the sample into SOE and non-SOE subgroups and I expect the SOE 
subgroup has less reduction in capital expenditure, because they have less of a problem 
with liquidity due to soft budget constraints; whereas the non-SOE subgroup is expected to 
have greater reduction in capital expenditure and/or assets, as they are subject to hard 
budget constraints and have greater need to reduce the pressure of liquidity constraints. In 
addition, following the discussion in section 4.1 and 5.2, since the definition of financial 
distress is severe financial difficulty, in the presence of soft budget constraints, are the 
SOEs among my sample of distressed firms indeed in financial distress? I. e. do these 
Aistressed SOE firms defined by my interest coverage criteria also demonstrate similar 
financial and operating performance deterioration? To answer this question, similar to the 
full sample firms, I use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to test for significance in the 
difference between my sample SOE firms and their industry median to confirm their 
distress status. 
Finally, having assessed the different causes of distress on a univariate basis, by matching 
each distressed sample firm with its industry median firm by interest coverage ratio in the 
same year, I construct a logit model to test for the determinants of financial distress on a 
multivariate basis. The use of logit model is appropriate considering the distributional 
property of my data. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking on the value of 
zero if the firm is in distress and one otherwise. I am particularly interested in testing how 
leverage, operating performance and investment behaviour affect the probability of firm 
going into distress. I also use other firm characteristics as control variables. Hence the 
independent variable is a vector of performance ratios prior to the onset of distress across 
the following categories: operating performance (SALAS, EBITDAAS, and EBITDASAL), 
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financial performance (TLIABAS, CLIABAS and APSAL), firm investment (CAPEXAS), 
ownership (DSOEO, DSOE and STATE), location (DLOC), and market (DummyAShare 
and FLOATING). These variables are fully defined in Table 5.2. 
I expect distress to be associated. with poor operating performance (EBITDAAS), 
investment level (CAPEXAS) and high leverage (TLIABAS or CLIABAS). In addition, i 
expect that operating performance and investment behaviour have a larger impact on the 
probability of firms going into distress than leverage. 
Due to the complexity of share ownership in China and its emerging nature, I test for the 
relationship between a variety of ownership indicators and firm distress and the effect of 
soft budget constraints. The ownership category includes three alternative variables: two 
are dummy variables and one is a continuous variable. DSOE is a dummy for relative state 
control, equal to one if the State is the largest shareholder of the company (may not 
necessarily own over 50%) and zero otherwise, whereas DSOEO is a dummy for absolute 
state control and only equal to one if the State owns at least 50% of the company37. I also 
run a parallel specification using the percentage of state ownership (STATE) instead of the 
state control dummies (DSOE and DSOEO), in an attempt to capture different dynamics in 
the relationship. Due to the soft budget constraint hypothesis, I expect SOEs to have a 
better chance to stay out of trouble hence I expect that the state variables have a negative 
impact on the probability of distress. 
DummyAshare is a dummy to proxy for ownership types in the tradable shares, equal to 1 
if the firm issued only A shares and 0 otherwise. In other words, the "0" firms have foreign 
investors as their (tradable) shareholders whereas the "1" firms have only domestic 
investors as their (tradable) shareholders. This dummy is to control for the potential impact 
of foreign ownership in the listed firms on the probability of distress. FLOATING is the 
ratio of tradable shares divided by total number of shares (tradable + non-tradable) and is 
generally a proxy for governance (Wang and Xu 2004, Liu 2005), with a higher ratio 
indicating more transparency and better governance 39. It is also a representation of 
37 Both definitions of state ownership have been used in previous China studies. For a thorough discussion of 
this issue see Clarke (2003). 
38 As stated by Xu and Wang (1999), Qian et al. (2002), Tian (2004), and Clarke (2003), tradable A shares 
are predominately held by widely dispersed individual investors. For the biggest shareholders holding 
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ownership concentration. However, contrary to the purpose of governance proxy, the 
higher the FLOATING ratio, the lower the ownership concentration. In a situation of 
distress, ownership concentration could be a positive factor with respect to overcoming 
coordination failure among shareholders. Hence the expectation that the two different 
proxies of the same ratio are opposite signed. However, since government is the single 
largest shareholder as discussed in section 2.3.2 C, ownership concentration measure may 
be correlated with government ownership measures. As expected, FLOATING is relatively 
strongly negatively correlated with STATE and DSOEO (-0.30 and 
-0.35 respectively), a 
low FLOATING ratio also indicates high State ownership. Due to this strong correlation, 
FLOATING will not be used in the regressions simultaneously with either STATE or 
DSOEO. 
Lastly, DLOC is a geographic location dummy, equal to 1 for firms with their headquarters 
located in major or coastal cities/districts such as Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and 
Guangdong, and 0 otherwise. The rationale behind the location dummy is that these 
coastal/major cities and districts are potentially more advanced because of more efficient 
management and better educated workforce (Wri et al. 2003). It is also possible that the 
financial systems in the major and coastal areas are more advanced, not only for the reasons 
stated above, but also because foreign financial institutions have been permitted to operate 
in these regions since the early 1990s. As such I expect that firms located in non-coastal 
cities are more likely to be distressed and those located in coastal cities have a better chance 
of avoiding distress. 
As a robustness check, I select distressed firms using two alternative definitions of distress, 
namely the market return measure and the ST/PT measure. The market return measure is a 
widely employed methodology in previous research which selects firms that are in the 
bottom 5% of three-year cumulative market returns of all listed firms; The ST/PT measure 
on the other hand, as discussed in section 4.1 and section 5.2, is used by the stock exchange 
regulators as an indication of distress. I form two subgroups by selecting sub-samples of 
firms from my full 100-firm sample using each of these two selection procedures in turn. I 
tradable A shares, that make it to a firm's top 10 shareholders (of total shares, including tradable and non- 
tradable), their aggregate shareholding is less than 0.5% of the firm's total market capitalisation. Detailed 
discussion on the unusual tradable/un-tradable shareholding structure in the Chinese context is given in detail 
in section 2.3.2 C and summarized in Table 2.8. 
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then repeat the univariate, cause of distress and multivariate analyses on these market return 
and the ST/PT subgroups. 
5.4 RESULTS 
In this section I present my empirical results. This section consists of three subsections. I 
will first look at the nature of financially distressed firms in China as a whole in section 
5.4.1; then in section 5.4.2 1 will investigate specifically differences between SOEs and 
non-SOEs, particularly the issue of the presence of soft budget constraints among SOEs; 
lastly, section 5.4.3 will be dedicated to examine the precursors of financial distress on a 
multivariate basis. 
5.4.1 Characteristic and source of distress 
In this section, I present and discuss the results of my full 100 sample firms' industry_ 
adjusted performance, the main contributors of distress and these firms' liquidity 
constraints. 
/. Industry-adjusted firm performance and efficiency 
- 
univariate analysis 
In this section, the operating and financial performance, and the efficiency of the sample 
distressed firms is analysed in detail. Table 5.3 reports the results for the full sample for t= 
1,0 and +1. The results show that the distressed firms' overall operating and financial. 
performance is significantly worse than that of their industry during all the three years (tom 1 
to +1). At the 1% significance level, the median distressed firms' industry adjusted 
operating performance measured by EBITDA over assets is negative in year 
-1. This 
measure drops considerably from 10.0335 in year 
-1 to -0.133 in year 0 and continues to 
deteriorate through to year +1. This confirms that indeed the distressed firms suffer from 
poor operating performance39. 
In addition, distressed firms' median sales scaled by assets are already significantly worse 
than industry median at year 
-1, and this situation deteriorates further in year 0. The trend 
continues to year +1. Interestingly, however, distressed firms' gross and operating profit 
39 Using EBIT as a proxy for operating performance yield very similar results to EBITDA, so I only 
report the EBITDA results here. 
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margin is similar to industry median during t=-1 and these measures only become worse 
relative to industry in year 0. Industry-adjusted sales/employee ratio was negative 
significantly in contrast to the insignificant industry-adjusted asset/employee ratio. The 
results suggest that distressed firms were performing perfectly well on a profit margin basis 
in the year prior to the onset of distress, but already in that year their asset and employee 
levels were being managed poorly relative to the level of sales. This inefficiency seems to 
have severely damaged profit margins by the following year (year 0). 
The financial performance variables show that distressed firms' leverage is indeed higher 
than the industry median. The distressed firms' median industry adjusted total (current) 
liabilities to assets of 
-0.063 (-0.065) is significant, at the 1% level in year -1 and this ratio 
doubled in year 0. Furthermore, although distressed firms' median accounts payable to 
total liabilities ratio drops from year 
-1 to year 0 and then to year +1, the continued increase 
in the accounts payable to sales ratios indicate that accounts payables continue to increase 
relative to sales, suggesting that distressed firms are-having increased difficulty paying 
back their suppliers. 
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Current liabilities are a relatively weaker form of finance compared with long term liabilities. 
From Table 5.3 we can see that for both the distressed firm and the industry median firm, current 
liabilities constitutes the same proportion of total liabilities, as the median differences between 
firm and industry median during the three-year period are insignificant. Thus the results suggest 
that in China, the common form of financing is provided in current liabilities, regardless whether 
or not the firm is in distress. 
Sample firms' investment proxied by capital expenditure scaled by assets is significantly worse 
than their industry during the entire three-year period. At year -1, sample firms' median 
CAPEX/assets is only 0.0147 versus industry median of 0.0414. Moreover, sample firms' 
median CAPEX/assets declines sharply over the three years period, from 0.0147 to 0.0054. 
B. Source Of distress (economic VS financial) 
Table 5.4 is constructed adapting the methodology of Asquith et al. (1994), in order to assess the 
relative importance of the two factors4° discussed in section 5.3.2, i. e., leverage and firm level 
perfop nance, in triggering financial distress. Panel A presents the results for year 0 and Panel B 
for year 
-1. There are three sets of columns in both panels. The first set of column in Panel A 
presents the mean and median percentage of cash flow shortfall caused by leverage and operating 
performance factors for the full sample. The 100 distressed firms are then separated into five 
subgroups by sorting their leverage factors in year 0. The same analysis is repeated for the 5 
subgroups: Results for Subgroup 1 (with highest leverage effect in year 0) and Subgroup 5 (with 
lowest leverage effect in year 0) are also presented in the second and third sets of columns of 
Panel A. The same analysis for the full sample and for these five subgroups is repeated for year - 
1 and the results are presented in Panel 13. The mean and median financial and economic factors 
in causing cash flow shortfall for the full five subgroups during year 
-1 and 0 are also presented 
in Figure 5.1. 
Panel A shows that relatively poor operating performance is the primary feature of firm distress, 
not leverage. A median of 94% cash flow shortfall is caused by poor operating performance; 
"° Following the methodology of Asquith et al. (1994), I initially distributed coverage shortfall to three factors: 
economic, financial and industry downturn. The results show industry downturn does not contribute to coverage 
shortfall in my sample hence the results are not presented here. 
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only 6% cash flow shortfall is caused by leverage. As for the subgroups, Subgroup 1 has the 
highest leverage effect and Subgroup 5 has the lowest leverage effect. Even in subgroup 1 
however, a median of 80% of cash flow shortfall is caused by operating performance. 
Importantly, Panel B shows that at year 
-1, leverage factor plays a more important role in causing 
cash flow shortfall, for the full sample as well as for Subgroup 1. For the full sample in the year 
prior to distress, a mean of as much as 55% of the cash flow shortfall is due to leverage, 
compared with only 6.5% a year later. However, the contrast in the leverage effect between year 
-1 and 0 using median values is not as dramatic as mean value, albeit with the same trend. As for 
subgroup 5, since both the mean and median leverage factors are negative during year 
-1 and year 
0, these firms' coverage shortfall was caused purely by economic factors. In addition, the 
normalised mean operating factor for subgroup 1 in year 
-1 was negative at 0.821, indicating that 
some of the firms in subgroup 1 enjoyed a better operating performance than their respective 
industry median firms. For the mean firm in this subgroup, interest coverage shortfall was caused 
entirely by financial factor. Figure 5.1 shows that except Subgroup 4 (the subgroup with the 
second lowest leverage effect in year 0), all, other 'ubgroups have a greater median financial 
leverage effect in causing cash flow shortfall in year 
-1 than in year 0. It is clear that the 
importance of the mean leverage effect in year 
-1 is due to a significant minority of firms with 
high leverage skewing the mean. 
Evidence suggests that firms facing financial distress and liquidity constraints in the year prior to 
distress have lower level of capital investment, and this low level of capital investment results in 
severe underperformance at the operating level in the year of distress. The evidence on 
investment (capital expenditure trend) js examined next. 
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Table 5.4 Source of cash flow shortfall 
This table is constructed to assess the relative importance of leverage and firm operating performance in triggering 
financial distress. Details of the methodology are presented in Appendix 2. The first year of coverage shortfall is 
denoted t=0, one year prior to the first year of coverage shortfall is denoted t=-1. Panel A presents the results for 
year 0 and Panel B for year 
-1. There are three sets of columns in both panels. The first set of column in Panel A 
presents the mean and median percentage of cash flow shortfall caused by leverage and operating performance 
factors for the full sample. The 100 distressed firms are then separated into five subgroups by sorting their leverage 
factors. The same analysis is repeated for the 5 subgroups. Results for Subgroup 1 (with highest leverage effect) 
and Subgroup 5 (with lowest leverage effect) are also presented. The same analysis for the full sample and for these 
five subgroups is repeated for year 
-1 and the results are presented in Panel B. 
Panel A: Normalised sources of coverage shortfall in first year of' distress (t=0) 
Full sample Subgroup I Subgroup 5 
Standard Standard Standard 
Factor Mean Median Deviation Mean Median deviation Mean Median deviation 
Leverage 0.065 0.058 0.11553 0.214 0.198 0.06109 
-0.088 -0.056 0.11949 
Operating performance 0.935 0.942 0.11553 0.786 0.802 0.06109 1.088 1.056 0.11949 
Panel B: Normalised sources of coverage shortfall in prior year of distress (t=-1) 
Factor Full sample Subgroup I Subgroup 5 
Leverage 0.550 0.088 3.78903 1.821 0.198 8.23414 
-0.015 -0.004 0.43162 
Operating performance 0.450 0.912 3.78903 
-0.821 0.802 8.23414 1.015 1.004 0.43162 
Figure 5.1 The relative effect of financial and economic factors in cash flow shortfall 
across the subgroups and over time (mean and median graphs) 
The relative effect of financial and economic factors in cash flow 
shortfall across the subgroups and over time 
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C. Liquidity constraints 
Table 5.5 presents distressed firms' capital expenditure trends over a variety of time windows. 
Capital expenditure growth rates are calculated as current year capital expenditures less previous 
year capital expenditures divided by previous year capital expenditures. The three rows in Table 
5.5 shows capital expenditure growth rates between year 
-1 and 0, year 0 and +1, and year -1 and 
+1. 
As we can see in the table, between year 
-1 and 0,75% of distressed firms have a lower capital 
expenditure growth rate than their industry medians, and that the median industry-adjusted 
growth rate is 
-61%; between year -1 and +1,84% distressed firms have a lower capital 
expenditure growth rate than their industry medians, and the median industry-adjusted growth 
rate drop to a median of 111%. In addition, from Table 5.3 we can see that firm capital 
expenditure scaled by assets in year -1 is 0.015, and this reduced to 0.010 in year 0 and again to 
0.005 in year+l. So the reduction in capital expenditure is not just due to companies contracting 
in side. The results suggest that distressed firms reduce capital expenditure to provide much 
needed liquidity. 
Table 5.5 Distressed firms' capital expenditure trends 
This table shows distressed firms' capital expenditure over a three-year window: one year prior to the onset of 
distress (t=-1), the first year of interest coverage shortfall (t0), and the second year of interest coverage shortfall 
(t--+1). Capital expenditure growth rates are calculated as current year capital expenditures less previous year 
capital expenditures divided by previous year capital expenditures. 
Median capital expenditure growth - full sample 
Median 
From To Median growth Fraction Ii' dustry-adjusted Fraction 
t= t= rate negative growth rate negative 
-1 0 -0.2831 0.6237 -0.6105 0.7527 
0 1 
-0.4954 0.7500 -0.5060 0.7300 
-1 1 -0.7085 0.7957 -1.1094 0.8387 
In summary, my results in this section show that distressed firms significantly under-perform 
their industry median across a range of financial and operating variables, even in the year prior to 
distress. Indeed distressed firms have statistically and economically significantly higher level of 
leverage than their industry in the year prior to distress. Distressed firms' leverage ratios 
. 
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deteriorate during distress. There are also signs of sample firms having difficulty to pay back 
their suppliers. In addition, the results from source of distress investigation show that poor 
operating performance is the primary feature of firm distress, not leverage. Lastly, my sample 
firms make significantly less capital expenditure investment prior to the onset of distress, as well 
as significant reductions in capital expenditure during distress, to provide much needed liquidity. 
The relative value of these variables in indicating distress in the year prior to its onset of distress 
is examined on a multivariate basis in section 5.4.3. 
5.4.2 Nature of distress among SOEs and non-SOEs 
In this section, I investigate the existence of soft budget constraint using firm liquidity measure 
- 
capital expenditure trend. In addition, I' also investigate the distressed SOE sub-sample to 
confirm that they are indeed distressed. 
Table 5.6 shows distressed SOE and non-SOE firms' capital expenditure trends over a variety of 
time windows, i. e., between year 
-1 and 0, year 0 and +1, and year -land +1, on an absolute and 
industry-adjusted basis. I employ the Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its Z-statistic) as my test 
for significance for the difference in median capital expenditure growths rates between SOE 
firms and non-SOE firms. 
Table 5.6 Distressed firms' capital expenditure trends 
This table compares distressed SOE vs non-SOE firms' capital expenditure growth rates over a three-year window: 
one year prior to the onset of distress (t=1), the first year of interest coverage shortfall (t=0), and the second year of 
interest cöverage shortfall (t=+1). Capital expenditure growth rates are calculated as current year capital 
expenditures less previous year capital expenditures divided by previous year capital expenditures. I employ the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its Z-statistic) to test for significance for the difference in median capital 
expenditure growths rates between SOE firms and non-SOE firms. 
Median capital expenditure growth comoaOson 
- 
SOEs vs Non-SOEs 
From To SOE Non-SOE Wilcoxon Ind-adj SOE Ind-adj non-SOE Wilcoxon 
t= t= Median Median Z-statistics Median Median Z-statistics 
-1 0 -0.1985 -0.36887 1.5723 -0.3561 -0.96232 2.0724 -- 0 1 
-0.4657 -0.59078 0.4374 -0.6144 -0.41224 0.4864 
-1 1 -0.5575 -0.81618 2.1768 "* -1.0916 -1.45505 0.6479 
Significant at the 10% level 
" Significant at the 5% level 
"' Significant at the 1%a level 
Table 5.6 provides some evidence for the existence of soft budget constraints for distressed SOE 
firms. On an absolute basis (not industry-adjusted), over the three years period, non-SOEs have a 
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significantly greater reduction in capital expenditure than SOEs (-82% vs. 
-56%). In addition, 
between year 
-1 and 0, on an industry adjusted basis, non-SOE firms reduce their capital 
expenditure at a much greater rate (both statistically and economically) than their SOE 
counterpart. The median industry adjusted capital expenditure growth rate between year 
-1 and 0 
for non-SOE firms is 
-96%, and the median figure for SOE firms is only -36%. 
Although evidence suggests that distressed SOEs face soft budget constraint whereas their non- 
SOE face hard budget constraint, these distressed SOEs seem to still face liquidity constraints, 
albeit to a lesser extent than their non-SOE counterparts. To fully understand the characteristics 
of the distressed SOEs, I repeat the Table 5.3 univariate analysis for the 51 distressed SOEs. The 
results are presented in Table 5.7. 
The results in Table 5.7 are very similar to those of the full sample analysis reported in Table 5.3. 
Overall the distressed SOE firms experience poor performance across all categories during 
distress. Prior to distress, they are more leveraged than their industry and their operating 
performance is also significantly worse than-their industry median. Of particular interest and 
diffelent to the full sample, the distressed SOEs industry-adjusted gross profit margin is negative 
and is statistically different from zero in the year prior to the onset of distress, suggesting that the 
distressed SOEs are less efficient at an earlier stage than their non-SOE counterparts on an 
industry-adjusted basis. In addition, different to the full sample results in Table 5.3, distressed 
SOE firms' employee/asset for SOEs are significantly higher than their industry median in year 
1, providing further evidence on the inefficiencies of SOEs. 
The analysis in this section shows that t)e distressed SOEs significantly reduce investment over 
and above their industry median level, and that their performance overall is significantly worse 
than their industry. In the context of soft budget constraint, the SOE firms selected by my 
distress selection procedure are indeed distressed, albeit with different investment behaviour 
when facing distress. The existence of soft budget constraint does not seem to save the distressed 
SOEs being distressed, as these SOEs demonstrate deteriorating financial and operating 
performance relative to their industry, similar to the full sample of distressed firms. 
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5.4.3 Early indicators of distress 
In this section, I conduct multivariate analysis to take account of the relative influence of 
the various factors discussed in the previous subsections as early indicators of distress. As 
discussed in section 5.3.2, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes on the 
value of zero if the firm becomes distressed during the period of study, and one if 
otherwise. Independent variables include accounting ratios from year 
-1, measuring the 
financial and operating performance of sample firms. Other variables include ownership, 
market (tradability) and geographic location. The sample consists of the 100 distressed 
firms and 84 matching non-distressed sample firms. The 84 matching firms are selected by 
matching industry SIC and year, and then choosing the firm with interest coverage ratio 
equal or closest to the industry median41. 
My previous analyses in section 5.4.1 provide strong associations between distress and firm 
performance one year prior to the onset of distress. In particular, I find that in year 
-1, the 
median earnings before - interest tax depreciation and amortisation scaled by assets 
(EBITDA/assets) of the distressed firms are significantly lower than their industry median, 
and these distressed firms face severe liquidity constraints. In addition, distressed firms' 
industry adjusted median sales/assets is low. Finally, the source of distress analysis in 
section 5.4.2 shows that in year 0, the key feature of distress is poor operating performance, 
contributing to 96% of coverage shortfall. 
As such I expect that firm operating and financial performance and investment behaviour in 
the year prior to distress provide significant indicators of the probability of distress. I also 
expect operating performance to provide stronger signal of the probability of distress than 
financial performance. Table 5.8 reports the correlation matrix of the variables and Table 
5.9 reports the regression results. I report the coefficients and the associated z-statistic. As 
a standard practice, since the coefficients in logit regressions cannot be interpreted as the 
marginal effect of a unit change of the independent variables on the probability of distress, I 
also report the marginal effects in the table. 
41 Some of the 100 distressed firms have the same 4-digit SIC, in this case I only choose one matching healthy 
firm for this 4-digit SIC industry. This is why there are fewer matched firms than distressed firms. 
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Table 5.8 shows that there are very few significant correlations between the variables. As 
expected, there are significant correlation between the two leverage variables (TLIABAS 
and CLIABAS); the SALAS ratio and the APSAL ratio; the three ownership variables 
(DSOE, DSOEO and STATE); and between the DSOEO ownership dummy and the 
FLOATING ratio. These have been taken into account when constructing and running the 
regression specifications. 
I report seven specifications for the regression. SALAS, EBITDAAS and CAPEXAS are 
all significant at the 1% level and the signs are as expected in all seven specifications. The 
marginal contributions of CAPEXAS and EBITDAAS are much larger than that of 
TLIABAS, indicating that a unit change in EBITDAAS and CAPEXAS has a greater 
influence on the probability of distress than a unit change in TLIABAS. In Specifications 
(1) and (2), DSOE and DSOEO carry positive signs, as predicted, but not significant. The 
third State ownership variable STATE is not significant either and the results are not 
reported here. 
Specification (3) removes the state dummies but, introduces the FLOATING variable. The 
overall test statistics for the regression demonstrated by the McFaddden R2 and 
Loglikelihood slightly improve, while SALAS, EBITDAAS and CAPEXAS are still 
significant with similar magnitudes in their marginal contribution to the probability of 
distress. FLOATING has a negative but significant coefficient. The interpretation of this 
coefficient is somewhat complicated. As discussed in Section 3.2, this variable can be 
viewed as a proxy for governance, as a larger proportion of tradable shares signals 
transparency in management. However, it also means that, since tradable-share 
shareholders are more dispersed (Yu and Wang 1999, Qian et al 2002), coordination failure 
may occur in the event of performance decline/distress. The negative sign shows the higher 
the FLOATING ratio, the more likely the firm is distressed. My explanation is that in this 
case, the effect of coordination failure dominates the governance effect. Another potential 
explanation is that since FLOATING is negatively correlated with STATE and DSOEO, 
with a correlation in the region of 
-0.35. This negative coefficient could also mean that the 
higher the FLOATING ratio, the lower the absolute State ownership ratio, hence firms are 
more likely to be distressed. 
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Variable 
Expected 
sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 
-1.528 -1.17 -1.637 -1.18 0.244 1.02 -1.368 -1.15 -1.256 -1.13 -1.340 -1.14 -1.522 -1.16 
-2.049- -2.065 "" 0.228 -1.882 " -1.810 " -1.927- -2.100 Operational 
SALAS + 2.194 1.25 2.176 1.24 2.131 1.24 2.191 1.24 2.250 1.25 2.255 1.25 2.265 1.25 
3.310 """ 3.276 ""' 3.123- 3.287- 3.279- 3.258- 3.276 """ 
EBITDAAS + 16.711 5.32 17.397 5.70 15.604 4.76 16.836 5.39 17.420 5.71 18.310 6.24 18.263 6.21 
2.951 """ 3.045- 2.771 """ 2.998- 3.013 ý" 3.134 """ 3.110 """ 
EBITDASAL + 
Financial 
TLIABAS 
- -3.832 -1.47 -3.765 -1.46 -3.946 -1.48 -3.802 -1.46 
-3.091 """ -3.053- -3.152- -3.103 - 
CLIABAS 
- -4.533 -1.57 -5.071 -1.66 -5.031 -1.65 
-3.360- -3.633- -3.585- 
Investment 
CAPEXAS + 13.460 3.84 13.406 3.82 14.124 4.11 13.172 3.73 10.840 2.96 11.325 3.10 11.639 3.20 
3.084- 3.074 ""' 3.256- 3.045 "ý 2.515 - 2.621- 2.664 """ 
Ownership 
DSOEO + 0.494 1.05 0.407 
1.215 0.983 
DSOE + 0.358 1.04 
0.904 
Market 
FLOATING 7 
-0.039 -1.00 
-2.005- 
Location 
DLOC + 0.746 1.08 0.768 1.08 
1.624 " 1.672 
Loglikelihood 
-82.488 -82.816 -81.098 -83.230 -80.908 -79.560 -79.076 
McFadden R2 0.326 0.324 0.338 0.320 0.326 0.337 0.341 
N 178 178 178 178 174 174 174 
* Significant at the 10% level 
" Significant at the 5% level 
"' Significant at the 1% level 
1 
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Specification (4) drops the FLOATING variable but both McFaddden R2 and Loglikelihood 
decrease. Specification (5) replaces TLIABAS with CLIABAS and the results are very similar. 
Specification (6) introduces the location dummy DLOC, and the coefficient for DLOC is positive 
and significant at the 10% level, confirming the results from Wei et al. (2003), i. e. firms located in a 
major or coastal city have a better chance of avoiding distress, all else being equal. Possible 
explanations are firms have better access to funds and/or their management is sounder. Specification 
(7) includes DSOEO. The magnitude and sign of the coefficient for DSOEO is consistent with what 
I find in Specifications (1) and (2), and is also insignificant. 
In summary, overall the investment, operational and financial performance variables are statistically 
significant, mostly at the 1% level, and the signs are as expected. However the marginal 
contributions to the probability of distress by investment and operational variables are much larger 
than those of the financial variables. This confirms my previous analyses that the main cause of 
distress is poor operating performance and lack of investment. The location dummy variable is 
significant while the state control variables are not'significant in the logit model, although the sign is 
as expected. 
5.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
For a robustness check, I use the two alternative methods defined in section 5.2 to locate distressed 
firms. Firstly I use the market returns approach and select firms at the bottom 5% of 3-year 
cumulative market returns. 303 firms were selected for the period 1999-2003. Of the 303 
companies, 44 companies coincide with t4e accounting measure. In other words, 44 out of the 
selected 100 firms (44%) are also defined as in distress by the cumulative 3-years market return 
measure. Secondly I use the method employed by the Chinese stock exchange regulator to define 
ST/PT firms and find that 74 of the 100 selected firms were ST/PT firms between t=2 and t-+2. 
This further confirms the severity of distress of my sample firms. I repeat the three main forms of 
empirical analyses on the two sub-samples and the results are analysed in this section. 
5.5.1 Market measure subsample 
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I firstly repeat the univariate analysis on the 44 distressed firms and the results as shown in Table 
II 
5.10 are very similar to the full sample. As shown in Table 5.11, the source of distress analysis 
shows that the main feature of distress at year 0 is poor operating performance, with operating factor 
contributing to 94% of cash flow shortfall. The mean and median operating and leverage factors are 
not very different from each other so the values are not as skewed as the full sample. In addition, in 
the year prior to distress, the leverage factor plays a more important role than in the year of distress ýIf 
itself, the mean leverage factor accounts for 34% of cash flow shortfall and the median leverage 
factor accounts for 15% of cash flow shortfall. So these results confirm those from the full sample, 
that leverage factor plays a greater role in year 
-1 than in year 0 for a significant minority of firms. 
In the multivariate logit regression analysis, I repeat the standard procedure to derive the most 
il 
: appropriate specifications, i. e. by considering the correlation table and adopt the backward 
rocedure, rather than merely using the signiiicant'independent variables from the full sample 
analysis. The results, as shown in Table 5.12, are again similar to those from the full sample, with 
BITDAAS, CLIABAS (TLIABAS) and CAPEXAS significant at the 1% level. The location 
ummy 
DLOC 
and the FLOATING ratio are no longer significant and so are not reported here. The 
TATE variable was not significant in the full sample but is highly significant here (specification (1) 
and (2)). 
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Table 5.11 Source of cash flow shortfall analysis for the 44 distressed firms selected 
by the market measure 
This table shows distressed firms' capital expenditure over a three-year window: one year prior to the onset of 
distress (t=-1), the first year of interest coverage shortfall (t=0), and the second year of interest coverage 
shortfall (t=+1). Capital expenditure growth rates are calculated as current year capital expenditures less 
previous year capital expenditures divided by previous year capital expenditures. Panel A shows median 
capital expenditure growth rates between year 
-1 and 0, year 0 and +1, and year -1 and +1. In Panel B, I 
employ the Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its Z-statistic) to test for significance for the difference in median 
growths rates between SOE firms and non-SOE firms over the same three-year window. 
Panel A: Normalised sources of coverage shortfall In first year of distress (t=0) 
Factor 
Leverage 
Operating performance 
Full sample 
Standard 
Mean Median Deviation 
0.067 0.061 0.09330 
0.933 0.939 0.09330 
Panel B: Normalised sources of coverage shortfall in prior year of distress (t=11 
Leverage 0.336 0.152 0.99061 
Operating performance 0.664 0.848 0.99061 
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Table 5.12 Early indicators of distress for the 44 distressed firms selected by the 
market measure 
This table shows five specifications of logit regressions denoted by (1), (2), (3), etc., estimating the 
probability of distress (measured by interest coverage ratio<1 in two consecutive years). The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value of zero if the firm become distressed during the period of 
study, and one if otherwise. The independent variables are accounting ratios from year -1, one year before the 
onset of distress. The sample consists of 44 distressed firms and 40 non-distressed matching sample firms. 
Not all variables are available for all firms. N denotes the number of observations for each specification. I 
categorise the independent variables into operational, financial, investment, ownership, market and 
geographic location. For the operational category, SALAS denotes the ratio of sales over assets; EBITDAAS 
denotes the ratio of earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation divided by assets. In the 
financial category, TLIABAS denotes the ratio of total liabilities over assets; CLIABAS denotes the ratio of 
current liabilities over assets. In the investment category, CAPEXAS denotes capital expenditure over assets. 
In the ownership category, DSOEO takes the value of one if the firm is under the absolute control of the State 
and zero otherwise; as a substitute for DSOEO, DSOE takes the value of one if the firm is under the relative 
control of the State and zero otherwise. STATE is the percentage of State ownership. FLOATING ratio 
denotes the tradability of the sample firms' equity shares; it is the ratio of the number of tradable shares over 
total shares (tradable + non-tradable). DLOC is a geographic location dummy and takes on the value of I if 
the firm's headquarter is located in a major or coastal city and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of an independent 
variable is under the number of the regression specification; underneath the coefficient is its z-statistic. 
Operational 
SALAS 
EBITDAAS 
Financial 
TLIABAS 
CLIABAS 
Investment 
CAPEXAS 
-0.249 0.141 -2.092 -0.203 -4.290 
-0.206 0.111 -1.057 -0.140 -2.979 
6.472 
2.278 "' 
42.309 45.938 
2.061 2.633""' 
-7.816 
-2.981 
-9.490 -7.338 
-2.971 '"º -2.156 ** 
49.575 46.997 29.478 
3.275 3.192 """ 2.372 *" 
Ownership 
STATE 4.167 3.945 2.212 
2.656 "' 2.498 1.090. 
Location 
DLOC 
-9.074 
-2.675 "" 
22.921 31.749 
2.207 "* 2.433 "* 
-1.708 
-1.1667 
Loglikelihood 
-20.470 -19.739 -14.270 -18.547 -17.830 
McFadden R2 0.635 0.648 0.742 0.669 0.678 
N 81 81 80 81 80 
" Significant at the 10% level p 
"' Significant at the 5% level 
""" Significant at the 1% level 
5.5.2 ST/PT measure subsample 
Here I report the empirical analysis on the selected 74 ST firms. The univariate analysis 
again shows very similar results to the full sample, as shown in Table 5.13. The source of 
distress analysis results presented in Table 5.14 shows the same trend, i. e. leverage factor 
plays a greater role in causing cash flow shortfall in year 
-1 than in year 0, although the 
difference in magnitude is not as great as in the full sample. 
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Table 5.13 Performance indicators of the 74 distressed firms comp1red with their industries between t=-1,0 and +1 
This table presents empirical results of the comparison of the 74 distressed firms selected by the ST/PT measure with their industries, in terms of operating and financial 
performance, liquidity, employees and investment, before and during the first year of interest coverage shortfall and during the second year of interest coverage shortfall (t=- 
1,0, + 1). For each empirical proxy I give median values of the proxy for the firm and its industry median, the median change in the proxy's value between firm and industry 
median, and a test of significance of the difference. I employ the Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its Z-statistic) to test for significance for the difference between firm and 
industry median. 
t=1 t=0 t=+1 
firm firm firm 
Sample firm Industry median I ndustry-adjusted Sample firm Industry median I ndustry-adjusted Sample firm Industry medianl ndustry-adjusted 
Median Median Median Median Median Median Median Median Median 
Selection criteria 
Interest cover 3.2443 7.7998 
-4.4373 "' -2.8944 6.7015 -11.6964'"" -4.3445 6.8894 -12.0517 
Variables 
Operating performance 
EBITDA/asset 0.0565 0.0919 
-0.0335 "' -0.0608 0.0783 -0.1526 '' -0.1075 0.0673 -0.1854 
Gross Profit Margin 0.1937 0.2023 
-0.0319 0.1266 0.1871 -0.0894'"" 0.1080 0.1940 -0.1195 
EBITDA/saies 0.1560 0.1596 
-0.0067 -0.2538 0.1351 -0.45281 -0.6283 0.1326 -0.7551 
Sales/asset 0.3556 0.5643 
-0.2120 ' 0.2549 0.5084 -0.2542 0.2196 0.4904 -0.2786 
Financial performance 
Interest Expensetassets 0.0167 0.0118 0.0054 ' 0.0231 0.0117 0.0134 0.0305 0.0113 0.0203 
Current liab/total liab 0.9600 0.9356 0.0211 0.9612 0.9345 0.0060 0.9580 0.9410 0.0032 
Current liab/asset 0.4531 0.4072 0.0805 0.5459 0.3990 0.1552 0.6959 0.4274 0.2727 
Total liab/asset 0.5149 0.4857 0.0353 0.6305 
. 
0.4646 0.1680 0.7635 0.4829 0.2910 
Total debt/asset 0.3305 0.2396 0.0848 0.3767 0.2333 0.1913 0.4664 0.2625 0.2176 
Accounts payable/total liab 0.1395 0.1844 
-0.0448 0.1116 0.1970 -0.0968 0.0789 0.1671 -0.0987 
AccountsPayable/Sales 0.2142 0.1378 0.0755 0.2518 0.1489 0.0861 0.2952 0.1405 0.1303 
Liquidity 
Current asset/current hab 1.0059 1.3729 
-0.2326 0.8090 1.3914 -0.5999 0.4652 1.2733 -0.8307 
Investment 
Capex/assets 0.0130 0.0426 
-0.0218 -- 0.0072 0.0532 -0.0429 0.0049 0.0509 -0.0431 
Employee 
Sales/employee 0.2052 0.3086 
-0.0688 0.1065 0.3496 -0.1876 0.1026 0.4053 -0.1953 
Asset/employee 575364.8 546587.6 
-5749.6 513461.4 669646.0 -78851.1 594552 780863.3 -134778.7 
' Significant at the 10% level 
Significant at the 5% level 
'*' Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 5.14 Source of cash flow shortfall analysis for the 74 distressed firms selected 
by the ST/PT measure 
This table shows distressed fines' capital expenditure over a three-year window: one year prior to the onset of 
distress (t=-l), the first year of interest coverage shortfall (t-0), and the second year of interest coverage 
shortfall (t-+1). Capital expenditure growth rates are calculated as current year capital expenditures less 
previous year capital expenditures divided by previous year capital expenditures. Panel A shows median 
capital expenditure growth rates between year 
-1 and 0, year 0 and +1, and year -1 and +1. In Panel B, I 
employ the Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its Z-statistic) to test for significance for the difference in median 
capital expenditure growths rates between SOE firms and non-SOE firms over the same three-year window. 
Panel A: Normalised sources of coverage shortfall in first year of distress (t=O) 
Factor 
Leverage 
Operating performance 
Standard 
Mean Median Deviation 
0.070 0.058 0.10989 
0.930 0.942 0.10989 
Panel B: Normalised sources of coverage shortfall in prior year of distress (t=1) 
Leverage 0.680 0.069 4.41451 
Operating performance 0.320 0.931 4.41451 
Table 5.15 Early indicators of distress for the 74 distressed firms selected by the 
ST/PT measure 
This table shows four specifications of logit regressions denoted by (1), (2), (3), etc., estimating the 
probability of distress (measured by interest coverage ratio<1 in two consecutive years). The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value of zero if the firm become distressed during the period of 
study, and one if otherwise. The independent variäbles areaccounting ratios from year-1, one year before the 
c hset of distress. The sample consists of 74 distressed firms and 64 non-distressed matching sample firms. 
Not all variables are available for all firms. N denotes the number of observations for each specification. I 
categorise the independent variables into operational, financial, investment, ownership, market and 
geographic location. For the operational category, SALAS denotes the ratio of sales over assets; EBITDAAS 
denotes the ratio of earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation divided by assets. In the 
financial category, TLIABAS denotes the ratio of total liabilities over assets; CLIABAS denotes the ratio of 
current liabilities over assets. In the investment category, CAPEXAS denotes capital expenditure over assets. 
In the ownership category, DSOEO takes the value of one if the firm is under the absolute control of the State 
and zero otherwise; as a substitute for DSOEO, DSOE takes the value of one if the firm is under the relative 
control of the State and zero otherwise. STATE is the percentage of State ownership. FLOATING ratio 
denotes the tradability of the sample firms' equity shares; it is the ratio of the number of tradable shares over 
total shares (tradable + non-tradable). DLOC is a geographic location dummy, equals I if the firm's 
headquarter is located in a major or coastal city and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of an independent variable is 
under the number of the regression speci9cation; underneath the coefficient is its z-statistic. 
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-4.956 -0.239 0.837 -2.521 
-2.311 "' -0.186 0.930 -1.476 
Operational 
SALAS 
APSAL 
EBITDAAS 
Financial 
TLIABAS 
CLIABAS 
Investment 
CAPEXAS 
Ownership 
STATE 
DSOE 
Market 
FLOATING 
DummyAShare 
Location 
DLOC 
2.301 4.007 3.740 
1.774 * 3.435 3.476 *** 
49.315 52.252 
3.386 4.207 `** 
-6.254 -8.581 -8.579 
-2.670 *** -4.723 -4.704 *** 
24.182 22.719 21.556 25.676 
3.086 4.010 3.957 3.233 "'* 
-0.063 
-1.644 
2.072 1.014 
1.602 0.257 
2.34299 1.8745 1.8923 1.2057 
2.49261 2.7442 **' 2.7922 1.6295 
i Loglikelihood 
-29.173 -43.951 -44.594 -33.801 
McFadden R2 0.690 0.536 0.530 0.641 
N 136 137 137 136 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*'* Significant at the 1% level 
The multivariate regression also confirms the results from the full sample, i. e., EBITDAAS, 
CAPEXAS and CLIABAS (TLIABAS) are significant at the 1% level. DSOE, DSOEO 
and STATE are not significant, and so are not reported here. Different to the market 
measure subgroup, the location dummy DLOC is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
This result suggests that the market does not pick up on the location element, but when the 
firms are defined as distressed by the exchange regulators, its headquarter location becomes 
a significant contributor to the probability of distress. 
In summary, I select two distinct subgroups of distressed firms from my full sample of 100 
firms, using two alternative distress definitions. I repeat the full empirical analyses on these 
two sub-samples and the findings are very similar to the full sample, thus providing 
evidence for the robustness of my full sample results. 
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5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyses distressed firms' operating and financial performance and operating 
efficiency before and during the first two years of distress for 100 fines that became 
distressed between 1999 and 2003. I firstly investigate the nature and source of distress in 
China versus what is documented in the literature, I then explore differences within China 
between SOEs and non-SOEs. 
Firstly by examining my full sample of distressed firms, I find that prior to distress, 
distressed firms have statistically and economically significantly higher level of leverage 
than their industry, but very low capital expenditure. In addition, their profitability 
measured relative to asset base is also significantly worse than their industry, although 
profit margin on sales is not worse than industry median until the first year of distress. 
In my attempt to assess the relative contribution of leverage effect (financial distress) and 
operating performance effect (economic distress), I find that firm level poor operating 
performance is the main feature. In the first year of distress, the poor operating 
performance effect is responsible for 94% of distress firms' cash flow shortfall and only the 
remaining 6% is caused by the leverage effect. My results are consistent with the findings 
of Asquith et al. (1994) but are different to those of Andrade and Kaplan (1998). The 
difference probably reflects the difficulty in empirically-, distinguishing financial and 
economic distress. 
In addition, I find that the leverage, effect plays a greater role in the year prior to distress 
than it does during distress. The findings support the view that financial renegotiations in 
distress in China are inefficient. The economic nature of distress in my sample firms is 
,; more prominent 
than what Asquith et al. (1994) find. There are three potential 
explanations for this predominant economic nature of distress in these Chinese firms: 1. My 
sample selection criteria of at least two consecutive interest coverage shortfall means that 
the selected firms suffer more sustained distress than those studied in Asquith et al. (1994); 
2. Due to the inefficient renegotiation process in China between distressed firms and their 
creditors, i. e. as firms in financial difficulty are less likely to be able to access vital funds, 
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they are more likely to experience sustained distress; 3. Managers are less proactive in 
managing financial distress due to lack of experience (since competition is a relatively new 
concept) and the lack of bankruptcy threat. As for the cause of such inefficiency in 
renegotiation during firm distress, in addition to information asymmetry, potential 
explanations include the lack of a timely financial renegotiation process for companies in 
distress. Also, consistent with Asquith et al. (1994), distressed firms reduce capital 
expenditure dramatically to relief severe liquidity constraints. 
The multivariate logit regression analysis confirms my results that distressed firms' 
significant reduction of capital expenditure (CAPEX) prior to distress is a precursor of the 
subsequent distress. In addition, sales, earnings before interest tax depreciation and 
amortisation (EBITDA) and total liability scaled by assets also have significant influence 
on the probability of distress. Changes in EBITDA/assets and CAPEX/assets have much 
greater influence than in total liability/assets on the probability of distress, confirming my 
source of distress results that the main contributor to firm distress is economic. I repeat my 
empirical analyses on two subgroups selected by two alternative definitions of distress, and 
find my main results robust. 
Secondly I examine the existence of soft budget constraint in the Chinese context by 
comparing SOEs with non-SOEs in their investment behaviour. I find that the distressed 
non-SOE firms experience a significantly greater reduction in capital expenditure, both 
statistically and economically, than their SOE counterparts. The results suggest that as 
non-SOEs face hard budget constraints, they have no alternatives but to cut investment; 
whereas their SOE counterparts have soft budget constraints and the reduction of 
investment is less severe. Nonetheless, the fact that the distressed SOEs also significantly 
reduce investment over and above their industry median level, and that their performance 
overall is significantly worse than their industry, suggests that in the context of soft budget 
constraint, the SOEs selected by my distress selection procedure are also distressed, albeit 
with different level of liquidity constraints when facing distress. The existence of soft 
budget constraints does not seem to save the distressed SOEs from being distressed. With 
this result financial resources (bank loans) are not efficiently allocated. Furthermore, 
distressed SOE firms suffer statistically significantly lower gross profit margin than their 
industry median, partially as the result of significantly higher employee headcount (scaled 
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by assets) relative to industry median, suggesting that these firms are less efficient at an 
earlier stage than their non-SOE counterparts on an industry-adjusted basis. 
Based on my empirical results, the policy implications are, firstly, the long waited new 
bankruptcy code needs to address the existing inefficiencies in the distress resolution 
process in order to facilitate the efficient (re)allocation of resources, creditor protection 
should be provided and contract enforcement strengthened; secondly, the negative 
consequence of soft budge constraints should be avoided so that bank loans are not utilised 
to save non-viable SOEs, and that market led competition is encouraged and maintained. 
For investors, the Chinese accounting data seem to provide credible information about the 
possibility of a firm entering into distress. As for SOE firm managers, the fact that 
distressed SOEs are indeed distressed despite their facing soft instead of hard budget 
constraints, suggests that investment decisions in adverse conditions need to be proactively 
managed for the viability of the firms. 
In this chapter I use accounting information to examine the nature and source of corporate 
distress in China. Next I will examine the valuation effect of restructuring announcements 
made 
by these 100 distressed companies. 
I 
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CHAPTER 6- VALUATION EFFECT OF 
RESTRUCTURING ANNOUNCEMENTS BY 
CHINESE FIRMS IN DISTRESS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the distress resolution process in China by examining the 
valuation effect of 303 hand-collected restructuring. announcements made by the 100 
distressed companies studied in chapter S. The main restructuring types covered in this 
chapter include mergers and acquisitions, asset sales, debt and managerial restructuring. 
This chapter identifies successful restructuring strategies that have proven to be value 
enhancing against the backdrop of government ownership and under-developed legal and 
financial systems. This is the first study to investigate distress resolution process in China. 
This is important as this topic is under-researched in the context of emerging markets. The 
establishment of the two Chinese stock exchanges offers the opportunity to apply the 
established event study methodology and-facilitates the inclusion of China in the literature. 
Following the previous chapter, I also follow two distinct themes in this chapter. Firstly I 
will investigate all relevant issues using my full sample announcements; I will then separate 
my sample by ownership, into SOE and non-SOE subgroup, to shed light on the role of 
government in the distress resolution process. 
As discussed in section 4.4.1, existing literature states that although M&A does not seem to 
be successful in revamping the perfprmance of distressed firms, it may be the best available 
alternative at the time (Clark and Ofek 1994). In addition, its use is limited by equity- 
holders' incentive to maintain their option value (Weston et al. 2001). Using US data, Kahl 
(2001) argues that M&A are used in re-allocating assets to more efficient uses and that 
although Chapter 11 tends to maintain inefficient going concerns, these distressed firms are 
not tolerated for long by the market. In the case of China, WB (2000) documents frequent 
employment of M&A. My data confirms the findings in WB (2000) and Kahl (2001), as in 
my sample, 22% announcements were related to M&A. Due to the difficulties in officially 
liquidating economically unviable firms in the Chinese context due to the lack of effective 
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bankruptcy laws, these observed mergers are perhaps a beneficial outcome in terms of 
improved use of resources. 
Although there are extensive event studies in the literature on M&A, there is very little 
study in the context of distress. As summarised by Weston et al. (2001), empirical studies 
on M&A appear to support the notion that value is created by M&A activities and that 
target firms receive positive premium. My full sample event study results show that 
consistent with the literature, M&A with payment announcements generate positive market 
reaction. 
Asset sales and swaps constitute over one third of our sample announcements. Empirical 
studies from developed economies suggest asset sales are fairly commonly and successfully 
utilised by financially distressed firms (Asquith et al 1994, Lasfer et al 1996, Lai and 
Sudarsanam 1997, and Kahl 2001). Lasfer et al. (1996) argue that the main driver for 
shareholder wealth enhancement of the distressed firms comes from the avoidance of 
bankruptcy costs by using cash generated from selling assets to meet debt obligations. 
i 
Contrary to the above findings from the above US/UK studies, my event study results show 
that neither voluntary nor forced asset sales are perceived as positive news by the Chinese 
market. My explanation is that the lack of bankruptcy threat in China minimises the 
potential benefit of avoiding bankruptcy costs which shareholders otherwise have to bear. 
This is a credible explanation 
- 
recall that in-the-two case studies in section 4.2.1, the 
motivation for asset sales is associated with providing liquidity for the operations of the 
firm and for managers to embark upon new operating strategies, rather than for meeting 
debt obligations as recorded elsewhere (Asquith et al. 1994; Lasfer et al. 1996). Another 
potential explanation for the negative market reaction is that distressed assets are sold 
below their intrinsic value (Pulvino 1998, Shleifer and Vishny 1992, and Garnaut et al. 
2004). 
Debt related restructuring consists of 17% of my sample announcements. The relatively 
low number of debt related restructuring confirms the claim that there may be a lack of 
creditor participation/protection in the Chinese bankruptcy and distress resolution process. 
Debt restructuring can only go in one of two directions 
- 
increasing or decreasing firm 
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leverage. However, to successfully restructure a distressed firm by increasing its leverage 
relies on an effective debt governance environment. Extensive studies based on developed 
economies provide strong evidence to support the notion that debt has a positive 
disciplinary role (Jensen 1986, Wruck 1990) and that the market reacts unfavourably to 
announcements on decreasing leverages but favourably to those on increasing leverages. 
In the case of China, according to Tian (2005), debt governance is not at work especially 
among SOEs. My full sample results on debt related restructuring is not clear cut and this 
issue will be further examined in the SOE and non-SOE subgroups. 
Managerial restructuring consists of 21% of my sample announcements. Evidence from 
developed economies shows that forced senior management departure is greeted with relief 
by the market, but voluntary resignations do not cause a price reaction (Denis and Denis 
1995, Dherment"Ferere and Renneboog 2002). In a socialist economy, if there is 
asymmetric information on managerial skills, good managers have little incentives to exert 
effort (Roland and Sekkat 2000). Furthermore, Garnaut et al. (2004) Argue the main 
problem in China is that poor performance is not credibly punished. Also, this type of 
announcement may signal to the market about the unfavourable current and future 
performance 
of the companies. As expected, I find that managerial restructuring is not seen 
by the market as an effective restructuring strategy, except for the foreign invested 
enterprises (FIE). There are two potential explanations for the different results between the 
FIE firms and the domestic firms (SOE plus non-SOE): 1). FIES are not subject to the 
domestic managerial pool; 2). FIEs are more efficient in monitoring their managers and 
incumbent managers are replaced more quickly than they are by the domestic companies. 
Unfortunately this positive result is derived on a small sample 
- 
with data availability this 
topic would provide an interestingoavenue for future research. 
Having examined my full sample event study results, I then categorise my sample firm 
announcements by ownership, into SOE and non-SOE subgroups. Firstly, consistent with 
my expectations, M&A with payment strategy works for the non-SOE firms where the 
announcements signal the market that the distressed firm is of value to the acquirer, whom 
the market expects to manage the distressed firm more efficiently. On the contrary, the 
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market reacts negatively to M&A without payment42 announcements made by the 
distressed SOE firms (the targets). This negative market reaction suggests that a mere 
controlling ownership "transfer" of a distressed SOE firm, from one government agency to 
another is not perceived as effective by the market and is value destroying. This finding 
highlights the undesired role of government in the M&A process. 
Furthermore, M&A with payment announcements made by SOE firms do not cause 
statistically significant price reaction. For this type of announcement, if the potential buyer 
is a non-SOE, the intended transaction would entail the privatisation of the seller SOE; 
however if the potential buyer is another SOE, the market may anticipate no real change to 
the distressed enterprise. In addition, as highlighted by the Joint-WIT case in section 2.5.2, 
distressed SOEs may be associated with overly large labour force which can be costly to 
settle. This non-reaction by the market suggests that the negative and the positive effects in 
this type of announcement cancel each other out. 
The effectiveness of debt restructuring is mixed. As argued by Tian (2004), for SOEs, 
larger bank loans lead to higher free cash flow and significantly higher administrative 
expenditure. As expected, I find the market reacts strongly in favour of leverage increasing 
announcements made by non-SOE firms but is somewhat indifferent to those made by the 
SOE firms (the results are negative but not statistically significant). The evidence supports 
the argument that debt governance is not at work among SOEs. As a result, restructuring 
distressed SQEs by. increasing their leverage is not seen as good news by the market. 
In addition, the market reacts significantly negatively to non-SOEs' attempt to renegotiate 
their debt contracts with their banks, but not significantly (economically but not statistically 
significant) to the same announcements made by SOEs. In the presence of soft budget 
constraint, this result suggest that the market perceive non-SOEs' attempt to renegotiate 
with their banks to be unsuccessful. These results provide weak evidence to suggest that 
there may be lending bias by the Chinese banks towards SOEs. The evidence so far 
suggests that the role of government in corporate China is not desirable yet resources are 
42 Note that "without payment" should not be confused with "payment terms". Detailed explanation has 
been given in section 4.2.1. 
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still allocated with a bias towards SOEs. This finding raises the question of what needs to 
be done to ensure the efficient allocation of financial resources (bank loans). 
The fundamental message of the findings is that the political motivation of the government 
manifests itself in the distortion of fund allocation and operating investment decisions in 
the Chinese distress resolution process. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 summarises the relevant 
literature, defines research questions and discuss some practical issues in using event study 
in the context of China, in which section 6.2.1 contains the China-related hypotheses and 
section 6.2.2 the SOE versus non-SOE ones; section 6.3 presents event study methodology; 
section 6.4 describes the data sample; section 6.5 discusses the empirical results and section 
6.6 concludes. 
6.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES 
AND HYPOTHESES 
Studies based on developed economies seich as US and UK show that firms in distress often 
employ 
a variety of restructuring strategies to resolve the situation, including financial and 
non-financial restructuring strategies. As discussed in section 3.1.2 and section 4.2, I 
broadly group restructuring strategies into three categories: asset, financial, and managerial 
restructuring, and look at each in turn. I will firstly review the literature for my full sample 
event study, and then review the literature on these three categories in a SOE vs non-SOE 
context. 
6.2.1 Valuation effect of restructuring announcements in China (China vs 
non-China) 
A. Asset restructuring 
Following Weston et al. (2001), 1 categorise both M&A and asset sales in the asset 
restructuring category. 
As discussed in detail in section 4.4.1, existing literature states that although M&A does not 
seem to be successful in revamping the performance of distressed firms, it may be the best 
available alternative at the time. In addition, its use is limited by equity-holders' incentive 
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to maintain their option value. Despite what the literature predicts, M&A has been used 
extensively in China to resolve distress (WB 2000). The popularity of such strategy is 
partly motivated by the institutional features of China, as discussed in detail in section 
4.2.1. 
There is very little existing literature on M&A using event study in a distress context. 
However as discussed in section 4.4.1, extensive empirical studies on M&A show that 
following M&A announcements, target firms receive significantly positive premium. As 
such I expect M&A with payment announcements made by my sample firms, which are all 
targets, receive positive market reaction. 
Hl: M&A with payment announcements generate positive market reaction. 
In the asset sales category, assets include tangible fixed assets, intangible assets and equity 
shareholding in another company (usually'non-tradable)43. Existing empirical studies 
suggest asset sales is fairly commonly utilised by financially distressed firms and often 
leads to successful resolution of distress (Asquith et al 1994, Lasfer et al 1996, Lai and 
udarsanam 1997 and Kahl 2001). Lasfer et al (1996) argue that the main driver for 
shareholder wealth enhancement comes from distressed firms' asset sales generating 
sufficient cash to meet their debt obligations and avoiding bankruptcy. In general, the 
empirical evidence on the impact of paying down debt on shareholder wealth gains from 
asset sales is positive, albeit at differing magnitudes (Ofek 1993, Brown et al 1994, Lasfer 
et al 1996, Denis and Kruse 2000). 
However this evidence is gathered from developed economies. In the case of China, 
although there exist formal insolvency and liquidation procedures, these procedures are 
rarely used and distressed and insolvent firms tend to be kept afloat (WB 2000, Garnaut et 
al. 2004, Tian 2005, Allen et al. 2005, and chapter 5 of this thesis). Without the explicit 
threat of bankruptcy, the shareholders would not gain the benefit of avoiding bankruptcy 
costs by selling assets to avoid "bankruptcy". Also, these assets may be sold or exchanged 
43 Distressed Chinese companies selling and transferring their minority shareholding of another company is 
documented in ADB (2000). Although this type of asset sales does not seem to be widely adopted by 
distressed firms elsewhere when they restructure, it is observed in the Netherlands (Frederikslust et al. 2003). 
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under their intrinsic values (Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Pulvino 1998), especially for those 
sold in a hurry to pay back debt. As such I expect the market reacts negatively to the asset 
sales/swaps type of announcement. 
H2: Announcements both of asset sales, whether voluntary or forced, and of asset swaps 
generate negative market reaction. 
B. Debt restructuring 
Debt restructuring is when a firm restructures its debt structure by either, increasing or 
decreasing firm leverage, for example interest forgiveness / deduction / extension, debt 
obligation transfer or taking on new debt, or debt-for-equity swaps. 
As discussed in detail in section 4.3.1, increasing firm leverage by taking on debt not only 
provides the firm with tax shield, but also puts pressure on the firm for efficiency to meet 
debt obligations, in other words, debt provides positive disciplinary role (Jensen 1986, 
Wruck 1990). Studies on exchange offers provide empirical evidence to support this claim 
Weston et al 2001). However, according to Tian (2004), debt governance is not at work in 
China, as larger bank loans lead to higher free cash flow and significantly higher 
administrative expenditure. Therefore I expect negative market reaction to distressed 
firms' announcements on increasing leverage. 
H3: Announcements to increase leverage receive negative market reaction. 
C. Managerial restructuring 
0 
This includes senior management and board members departure (voluntary or forced) and 
new appointments. The issue of managerial restructuring as a response to performance 
decline has been studied extensively in the developed economies and the findings on forced 
managerial resignations are ambiguous. Denis and Denis (1995) study 69 forced 
resignations and find that the dismissal of underperforming management is greeted with 
relief by the market. Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog (2002) recorded a 0.5% positive 
abnormal return over forced CEO departure in a sample of listed French companies, 
whereas voluntary resignations do not cause a price reaction. On the contrary, Warner et 
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al. (1988) uncover significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns of-4.3% subsequent 
to forced turnover (in the period of 5 to 30 days following the dismissal). This negative 
market reaction is explained by an information effect which masks the real impact of forced 
turnover on shareholder wealth: forced turnover may signal poor current and future 
performance which had not yet been uncovered nor anticipated by the market. 
In a socialist economy, if there is asymmetric information on managerial skills, good 
managers have little incentives to exert effort (Roland and Sekkat 2000). Also, according 
to Garnaut et al (2004), the main problem in the Chinese managerial system is that 
managers are rewarded for their success but not credibly punished for their failure. 
Furthermore, this type of announcement signals to the market about the unfavourable 
current and future performance of the companies. So I expect the event study results on 
this type of news to be negative. Furthermore, FIE firms have better access to international 
managerial labour market and hence this type of announcements made by FIE firms is 
expected to receive positive market reaction, consistent with Denis and Denis (1995) and 
Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog (2002). 
ý4: Domestic firms' managerial restructuring announcements are associated with 
negative price reaction. 
H5: FIE firms' aanagerial restructuring announcements are associated with positive 
price reaction. 
6.2.2 SOE vs non-SOE 
A. Asset restructuring 
For the M&A category, as discussed in detail in section 4.2.1, one pertinent feature of the 
Chinese M&A is that for some SOEs, mergers take place under the initiative of the 
government without payment involved, i. e., the without payment type of merger is when 
the former government controlling shareholder simply transfers its holding to another 
government shareholder. Since the government has a very different motivation when 
restructuring, I expect the market to react differently to the different types of M&A. 
Page 147 
I expect that M&A with payment announcements enhance shareholder wealth. As the new 
owner is willing to pay a price for the distressed company, the market has a positive 
anticipation of the new company and I expect the market to react favourably. I also expect 
that the without payment announcements generate negative abnormal returns, as this type 
of transaction merely changes the ownership of the distressed firm from one government 
agency to another, with the government's primary motivation being maintaining political 
and social stability over profit maximisation. Explicitly: 
H6: M&A with payment announcements by non-SOEs generate positive market reaction. 
H7: M&A without payment (by SOEs) announcements generate negative market reaction. 
The expectation of M&A with payment announcements by SOEs is mixed. On the one 
hand, the payment effect of the announced transaction signals the market the positive 
prospect of the company. In other words, the distressed company is of value to the buyer 
and the buyer maybe able to manage the company more effectively. In addition, the case 
of a non-SOE buyer means the state controlled shares will be privatised. On the other 
hand, as highlighted by the Joint-WIT Case in. section 2.5.2 and the significantly lower 
assets/employee 
ratio in Table 5.7, distressed SOEs often face inefficiency caused by 
overly large labour force which could result in costly settlement for the new owner. As 
such I expect mixed market reaction: 
H8: M&A with payment announcements by SOEs do not generate significant market price 
reaction. 
B. Debt restructuring 
As discussed in the previous section, Tian (2004) argues that larger bank loans lead to 
higher free cash flow and significantly higher administrative expenditure. He also finds 
such relationship is positive and significant in SOEs but in the case of non-SOEs, it is not 
significant. Consistent with what the literature predicts, I expect that the market reacts 
positively to increasing debt announcements made by non-SOEs but negatively to those by 
SOEs. 
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H9: The market reacts negatively to the increasing leverage type of news made by non- 
SOE firms 
H10: The market reacts negatively to the increasing leverage type of news made by SOE 
firms 
In addition, renegotiation between debtors and creditors is also frequently observed in 
other studies (Asquith et al. 1994, Lai and Sudarsanam 1997). Naturally, the distressed 
firms' ability to renegotiate debt with their lenders is perceived as good news. In the 
context of soft budget constraints, I would expect that the SOEs have more power in their 
attempt to renegotiate with their banks than their non-SOE counterpart. Thus I expect that 
the market anticipates the likelihood/success of creditor renegotiations and reacts 
favourably to such announcements made by SOEs, but not is necessarily positively to those 
made by non-SOEs. 
Hi 1: The market reacts favourably to debt renegotiation announcements made by SOEs 
H12: The market does not react favourably to debt renegotiation announcements by non- 
SOEs (so the expected result is either negative or no reaction). 
i 
6.3 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Event study methodology has been widely employed to study China related topics (Chuff 
and Kwok 1998, Abdel-khalik et al. 1999, Bailey et al. 1999, Cheng 2000, Gao and Tse 
2004, Barnes and Ma 2002). Barnes and Ma (2002) provide evidence to support the semi- 
strong form efficiency of the Chinese stock markets. 
Some of the typical emerging market characteristics which may affect the design of the 
model are worth mentioning here. For example, Mei et al. (2004) believe the Chinese stock 
market's trading is speculative. Abdel-khalik et al. (1999) use Sharpe's market model as 
they believe that given the lack of quality of the published financial data or the information 
generating these data, more rigorous research designs are not justified. Gao and Tse (2004) 
suggest there is information leakage before events take place. In addition, as discussed in 
44 Note that unlike for H9 and HIO, this type'of announcement does not necessarily change the firm's leverage 
level. 
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section 4.1, listed companies which have been making losses (negative net profit) for two 
consecutive years are categorised as "special treatment" (ST), whereas companies that have 
been making losses for three consecutive years are to be put into "Particular Treatment" 
(PT) status and are suspended from the Exchanges. ST firms are limited to 5% share-price 
movements up or down daily. The above characteristics need to be taken into account in 
my event study model specification. 
I employ the market model as the benchmark for expected returns45. One motivation for 
employing the market model benchmark is that, in general this model results in smaller 
variances of abnormal returns and produces smaller correlations across security abnormal 
returns giving closer conformity to standard statistical tests (Beaver, 1981). 
Using the notation from Strong (1992), the basic model is: 
xo : E(R JIy, ) - E(R, ) = E(£, I y, ) = 0, for all yi 
HA : E(R I yj) 
- 
E(R j) = E(c1 I yj) * 0, for at least one yj (1) 
f 
where R, is the return on security j in an event period of interest; 
yj is the information signal of the firm specific event of interest, in this case the 
restructuring announcement; 
E(Ri I Yj) is the expected value of the return distribution on security j during 
the event period; 
E(R) is the expected value of the return distribution on securityj, unconditional 
with respect to yj 
, 
but will be conditional on information available prior to the 
event period and, in some research design, on the return of the market index in 
the event period; 
E(ej I y, ) denotes the unexpected or abnormal return on security j conditional 
on the signal yj 
. 
45 We also employ the market adjusted model and the results do not change. 
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The alternative hypothesis states that for the information signal y, to possess information 
content, E(s, I yj) must be non-zero. 
The alternative hypothesis states that for the information signal y, to possess information 
content, E(e, I y1) must be non-zero. As stated by Strong (1992), the basic structure of an 
event study analysis is: 
1. Identify event dates; 
. 
2. Within the overall test period (TT) of interest, calculate abnormal returns for each 
firm and for each period within TP: 
sir 
.= 
Rat 
- 
E(Rj, ), tE TP is the measurement interval 
3. Compute the mean abnormal return across firms in the sample, possibly cumulated 
over the TP, as an estimate of E(sj I yj) and test whether E(Ei I yj) =0 using a test 
statistic of the form: 
mean abnormal return 
standard deviation 
Within this structure, various dimensions affect the calculation of abnormal returns such as 
calculation of returns, return measurement interval, the benchmark for abnormal returns, 
the choice of estimation period (ET) and test period (TP), and the choice of market index. 
As a result in the current literature there is an established spectrum of experimental designs 
over which researchers are given discretion. As stated by Jarrow et al. (2001), it is 
important to note that only when underlying assumptions are valid can refinements improve 
the power of tests and efficiency otparameter estimates. In addition, minor variations in 
empirical methods have little impact on inferences. Hence, in general simplicity is 
preferred over the sophistication in modelling or statistical techniques (Brown & Warner 
1980,1985; Malatesta 1986; and Strong 1992). More recently, Levy (2000) also indicates 
that the choice of model does not significantly affect the results. These observations are 
particularly applicable to the Chinese context due to the emerging nature of its stock 
market. 
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Next, I will explain the steps by which the event study analyses will be carried out and 
define my choice of the above mentioned dimensions. 
Step 1: The benchmark of abnormal return 
- 
the expected return 
The market model46 is expressed as follows: 
R j, =a, +, ß1 Rß + eßt (2) 
Where sit is a mean zero, independent disturbance term in period t, /1 is the beta, i. e. the 
sensitivity of return j to the market movements, aj measures the mean return over the 
period not explained by the market, and R, is the return on the respective stock exchange 
all shares index for the period t. This equation partitions R j, into a systematic component 
linearly related to R., and an unsystematic component sj,, which is uncorrelated with R.. 
The effect of the restructuring announcements is meant to be fully captured in this 
f 
unsystematic component, s j, , and the assumption being that the information signal and R, : 
are independent. 
In addition, the market adjusted returns benchmark will also be employed to compare the 
results and check for the robustness of the models. The market adjusted returns benchmark 
uses the same formula as equation (2), and it specifies that aj =0 and ß1=1. This is based 
on the assumption that, because alpha equals zero in the long run and betas vary over time, 
their estimation will be inaccurate to base around a model of expected returns, though they 
will eventually converge to unity. In this case, the ex-post abnormal return of security j in 
period t that controls for market effects is given by: 
AR1, 
= sj, = R1, - Rmt (3) 
Step 2: Estimation Period (EP) and Test Period (TP) 
46 According to Strong (1992), the market model has probably been the most popular benchmark adopted 
in event studies. 
, *I, ý. 
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The implementation of the two models requires the definition of the event of interest, the 
event date, the event window or test period (TP), which is the period over which the returns 
will be examined and the estimation period for benchmark returns. The event day (tom) is 
defined as the day when the firm announces its restructuring plan. However there might be 
information leakages before the announcement or drifts after the announcement in 
restructuring related events. Furthermore, the price cap of+/-5% for ST firms also needs to 
be taken into account. In order to fully capture the information content of the 
announcements, we use a wider event window of 81 days (t=-41, 
..., 
0,..., +41). This 
width of event window is also employed by other studies of similar nature, e. g. Lasfer et al. 
(1996). 
EP needs to be specified to estimate the benchmark expected return, i. e. the alpha and beta 
in equation (2) for the market model, and subsequent t-tests for both the market model and 
the market adjusted model. I employ daily log returns and an estimation window of 200 
days (t=-241 to 
-41). 
Step 3: The calculation of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns 
t 
Daily returns are used and the calculation is given by: 
Rft 
=1n(Pj, ) 
-1n(Pj, 
_1) (4) 
Where P,, and P,, 
_, 
are the closing price of security j at the end of day t and t-1 
respectively. 
Market return is calculated as follows: 
R, 
t = 
ln(I, ) 
- 
ln(I: 
_, 
) (5) 
Where I, and I, 
_, 
are the market index levels at the end of day t and t-1 respectively. 
For the market adjusted model, the expected return is the market return hence the abnormal 
return ARS, equals (R. 
- 
R., ). 
Cumulative Abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated as follows: 
CARS 
=Z AR J teTP 
(6) 
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For the market model, before expected returns of each security during TP can be estimated, 
the security's alpha and beta will be estimated by performing an OLS regression using 
security returns during EP. Therefore the abnormal return for each security is given by 
equation (2) and calculated as follows: 
ARft 
=R ft-(aj +/3j Rmt (7) 
CARs are used to fully capture the effect of an event on share prices, and to accommodate 
uncertainty over the exact date of the event (Strong 1992). Also, this takes care of the issue 
of price movement cap for `ST' firms discussed in section 6.3.2. In this chapter, CAR(0, 
+1) or CAR2 denote the accumulation of abnormal returns over a two days window (t=0, 
+1); CAR(-2, +2) or CAR5 denote that of a5 days window (t---2,... O,... +2); and CAR(-5, 
+5) or CAR, 1 denote that of a 11 days window (t=-5, 
... 
0, 
... 
+5). 
The significance tests of the AR will be carried out, using equation 8 below: 
ARr :t= 
StErr N(O, l), (8) 
S(AR) 
_1 z 
where S(AR) 
_ 
'EEP(Er T-s+2,, EPA`) (9) 
T-s+1 
The significance tests of the CAR will be carried out, using equation 10 below: 
CARTP :t= `ErP N(0,1), (10) S(CAR) 
where S(CAR) 
_ 
S(AR) (11) 
T-s+1 
Step 4: Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) 
AARs are calculated to measure the average impact of a distress resolution category with 
multiple events that have been announced in multiple dates. The calculation is as follows: 
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N 
AAR, 
=1s,, fETP 
x J-1 
(i2) 
Where N= number of announcements relating to the same distress resolution 
category. 
Similarly, CAAR are calculated by accumulating AARs over an event window: 
CAARTP 
= 
AAR, 
teTP 
(13) 
The significance tests of the AAR and CAAR will be carried out, using equations (14) and 
(16) below respectively. 
N 
-- 
N(0,1), (14) AARt :t=S (AAR) 
1 E(fir 
- 
A`4R 
, I)2 
where S(AAR) = 'EEP T-s+2, EEp (15) 
{ T-s+l 
CAARW :t= S( 
AR) 
; ze N(0,1), (16) 
where S(CAAR) S(AAR) 
_ 
(17) 
T-s+l 
.4 
The parametric t-test on AAR assumes implicitly that the mean effect of the event is 
identical across securities within the group (Strong 1992, p545) and that cross-sectional 
abnormal returns are independent (absent of cross-correlation). Considering the small 
sample properties and possible non-normal distribution of the abnormal returns, I also 
apply a nonparametric generalised sign test (Cowan 1992). The test examines if the 
number of stocks with positive abnormal returns exceeds the number expected in the 
absence of abnormal performance in the event window. The null hypothesis for the 
traditional sign test is thatp=0.5. In the generalized sign test, the null hypothesis does not 
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specifyp as 0.5, but as the fraction of positive returns computed across stocks and across 
days in the parameter estimation period. The fraction of positive abnormal returns 
expected in the 200-day estimation window under the null hypothesis is: 
1N1 
-41 
18 
n 2001-Zao  
() 
where 
Srr 
=l if AR; t >0 
0 otherwise 
The generalised sign test statistic uses the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution (with parameter p) and is defined as follows: 
A 
w-np ZG 
-AA 1np(1-p) (19) 
where w is the number of stocks in the event window for which the (cumulative) average 
abnormal return (CAR; ) is positive. The generalised. sign test is more powerful than the 
rank test as the length of the event window increases and for highly volatile stock returns 
(Cowan 1992). 
t 
6.4 DATA 
I use the 100 distressed companies defined in section 5.3.1 as my distressed companies 
universe, and collected 4174748 restructuring announcements made by these 100 companies 
in compliance with the Stock Exchanges' official announcement requirements, over a six 
years period, between year 
-2 (i. e. two years prior to the onset of distress) and year +3 
(three years following the onset of distress). The details of the source of these 
announcements are discussed in section 2.3.2 and 4.2.1. A list of the announcements is 
presented in Appendix 6. In the M&A category, all firms in my sample are a takeover 
target. In addition, in the asset sales category, I classify announcements into forced and 
47 I have in fact collected 479 announcements, of which 417 are initial announcements (when the news first 
arrive at the market) and 62 are made up by updates and approval/completion announcements, mainly for the 
M&A category. I conducted event study on these 62 announcements and the results show that updates do not 
carry information but the approval/completion announcements carry extra information content to which the 
market responds. This result suggests that the added certainty of completion, rather than the stated intention of 
M&A, carry significant additional information content. 
48 In all M&A cases, the target remains a listed entity with its own independent annual reports after the 
completion of the takeover transactions. 
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voluntary asset sales subgroups. An asset sales announcement is classified into the forced 
asset sales subgroup if it explicitly states that the proceeds of the intended asset sales (or 
assets being auctioned under court order) are used to pay back debts due, and an asset sales 
announcement without the explicit mention of using proceeds to pay back debts due is 
classified into the voluntary asset sales subgroup. 
In the debt related restructuring category, I classify announcements into three subgroups: 
increasing leverage; renew debts and debt renegotiation. The increasing leverage subgroup 
includes both announcements on taking new bank loans and on the firms' intention to take 
new bank loans; the renew debts subgroup includes announcements on these firms' bank 
debt renewal; the debt renegotiation subgroup includes announcements on details of the 
firms' renegotiations with their creditors on debt renewal, interest and/or principal 
forgiveness/reduction, or maturity extension. In all three subgroups, the bank loan due 
dates are either imminent or already overdue. Lastly, in the managerial restructuring 
category, there are three subgroups: a). resignation and appointments; b). termination and 
appointments; and c). appointments only. 
f 
Among the 417 announcements, 94 were eliminated to avoid confounding measurement of 
price reaction discussed in the previous section. In addition, 20 events were eliminated as 
there are more than 30 missing daily returns in the test period (TP) for each of the 20 
events. Table 6.1 presents the remaining 303 announcements by distress year and by 
restructuring type. 17%- of these announcements are M&A with payments and 5% are 
M&A without payments; 40% are asset sales or swaps; 17% are debt related restructuring; 
and 21% relate to managerial restructuring. Of the 303 announcements, 1% was made 
during the second year prior to thd onset of distress (year 
-2) and 15% were made during 
the first year prior to the onset of distress (year t= 
-1); the percentage nearly doubled to 
28% during the onset of distress (year 0) and peaked to 29% during the year following the 
onset of distress (year +1); only 4% were announced three years after the onset of distress 
(year +3). 
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Table 6.1 Announcement data 
. 
-, 
This table presents the 303 announcements by restructuring type, ownership and distress year. Column 1 shows the announcement type; Column 2 presents ownership type; 
Column 3-8 present the number of announcements made in each distress year, where t=0 denotes the first year the firm suffers from interest coverage shortfall, and t=-2 
denotes two years prior to the first year of interest coverage shortfall; Column 9 presents the total of different restructuring announcement categories and Column 10 presents 
the percentage by announcement type. Ownership type includes foreign invested enterprises (FIE), Other (i. e. non-SOE) and SOE firms. FIE type does not occur in all 
restructuring categories. 
Grand 
Announcement type Ownership Year t= 
-2 Year t= -1 Year t=0 Year t= +1 Year t= +2 Year t= +3 Total 
1. Asset Restructuring 
1.1 M&A 
M&A with payments Other 
SOE 
3 
6 
9 
9 
8 
8 
2 
7 
22 
30 
Subtotal 9 18 16 9 52 17% 
M&A without payments SOE 1 4 6 2 3 16 
Subtotal 1 4 6 2 3 16 5% 
1.2 Asset sales/swaps 
Asset sales Other 
SOE 
7 
7 
7 
9 
2 
7 
13 
6 
1 30 
29 
Subtotal 14 16 9 19 1 59 20% 
Forced asset sales FIE 
Other 
SOE 
1 2 
2 
1 
3 
6 
3 
4 
1 
1 
10 
12 
Subtotal 1 4 10 7 1 23 8% 
Asset swaps Other 
SOE 
1 
1 
1 
3 10 
5 
6 
3 
6 
10 
26 
Subtotal 2 4 10 11 9 36 12% 
2. Debt related restructuring 
Debt related 
- 
increasing 
leverage 
Other 
SOE 
43512 
13422 
15 
12 
Subtotal 56934 27 9% 
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6.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.5.1. China versus other economies 
The event study results for the three main restructuring categories are presented in Table 
6.2. As we can see in Table 6.2, broadly the non-parametric sign test results are consistent 
with the parametric t-tests. Below I discuss the event study results for M&A, asset sales, 
debt related restructuring and managerial restructuring announcements in turn. In principal 
all results that are significant either in the parametric or non-parametric (or both) are 
discussed. 
A. M&A 
As Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 shows, as expected, the market embraces M&A with payment 
announcements on and around the announcement day 0. AARo is 1.3%, CAAR(-40,0) is 
9.4%, CAAR(-40, +20) decreases to 6.9% but CAAR(-40, +40) is no longer significant. 
The market reacts positively prior to and around the announcement day but CAARs decline 
post announcement day. The full 81 
-day CAAR is not significant. This result supports hypothesis 
1. 
Figure 6.1 Cumulative average abnormal returns for 81-day event period centered on 
announcement day for the M&A with payment category 
14.0% 
12.0% 
10.0% 
e0% 
e 0% 
4.0% 
2.0% 
00% 
1 
, y9 ýh , ý. ý0 ýb , ý9 , ýO 1f;. 1" 5O 
-2.0% 
j-r-M Smn 
-S-non. SOE -1-SOE 
ox-% % .( 
t 
.. ... ... ..... 
Page 160 
Table 6 
.2 Event study results for the full sample This table presents the event study results for the three restructuring categories: asset restructuring including 
M&A and asset sales/swaps; debt and managerial restructuring. Column 1 givens the types of restructuring 
and the sub-sample by ownership type; Column 2 provides the number of observations in each category (sub- 
category); Columns 3 
-7 present the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) on day -40, -20,0, +20 
and +40; Column 8 presents the average abnormal returns (AAR) on the event day (day 0). 
Asset restructunng N CAAR 0 CHAR 0 CAAR0 CAAR. 20 CAAR+4O AARO 
M&A 
M&A with payment 
Full sample 52 0.4% 2.9% "b9.4% "' " 6.9% -b3.5% 1.3% "' b 
Asset sales 
Voluntary asset sales 
Full sample 59 
-0.4% -0.9% -0.9% -4.2% -5.3%' 0.6% b 
Forced asset sales 
Full sample 23 
-0.2% 2.2% 0.8% -2.5% -8.4% 0.0% 
Asset swaps 
Full sample 36 
-0. T% b 0.7% 1.3% 0.0% -2.4% 1.2% b 
Debt restructuring 
Increasing leverage 
Full sample 27 0.4% 2.0% 4.8% 3.7% 4.5% 0.2% 
Renew debts 
Full sample 10 
-0.7% - 0.3% -0.2% -2.3% -0.3% 0.4% 
Debt renegotiation 
Full sample 16 
-0.4% 0.4% 2.4% -3.5% -6.2% 0.4% 
Managerial restructuring 
Resignation/appointments 
Full sample 40 
-0.5"/x' b -1.6% -2.6% -4.0% -7.4%" -0.1% 
Termination/appointments 
Full sample 11 
-0.3% " -1.8% -2.2% -1.3% -6.4% -0.5% 
Appointments only 
Full sample 13 0.1% 
-1.3% -3.6% -4.8% -2.6% -0.2% 
Managerial related 
non-SOE 28 
-0.2% -3.0% -4.2% -7.1%" -10.6%"' 0.1% 
SOE 32 
-0.5% b -0.6% -2.7% -3.5% -5.6% -0.2% 
FIE 4 
-0.7% -1.1% 8.1% 16.9%' b 14.6% b -1.8%' 
"'" Significant at the 1% level in the t-test 
Significant at the 5% level In the t-test 
a Significant at the 1% level in the sign test 
b Significant at the 5% level in the sign test 
0 
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Figure 6.2 Cumulative average abnormal returns for 81-day event period centered on 
announcement day for the M&A with and without payments categories 
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B. Asset sales and swaps 
As we can see in Table 6.2, CAAR(-40, +40) for the voluntary asset sales announcements 
is 
-5.3%, for the forced asset sales announcements is -8.4%49, and for the asset swaps 
announcements is negative but not significant. Therefore in the case of asset sales and 
swaps, different to existing literature based on US/UK studies, market reacts negatively as 
expected. Hypothesis 2 is supported. The magnitudes CAARs for the three types of asset 
sales/swaps are presented in Figure 3,4 and 5. 
a 
49Results for both voluntary and forced asset sales are only significant at 10% in the parametric test but 
not significant in the non-parametric test. 
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Figure 6.3 Cumulative average abnormal returns for 81-day event period centered on 
announcement day for the voluntary asset sales category 
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Figure 6.4 Cumulative average abnormal returns for 81-day event period centered on 
announcement day for the forced asset sales category 
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Figure 6.5 Cumulative average abnormal returns for 81-day event period centered on 
announcement day for the asset swaps category 
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C. Debt restructuring 
As we can see in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.6, the increasing leverage type of news receive 
positive but not significant cumulative average-abnormal returns. Hence hypothesis 3 is 
rejected. In other words, in the distress context in China, debt does not seem to play a 
disciplinary role as argued by Jensen (1986) and Wruck (1990). My results are consistent 
with that of Tian (2004). In addition, Tian documented different debt governance effects in 
SOE and non-SOEs. I will examine this issue further in the next section. 
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Figure 6.6 Cumulative average abnormal returns for 81-day event period centered on 
announcement day for the increasing leverage category 
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D. Managerial restructuring 
Table 6.2 shows that the three subgroups of managerial restructuring announcements, i. e., 
rpsignation/appointment, termination/appointmeht and appointment only, generate negative 
price reactions over the full event window, although only the resignation/appointments 
subgroup has a significant CAAR(-40, +40) of 
-7.4%. There is no announcement day 
effect for the three subgroups suggesting there may be leak of information before the 
announcement day. 
When I regroup the managerial restructuring announcements by ownership type, into 
foreign ownership (FIE) and domestic (SOE and non-SOE) subgroups, CAAR(-40, +40) 
for the domestic subgroups are negative, i. e. for the non-SOE subgroup is significant and 
negative at 
-10.6%, for the SOE subgroup is negative at 5.6% but only significant at the 
10% level. However, as expected, CAAR(-40, +40) for the FIE subgroup is significant and 
positive at 14.6%, consistent with the results in Denis and Denis (1995) and Dherment- 
Ferere and Renneboog (2002). Figure 6.7 shows the full 81-day event window cumulative 
average abnormal returns for the different ownership subgroups. Hence hypothesis 4 and 5 
are supported. The significantly positive result for the FIE subgroup provide evidence to 
suggest that foreign invested companies may not be subject to the same domestic 
managerial pool where credible punishment for poor performance and incentive to exert 
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effort may be lacking. An alternative explanation could be that FIE firms monitor their 
management more efficiently and that underperforming management are replaced more 
quickly than they are in a domestic company. However this finding is based on only four 
events and should be treated with caution. To provide meaningful implications for the use 
of managerial restructuring strategies in the Chinese context, further research is needed 
when more data become available. 
Figure 6.7 Cumulative average abnormal returns for 81-day eventperiod centered on 
announcement day for the managerial restructuring category 
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6.5.2. SOE vs non-SOE 
Similarly, the event study results for the ownership subgroups for the three main 
restructuring categories are presented in Table 6.3. Again the non-parametric sign test 
results are broadly consistent witlß the parametric t-tests. I will discuss the event study 
results for M&A and debt restructuring in turn. In principal all results that are significant 
either in the parametric or non-parametric (or both) are discussed. 
A. M&A 
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, the non-SOE and SOE subgroup analysis provides some 
understanding on the drivers for the initial increase and then post event-day decrease of the 
CAARs for the full sample. As Table 6.3 shows, the non-SOE subgroup has strong 
positive market reaction throughout the full 81-day event window, including the event-day. 
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Its CAAR(-40,0) is 10.5%, CAAR(-40, +20) is 11.7% and CAAR(-40, +40) is 10%. On 
the other hand, for the SOE subgroup, CAAR(-40,0) is 8.9% and AAR0 is 1.8%; however 
post event-day cumulative average abnormal returns decline, neither CAAR(-40, +20) nor 
CAAR(-40, +40) are significant. Clearly we can see in Figure 6.1, M&A with payment 
announcements made by non SOE firms create sustainable shareholder wealth over the full 
event window. The results support hypothesis 6. 
Table 6.3 Event study results for the SOE and non-SOEsubgroups 
This table presents the event study results for the SOE and the non-SOE subgroups, for the M&A and debt 
restructuring categories. Column 1 givens the types of restructuring and the sub-sample by ownership type; 
Column 2 provides the number of observations in each category (sub-category); Columns 3 
-7 present the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) on day 
-40, -20,0, +20 and +40; Column 8 presents the 
average abnormal returns (AAR) on the event day (day 0). 
Asset restructuring N CMF; L40 CAAP120 CAARO CMRn0 CMR. 40 AARO 
M&A 
M&A with payment 
non-SOE 22 
-0.1% 2.5% 10.5%"'' 11.7% 10.0%" 0.6% 
SOE 30 0.9% " 3.3% * 8.9%-8 3.6% 
-0.9% 1.8% b 
M&A without payment 
Full sample (SOE only) 16 
-0.4% -2.5% 2.2% -1.6% -9.7% 1.1% 
Debt restructuring 
Increasing leverage 
non-SOE 15 0.2% 
. 
3.1% 10.7%- 7.6% * 12.1 % "' 
-0.2% 
SOE 12 0.7% 0.5% 
-2.6% -1.1% -4.2% 0.6%. b 
Debt renegotiation 
non-SOE 7 
-0.1% -6.1% -7.5% -11.1% -14.4%" 0.5% 
SOE 4 
-0.5% 8.8% 20.7% 13.2% 8.2% 0.7% 
FIE 5 
-0.7% 0.9% -0.8% -8.9% -9.7% 0.0% 
Significant at the 1% level In the t-test 
Significant at the 5% level In the t-test 
a Significant at the 1% level In the sign test 
b Significant at the 5% level in the sign test 
Determined by the nature of the transaction there were only SOEs in the M&A without 
payment category. As shown in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.2, M&A without payment 
announcements generate a negative 9.7%50 of CAAR(-40, +40). Figure 6.2 also shows the 
magnitudes of the CAARs between the M&A with and without payments announcements. 
The results show that M&A without payment type of announcement is value destroying and 
provide some weak support for hypothesis 7. 
The results discussed above confirm my expectations that M&A with payment 
announcements made by non-SOE firms create value for shareholders (CAAR(-40, 
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+40)=10%), and that M&A without payment announcements are not perceived by the 
market to be successful in revamping the firms' performance. In addition, M&A with 
payment announcements made by distressed SOEs do not receive significant market 
reactions over the full event window, as can be seen in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.1, although 
this type of announcements are embraced by the market pre- and on announcement day. 
The lack of market response to the M&A with payment announcements made by SOE 
firms suggests that the negative and positive effects discussed in section 6.2.2 cancel each 
other out and hypothesis 8 is supported. 
Evidence suggests that M&A with payment strategy is perceived by the market as effective 
in restructuring distressed firms only when the firms are not controlled by the state and are 
therefore more subject to market competition. 
B. Debt restructuring 
As can be seen in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.6, the non-SOE firms' announcements on 
increasing leverage are perceived favourably by the market, the full event window CAAR(- 
A0, +40) for the non-SOE subgroup is 12.1 % and is significant by the parametric t-test. On 
the other hand, although the market reacts positively to the SOE subgroup on the 
announcement day (AARo = 0.6%), the full event window cumulative average abnormal 
return is negative but not significant. As Figure 6.6 shows, the market reacts favourably to 
increasing leverage announcements made by non-SOE firms and this wealth enhancing 
effect is sustainable in the 81 days event window, whereas the market does not react to the' 
same announcements made by SOE firms. Hypothesis 9 is supported and hypothesis 10 is 
partially supported. 
0 
The results complement the finding in Tian (2005), i. e. debt governance is not effective in 
SOE firms and institutional features matter. When a distressed firm is controlled by the 
government, the firm's attempt to restructure by increasing leverage is not perceived 
favourably by the market. 
so Only significant at the 10% level in the parametric test and not significant in the non-parametric test 
though. 
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For the debt renewal type of announcement, there is no significant market reaction. As for 
the debt renegotiation category, overall there is no announcement day effect. Over the full 
event window, the market reacts negatively to announcements made by the non-SOE firms 
with a CAAR(-40, +40) of 
-14.4%; the full event window CAAR for FIE firms is also 
negative but not significant. These results indicate that the distressed non-SOEs' intention 
to renegotiate with their creditors is seen as negative news, as the market does not 
anticipate the negotiation to be successful. On the other hand, although the announcements 
made by the SOE firms do not generate statistically significant cumulative average 
abnormal returns, market reaction is positive. Hypothesis 11 is partially supported and 
hypothesis 12 is supported. Evidence suggests there may be lending bias by the banks to 
SOE firms. The magnitudes of the full event window CAARs for the three subgroups can 
be seen in Figure 6.7. 
Figure 6.7 Cumulative average abnormal returns for 81-day event period centered on 
announcement day for the debt renegotiation category 
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
My study is the first to examine the valuation effects of restructuring announcements by 
distressed Chinese firms. This is an important topic in the recently liberalised economy. 
With the relatively "new" concept of competition, what is the mechanism by which 
unviable and inefficient firms fail, with the result that assets are (re)allocated? This study 
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provides insights on which restructuring mechanisms are value enhancing in an emerging 
market context. 
I examine market reactions to three main types of restructuring: asset restructuring 
including M&A and asset sales, debt and managerial restructuring. The descriptive 
statistics in Table 6.1 show that asset restructuring including M&A and asset sales/swaps 
make up 62% of all restructuring announcements. Sample data statistics provide evidence 
to support the argument that as a result of difficulties in officially liquidating economically 
unviable firms in the Chinese context due to the lack of effective bankruptcy laws, these 
observed mergers and asset sales act as an asset mobility mechanism and are a beneficial 
outcome in terms of improved use of resources. On the other hand, the lack of creditor 
participation in distress resolution is confirmed by the overall lowest percentage (17%) of 
debt restructuring related announcements among the three main categories in my whole 303 
sample announcements. 
Firstly I focus on the full sample and compare evidence from China to what's documented 
in the existing literature. Consistent with the literature that target firms receive positive 
premium, 
my overall M&A with payment announcements generate positive market 
reaction. 
Different to the current literature based on developed economies such as US and UK, asset 
sales are not perceived as positive news by the market. Instead of enhancing shareholder 
wealth by reducing bankruptcy costs as recorded in the UK, it appears that the lack of 
bankruptcy threat in China minimises the potential benefit of avoiding bankruptcy costs 
which shareholders otherwise have to bear. 
Overall the effect of debt restructuring announcements is not clear cut. Different to the 
documented disciplinary role of debt in a developed economy, Tian (2004) argues that debt 
governance is not at work in China. My event study results are positive not significant. 
Managerial restructuring is not seen by the market as an effective restructuring strategy. 
Our explanation is that there is a lack of effective management pool in the domestic market 
due to the documented lack of managerial incentives to perform and of credible punishment 
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for poor performance in the current emerging market literature. This explanation is 
supported by the positive market reactions to announcements made by FIE firms which 
may not subject to the domestic managerial pool. Alternative explanation for the positive 
market reaction to managerial disciplinary events by FIEs is that FIE firms monitor their 
management more effectively. 
Secondly, given the significant role of government in corporate China, I separate my full 
sample by ownership structure to provide further insight on the role of state ownership. In 
the M&A category, M&A with payment strategy is effective only for the non-SOE firms, 
where these firms are subject to a market driven mechanism and competitive environment. 
M&A with payment strategy for non-SOE target firms signifies to the market that the 
distressed firm is of value to the new owner and that the new owner maybe able to manage 
the firm as a viable going concern effectively 
- 
in this circumstance, changing ownership 
stands a good opportunity for the distressed firm to be restructured successfully. The M&A 
with payment announcements made by the SOE firms do not create shareholder wealth. 
The M&A without payment announcements are seen as value destroying. The 
government's attempts to revamp firm performance by transferring ownership, either with 
or 
without payment, are not perceived as effective by the market, providing evidence to 
support the argument that the government's primary motivation rests in providing 
employment rather than in profit maximisation. 
The effectiveness of debt restructuring is mixed. The market reacts positively to non-SOE 
firms' announcements of increasing leverage, but the same type of news made by SOE 
firms do not cause significant price reaction. The lack of success in this strategy by SOEs 
is because debt governance is not. at work among SOEs. In addition, the market reacts 
significantly negatively to non-SOEs' attempt to renegotiate their debt contracts with their 
banks, but not significantly (economically but not statistically significant) to the same 
announcements made by SOEs. These results provide weak evidence to suggest that there 
may be lending bias by the Chinese banks towards SOEs. The evidence so far suggests that 
the role of government in corporate China is not desirable yet resources are still allocated 
with a bias towards SOEs. This finding raises the question of what needs to be done to 
ensure the efficient allocation of financial resources (bank loans). 
Page 171 
My findings provide important insights for the understanding and the effective organisation 
of distress resolution in an emerging market context. By identifying successful 
restructuring strategies and investigating why certain chosen restructuring methods fail in 
terms of share price reaction, this study sheds light on the design of an effective mechanism 
for the efficient economic and social (re)allocation of resources in an emerging market 
context. My fundamental conclusion is that government ownership has an undesirable 
impact on the successful distress resolution process as it distorts capital allocation and 
management incentives. This issue is discussed in the next chapter in the light of the 
findings from this and the previous empirical chapter of this thesis. 
f 
i 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
This thesis examines corporate distress and its resolution in China. Little research has been 
done on this topic in the context of emerging economies. Given the impact of privatisation 
on the world's economic landscape in recent times, this study provides important insights 
for the design of an efficient mechanism through which viable firms survive while the non- 
viable ones do not, thus ensuring assets of poor performers are reallocated to better uses. 
The bankruptcy code comparison study highlights a number of issues. Firstly, bankruptcy 
in China has been a bureaucratic process with little creditor involvement. Secondly, there 
is a bias against creditor interests, and a lack of a timely restructuring mechanism to 
provide much needed distress financing to prevent the still viable firms from failing, while 
liquidating the economically unviable firms, in order to ensure timely reallocation of assets 
to their best alternative use. Also, the hindrance of creditors' rights defers the unfolding of 
market based lending and borrowing. Thirdly, the government's political interests and 
intervention, aggravated by the country's weak enforcement mechanism, result in the 
formal bankruptcy procedures rarely being used in practice. With this result there may be 
lack of bankruptcy threat to distressed companies. The empirical work in this thesis is 
designed to test the consequences of the lack of timely re-organisation mechanisms and the 
lack of/weakened bankruptcy threats in China. 
Next, I analyse the operating and financial performance-and operating efficiency before and 
during the first two years of distress for 100 firms that became distressed between 1999 and 
2003. I find that, although distressed firms have statistically and economically significantly 
higher level of leverage than their industry prior to distress, the nature of distress is 
economic, not financial. In the first year of distress, the poor operating performance effect 
is responsible for 94% of cash flow shortfall in my sample firms, only the remaining 6% is 
caused by the leverage effect. My results are consistent with the findings of Asquith et al. 
(1994) for the US, although the role of operating under-performance is far stronger in 
China than in the US. 
In addition, I find that the leverage effect plays a greater role in the year prior to distress 
than it does during the first year of distress itself. The findings support the view that 
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financial renegotiations in distress in China are inefficient51. As for the cause of such 
inefficiency, in addition to information asymmetry, a further explanation includes the lack 
of a timely financial restructuring process. 
This study also shed light on the important issue of soft budget constraint. Using capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) scaled by assets to proxy for firm investment behaviour, I find 
evidence to suggest that distressed firms face severe liquidity constraints, and the level of 
liquidity constraints for non-SOE firms is significantly more severe than for SOE firms. 
Evidence suggests that non-SOEs face hard budget constraints whereas their SOE 
counterparts face soft budget constraints. Nonetheless, the fact that the distressed SOEs 
also significantly reduce investment over and above their industry median level, and that 
their performance overall is significantly worse than their industry, suggests that despite the 
presence of soft budget constraints, the SOEs selected by my distress selection procedure 
also exhibit the standard characteristics of distress, albeit with a different level of liquidity 
constraint when facing distress. The existence of soft budget constraints does not seem to 
save the distressed SOEs from being distressed. 
The multivariate logit regression analysis confirms my results that distress is preceded by a 
significantly low level of capital expenditure. In addition, earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) and total liabilities scaled by assets also have 
significant influence on the probability of distress. Furthermore, changes in 
EBITDA/assets and CAPEX/assets have much greater influence on the probability of 
distress than changes in total liabilities/assets, confirming my finding that the main 
contributor to firm distress is economic. 
I 
The results so far highlight the fact that the lack of a timely restructuring mechanism and 
the political motivation to keep firms alive leads to the extreme economic nature of 
corporate distress. Having used accounting information to examine the nature and source 
of corporate distress in China, I use 303 hand-collected restructuring announcements by the 
100 distressed firms to quantify the value-enhancing effect of restructuring announcements 
using event study methodology. I find that asset restructuring including mergers and 
51 As financial problems could have been expected to trigger corrective actions sooner. 
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acquisitions and asset sales/swaps is the most popular strategy in firm distress resolution. 
In the light of the documented nature of distress being economic (chapter 5) as a result of 
difficulties in officially liquidating distressed firms due to the lack of effective bankruptcy 
laws, these observed mergers and asset sales are perhaps a beneficial outcome in terms of 
improved use of resources. In addition, the relatively low number of debt related 
restructuring announcements confirms the claim that there is a lack of creditor 
participation/protection in China. 
Firstly I compare my event study results from China to what's documented in the literature. 
Consistent with the literature, M&A with payment transactions create positive premium for 
the announcing firms 
- 
in this case all are targets. However, different to the literature, asset 
sales and swaps do not create shareholder wealth. Instead of enhancing shareholder wealth 
by reducing bankruptcy cost as recorded in the UK, it seems the weakened bankruptcy 
threat in China minimises the potential benefit of avoiding bankruptcy costs which 
shareholders otherwise have to bear. Evidence also suggests that debt governance is not at 
work in China and this affects the effectiveness of debt-related restructuring. Managerial 
restructuring method seems to work only'for firms that are controlled by foreign investors. 
My 
explanation is that there is a lack of effective management pool in the domestic market. 
Further explanation is that FIE firms monitor their management more effectively. 
Secondly, given the importance of state ownership in the context of China, I investigate the 
differentvaluation effect of restructuring announcements by SOE and non-SOE firms. My 
findings are as follows. M&A with payment strategy is effective for the non-SOE firms. 
On the contrary, the government's attempt to revamp firm performance by transferring the 
ownership, either with or withoutipayment, is not perceived as effective by the market. 
This finding supports the argument that the government's primary motivation rests in 
providing employment rather than in profit maximisation. 
In addition, there is some evidence to support the notion of Chinese banks' lending bias 
towards SOEs. These findings suggest that government ownership in corporate China is 
not desirable yet resources are still allocated with a bias towards SOEs. This raises the 
question of what needs to be done to ensure the efficient allocation of funds (bank loans). 
The fundamental conclusion is that government ownership has an undesired impact on the 
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successful distress resolution process as it distorts capital allocation, management 
incentives and investment decisions. 
The two empirical chapters provide evidence to support the arguments on the lack of 
bankruptcy threat, low creditor protection and absence of timely restructuring mechanism 
in China. Poor operating performance is the key characteristic of firms in distress 
- 
including high employment levels found among distressed firms. The event study results 
show that restructuring events are consistently perceived by the market as being more 
value-enhancing for non-SOEs than for SOEs. This finding highlights the role of 
government in the restructuring processes. With the government's primary motivation rests 
in providing employment and curbing non-performing loans, its continued corporate 
ownership results in the maintenance of inefficient going concerns. The continued existence 
of soft budget constraints, furthermore, distorts efficient capital allocation and management 
incentives. 
My bankruptcy code comparison study of the Chinese bankruptcy code with seven other 
codes raises questions on what is the best practice. Although both the UK and the US codes 
have deficiencies, they provide a framework for the current debate on what is the best 
practice. The US system is a collective procedure with a bias towards keeping the firm as a 
going concern. The UK system, on the other hand, is based on "freedom of contracts" 
(Franks 2000) which preserves the rights and preferences of the parties as reflected in the 
debt contract. In light of the empirical findings in this study, is a UK type system 
preferable when a country is exposed to a strong political interference? My study does not 
provide a complete answer to this important question and much remains to be done. 
Findings in this thesis take a step towards gaining an understanding of distress resolution in 
China. As the most influential emerging economy, evidence from China forms an essential 
part of the distress literature in emerging markets and an integral part of the extended 
current literature on privatisation. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1- Recent reforms 
-a brief chronology 
1995 new commercial banking law Is adopted, as is a law governing the People's Bank of China 
(PBC, the central bank); provisional regulations guiding foreign Investment; an Insurance 
law; legislation to Implement a move to a five-day week; and legislation to regulate the 
securities and debt markets. Import tariff reductions of 30% for 4,000 of 6,000 lines and the 
replacement of 179 non-tariff barriers (30% of the total) by tariffs are announced. 
1996 programme of transforming 1,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) Into fully autonomous 
corporations Is announced. Smaller enterprises are encouraged to merge. The average 
unweighted tariff falls to less than 23%, with Implementation of the reductions from April. 
1997-99 Experimentation with different forms of ownership, Including joint-stock shareholding, is 
declared to be compatible with socialism; it becomes clear that the authorities are willing, 
indeed eager, to countenance the merger, closure or privatisation of thousands of smaller 
state-owned enterprises while ensuring retention by the state of Its majority stake In larger 
enterprises and its total control of around 500 of the largest enterprises. The government 
clashes the number of industrial ministries. The average tariff rate on Imports is reduced to 
17%. 
2000-01 Progress Is made In restructuring SOEs. It is reported that the sector made total profits of 
Rmb230bn (US$28bn) In 2000, up by 130% year on year. Of the 6,599 large and medium- 
sized SOEs that had been In loss in 1997,70% had moved into profit, been restructured or 
merged by end-2000. Aside from restructuring and mergers, this improvement stemmed 
rom the provision of cheap credit by the state commercial banks, whose ability to lend 
benefited from the transfer of Rmb395.7bn of non-performing loans to asset management 
corporations by end-2000. Large conglomerates, which may raise capital on international 
stock markets and compete internationally, are being formed. At the beginning of 2001, the 
average tariff on imports was further reduced, to 15.3%. 
Source: Euromonitor 
Appendix 2- The calculaton of relative contribution to financial distress by leverage 
and firm operating performance 
i 
The full detail on the calculation of relative contribution to financial distress by leverage and firm operating 
performance is shown below: 
1. In order to calculate the leverage effect, I set the firm's (IntExp/assets)tio = industry median 
(IntExp/assets), and keep the firm's assets figure unchanged, this way I get a calculated IntExp 
(IntExp) at t=o. 
Therefore, the calculated cash-flow change is: 
ACashFlowl = (EBITDA - IntExp) - (EBITDA - IntExp) = IntExp-IntExp 
....... 
(1) 
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2. Similarly, to calculate the firm performance effect, I set the company's (EBITDA/assets) to equal the 
corresponding industry median (EBITDA/assets) at t=0, in order to get the calculated EBITDA for the firm 
A (EBITDA). The cash-flow change relating to this effect is then: 
A 
ACashF1ow2 
= 
(EBITDA- IntExp) 
- 
(EBITDA 
- 
IntExp) 
= 
EBITDA- EBITDA.... (2) 
Although all sample firms have been in distress for at least two years, the above three steps calculation was 
carried out using only the cash-flow changes from one year prior (t=-1) to the first year of shortfall (t=0), 
similar to Asquith et al. (1994) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998). 
The sum of the two cash flow changes would take our sample firms' cash flows to those of the average firm in 
an average industry. Thus the portion of distress caused by leverage is calculated 
OCashFlow, 
, 
and so on. as: (EtCashFlow, + OCashFlow2 ) 
Appendix 3-A translation of regulatory requirements on information disclosure for 
listed companies 
A translation of some of «he formats of announcements by listed companies», 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange-52, effective 12th March 2002 
1. Purchase/sell assets and debt restructuring. 
a. General information of the transaction, including names of both parties, nature of transaction 
(sell/buy/debt restructuring), prices, agreement date and transaction dates, if the transaction is 
between related parties. 
b. Board of directors' decision, voting details, etc. Also, if this transaction needs approval from 
certain government bodies, if agreement from creditors is required, if any agreement from a third 
party is required. 
c. List all necessary procedures for approval and other requirements and potential barriers for the 
intended transaction. 
d. Information about other parties. If the transaction involves the forgiveness of debts, information 
about the creditor, its relationship with the company. 
e. Debt restructuring here only refers to non-cash arrangements for debt reduction, interest payment 
suspension or reduction, change of covenants, and debt forgiveness. 
f. If the transaction is between related parties, see relevant legal provision for announcements. 
2. Transactions between related parties 
a. Generation introduction: agreement date, venue, relationship between parties, shareholder 
meeting and board of directors meeting's decision and voting details, if such transaction requires 
approvals, etc. , 
b. Details about the transaction, etc. 
3. Distribute and transfer equity shares (with or without payments) 
a. Meeting time and details of the shareholder meeting when the notion to issue further equity 
shares, or transfer equity shares has been passed. 
b. Registration of new shares/shareholders. 
4. Shareholders' meeting notice 
5. The resolution of shareholders meetings 
6. Make external investment (including entrusting) 
7. Provide guarantees for others 
a. General information. 
b. Information about the guaranteed company. 
c. Content of the guarantee. 
52 This regulation applies to both stock exchanges. 
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d. Comments from the board of directors, reason for such guarantee, etc. 
3. Change the purpose of funds raised 
9. Unusual share price movements 
a. Introduction 
- 
state that there is observed share price abnormal movements, the reason for such 
movement, or for the suspension of its listing. 
b. After conformation with major shareholders and management team, provide reasonable 
explanation for such observation. If no known cause to the company for such movements, issue 
standard statement. 
10. Clarification 
11. Major litigation and court order 
12. Receiving permission to issue additional equity 
13. Change share name abbreviation 
14. Independent director nomination 
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Appendix 6-A list of 479 restructuring announcements 
For the purpose of chapter 6, a list of restructuring related announcements made by the 100 distressed 
companies between 1999 and 2003. (between t=-2 and t-+3). Column I&2 show the listing code and name 
of the Stock Exchange where the stock is listed; Column 3 gives the dates of the announcements; Column 4 
categorises the type of restructuring strategies into the four categories discussed in section 7.2; Column 5 
shows if the news is related to an announcement (+) or is it a cancellation of a previous announcement (-); 
Column 6 shows the codes I adopted for the purpose of computing event study results. 
Listing 
code 
Stock 
exchange Date Type Sign code 
100505 Shenzhen 21/09/2000 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100505 Shenzhen 23/10/2000 Asset sales update + 412 
100505 Shenzhen 30/12/2000 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100505 Shenzhen 28/06/2002 Asset swaps + 421 
600784 shanghai 29/04/2000 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600784 shanghai 05/07/2000 M&A with payment proposal + 11 
600784 shanghai 28/12/2000 M&A with payment update + 12 
600784 shanghai 14/03/2001 M&A with payment proposal + 11 
600784 shanghai 04/01/2002 Asset swaps + 421 
600784 shanghai 04/06/2002 Asset swaps + 421 
600784 shanghai 26/09/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600784 shanghai 10/01/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600603 shanghai 19/11/2001 Forced asset sales + 441 
Forced asset sales 
600603 shanghai 21/03/2002 confirmation + 442 
600603 shanghai 23/04/2003 Appointment + 33 
600758 shanghai 02/07/2001 Auctioned M&A cancellation 
- 
154 
600758 shanghai 28/11/2002 Appointment + 33 
600758 shanghai 19/07/2003 Auctioned M&A + 151 (. 600758 shanghai 29/07/2003 Auctioned M&A follow-up + 152 
600758 shanghai 23/09/2003 Auctioned M&A completion + 153 
600758 shanghai 10/10/2003 Forced asset sales + 441 
600844 shanghai 21/11/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
600844 shanghai 28/12/2001 Termination and appointment + 32 
600844 shanghai 16/01/2002 M&A with payment follow-up + 12 
600844 shanghai 06/07/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600752 shanghai 29/05/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100048 shenzhen 27/10/2000 Asset swaps + 421 
100048 shenzhen 13/06/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100048 shenzhen 27/11/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100799 shenzhen 04/04/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100799 shenzhen 05/0912002 M&A with payment + 11 
100799 shenzhen 03/04/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
100799 shenzhen 12/07/2003 M&A with payment approval + 14 
100799 shenzhen 26/09/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
600159 shanghai 13/11/2001 Increasing leverage + 51 
600159 shanghai 01/03/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600159 shanghai 17/07/2002 M&A with payment proposal + 11 
600159 shanghai 16/11/2002 M&A with payment update + 12 
600159 shanghai 15/11/2003 M&A with payment update 
- 
13 
600735 shanghai 03/07/2001 M&A (with payment) + 11 
600735 shanghai 09/09/2003 M&A with payment update 
- 
16 
600781 shanghai 28/12/2001 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600781 shanghai 23/11/2002 Renew debts + 52 
600781 shanghai 22/11/2003 M&A with payment + 11 
Page 192 
f 
100529 shenzhen 
100529 shenzhen 
100809 shenzhen 
100809 shenzhen 
100809 shenzhen 
100809 shenzhen 
100809 shenzhen 
100809 shenzhen 
100809 shenzhen 
100809 shenzhen 
100809 
600878 
600878 
600681 
600681 
600681 
shenzhen 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai' 
shanghai 
100699 
100699 
100699 
600053 
600053 
600053 
600053 
600053 
600053 
100718 
100718 
100718 
100718 
100718 
100718 
600137 
600137 
600137 
600137 
600137 
600137 
600137 
600137 
600137 
100950 
100950 
100950 
100950 
100618 
100618 
100635 
100635 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shanghai 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
shenzhen 
24/09/2003 M&A with payment 
22/10/2003 M&A with payment 
30/12/2000 Operations restructuring 
18/09/2001 M&A without payment 
M&A without payment 
06/07/2002 approval 
23/05/2003 M&A with payment 
28/06/2003 change management 
21/08/2003 Asset sales announcement 
M&A with payment 
15/09/2003 cancellation 
30/09/2003 Debt restructuring 
Operations restructuring 
22/12/2003 follow-up 
28/12/2001 Resignation and appointment 
27/11/2002 M&A with payment 
13/05/2002 M&A with payment 
18/02/2003 M&A with payment 
15/03/2003 M&A with payment update 
M&A without payment 
28/11/2000 proposal 
25/10/2002 M&A without payment 
08/11/2002 Asset swaps 
29/06/2002 Asset swaps 
11/07/2002 Resignation and appointment 
09/10/2002 Resignation and appointment 
25/01/2003 Resignation and appointment 
08/07/2003 'Auctioned M&A 
18/12/2003 Auctioned M&A failed 
04/10/2001 Asset sales announcement 
07/08/2002 Resignation and appointment 
22/11/2002 M&A with payment 
16/01/2003 Increasing leverage 
Operation temporary 
04/03/2003 discontinuation 
Operation temporary 
23/05/2003 discontinuation follow-up 
24/06/2000 M&A with payment 
25/07/2001 Asset swaps 
31/01/2002 Asset sales announcement 
29/03/002 Asset swaps 
18/04/2002 Discontinue operation 
04/06/2002 Discontinue operation up-date 
11/10/2002 Resignation and appointment 
23/11/2002 Operation restarted 
04/03/2003 Forced asset sales 
27/06/2002 Appointment 
14/08/2002 M&A without payment 
M&A without payment 
30/11/2002 approval 
27/09/2003 Resignation and appointment 
08/11/1999 M&A without payment 
17/01/2002 Resignation and appointment 
12/12/2001 Resignation 
31/12/2001 Discontinue operation 
+ 11 
+ 11 
+ 431 
+ 21 
+ 24 
+ 11 
+ 32 
+ 411 
- 
13 
+ 53 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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31 
11 
11 
11 
12 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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21 
21 
421 
421 
31 
31 
31 
151 
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411 
31 
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11 
421 
411 
421 
431 
432 
31 
432 
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33 
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24 
31 
21 
31 
31 
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100635 shenzhen 03/08/2002 M&A with payment + 11 
100635 shenzhen 15/11/2002 Forced asset sales + 441 
100635 shenzhen 19/12/2002 M&A with payment follow-up + 12 
100635 shenzhen 01/07/2003 Appointment + 33 
100635 shenzhen 09/10/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
100635 shenzhen 13/11/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100498 shenzhen 29/11/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100498 shenzhen 17/12/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
M&A with payment 
100498 shenzhen 10/04/2002 cancellation 
- 
13 
100498 shenzhen 28/10/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600617 shanghai 25/12/2001 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100159 shenzhen 22/04/2002 M&A without payment + 21 
100159 shenzhen 28/12/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100159 shenzhen 29/07/2003 Increasing leverage + 51 
600669 shanghai 01/07/2002 Discontinue operations + 431 
600669 shanghai 19/12/2002 Leasing operating facilities + 431 
600669 shanghai 21/10/2003 Appointments + 33 
100567 shenzhen 21/04/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
100567 shenzhen 03/08/2002 Leasing subsidiary out + 431 
100567 shenzhen 14/12/2002 Forced asset sales + 441 
100567 shenzhen 24/12/2002 Forced asset sales + 441 
100567 shenzhen 11/01/2003 Forced asset sales + 441 
100567 shenzhen 15/03/2003 Forced asset sales + 441 
600869 shanghai 26/11/2001 Increasing leverage + 51 
600869 shanghai 22/11/2002 M&A with payment + 11 
600869 shanghai 02/01/2003 Appointment + 33 
M&A with payment 
600385 shanghai 17/12/2001 announcement + 11 
600385 shanghai 07/01/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600385 shanghai 02/02/2002 M&A with payment follow-up + 12 
600385 shanghai 04/03/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600385 shanghai 24/05/2002 Operational restructuring + 431 
600385 shanghai 19/06/2002 Increasing leverage + 51 
600385 shanghai 27/07/2002 M&A with payment follow-up + 12 
600385 shanghai 13/12/2002 Increasing leverage + 51 
600385 shanghai 14/08/2003 Increasing leverage + 51 
600842 shanghai 20/03/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
600842 shanghai 16/07/2001 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600842 shanghai 19/12/2001 Forced asset sales + 441 
600842 shanghai 31/12/2001 Forced asset sales failed + 441 
600842 shanghai 28/01/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600842 shanghai 27/02/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600842 shanghai 17/10/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600792 shanghai 07/12/1999 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600792 shanghai 28/04/2000 M&A with payment + 11 
600792 shanghai 31/12/2001 M&A with payment proposal + 11 
600792 shanghai 27/06/2002 Negotiation with creditor + 53 
600769 shanghai 14/07/2000 M&A with payment + 11 
600769 shanghai 03/07/2001 Asset swaps + 421 
600769 shanghai 23/05/2002 M&A with payment + 11 
600769 shanghai 12/10/2002 M&A with payment approval + 14 
100670 shenzhen 06/11/2000 Renew debts + 52 
100670 shenzhen 05/12/2001 Increasing leverage + 51 
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100670 shenzhen 26/06/2002 Termination and appointment + 32 
100670 shenzhen 27/07/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100670 shenzhen 23/05/2003 Termination and appointment + 32 
100670 shenzhen 11/09/2003 Increasing leverage + 51 
100670 shenzhen 14/11/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600182 shanghai 21/11/2001 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600182 shanghai 10/06/2003 Auctioned M&A + 151 
600182 shanghai 15/07/2003 Auctioned M&A completion + 153 
600182 shanghai 31/07/2003 Termination and appointment + 32 
600182 shanghai 14/10/2003 Negotiation with creditor + 53 
100885 shenzhen 13/11/2001 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100885 shenzhen 18/02/2003 M&A with payment + 11 
600876 shanghai 20/07/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100638 shenzhen 11/09/2000 M&A without payment + 21 
100638 shenzhen 08/12/2000 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100638 shenzhen 09/11/2001 Asset swaps + 421 
100638 shenzhen 07/12/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100638 shenzhen 07/08/2003 Auctioned M&A + 151 
100638 shenzhen 20/09/2003 M&A without payment + 21 
600899 shanghai 21/08/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600899 shanghai 07/11/2002 Operational restructuring + 431 
600899 shanghai 08/03/2003 Termination and appointment + 32 
600892 shanghai 07/09/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600892 shanghai 17/12/2002 Forced asset'sales + 441 
Debt re-negotiation with 
600892 shanghai 03/01/2003 creditor + 53 
600892 shanghai 24/04/2003 MA with payment + 11 
600892 shanghai 07/06/2003 M&A with payment update + 12 
600892 shanghai 01/08/2003 Appointment + 33 
600892 shanghai 30/12/2003 Redundancy + 61 
600786 shanghai 21/06/2000 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100816 shenzhen 14/05/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
100409 shenzhen 29/06/2001 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100409 shenzhen 20/11/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
100921 shenzhen 26/06/2000 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100921 shenzhen 31/10/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
100921 shenzhen 13/03/2002 M&A with payment update + 12 
100893 shenzhen 27/09/2002 M&A with payment + 11 
100893 shenzhen 04/01/2003 M&A with payment completion + 14 
100570 shenzhen 24/12/? 001 Renew debts + 52 
100570 shenzhen 26/02/2003 Renew debts + 52 
100533 shenzhen 07/06/2001 Auctioned M&A + 151 
100533 shenzhen 19/11/2002 Re-negotiation with creditor + 53 
100533 shenzhen 30/09/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100533 shenzhen 01/11/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100660 shenzhen 06/05/2003 Renegotiation with creditor + 53 
100660 shenzhen 01/11/2003 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100723 shenzhen 30/06/2000 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100723 shenzhen 12/09/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
100723 shenzhen 20/12/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100723 shenzhen 06/06/2002 M&A with payment update + 12 
100723 shenzhen 28/11/2002 M&A with payment approval + 14 
100723 shenzhen 17/05/2003 Increasing leverage + 51 
100723 shenzhen 13/06/2003 Resignation and appointment + 31 
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100723 shenzhen 01/08/2003 Increasing leverage + 31 
100723 shenzhen 05/11/2003 Increasing leverage + 51 
600691 shanghai 25/11/1999 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600691 shanghai 11/12/1999 M&A with payment + 11 
600691 shanghai 21/11/2001 M&A with payment update + 12 
600691 shanghai 18/01/2002 M&A with payment update + 12 
600691 shanghai 07/03/2003 M&A with payment approval + 14 
600691 shanghai 22/03/2003 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100561 shenzhen 23/11/2000 Asset swaps + 421 
100951 shenzhen 29/09/2000 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100951 shenzhen 22/05/2003 M&A with payment + 11 
100951 shenzhen 24/09/2003 M&A with payment + 11 
100951 shenzhen 29/11/2003 Equity restructuring + 71 
100552 shenzhen 08/09/2000 Asset swaps + 421 
100552 shenzhen 07/12/2000 Operations restructuring + 431 
100552 shenzhen 26/07/2002 M&A without payment + 21 
M&A without payment 
100552 shenzhen 07/01/2003 approval + 24 
600622 shanghai 29/09/2000 M&A with payment + 11 
600622 shanghai 10/10/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100801 shenzhen 31/05/2000 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100801 shenzhen 03/06/2003 M&A with payment + 11 
600234 shanghai 28/01/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
600234 shanghai 28/01/2002 M&A with payment update .+ 12 
600234 shanghai 08/02/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600234 shanghai 04/03/2003 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600234 shanghai 14/10/2003 M&A with payment approval + 24 
600870 shanghai 20/06/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600870 shanghai 02/04/2003 Increasing leverage + 51 
600057 shanghai 24/01/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600057 shanghai 30/05/2002 Asset swaps + 421 
100555 shenzhen 10/11/2000 Asset swaps + 421 
M&A with payment 
100555 shenzhen 20/11/2000 cancellation + 13 
100555 shenzhen 27/07/2000 Increasing leverage + 51 
100555 shenzhen 10/12/2001 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100555 shenzhen 31/05/2002 Renew debts + 52 
100555 shenzhen 12/07/2002 M&A with payment proposal + 11 
100621 shenzhen 19/06/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100621 shenzhen 30/11/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100621 shenzhen 29101k003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600847 shanghai 04/07/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
600847 shanghai 07/09/2001 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600847 shanghai 22/06/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600852 shanghai 28/09/2001 Debt renegotiation + 53 
600852 shanghai 26/11/2001 forced asset sales + 441 
600852 shanghai 17/07/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600852 shanghai 22/10/2002 Appointment + 33 
600852 shanghai 22/02/2003 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100535 shenzhen 07/12/2000 M&A without payment + 21 
100535 shenzhen 20/04/2001 Asset swaps + 421 
100535 shenzhen 03/09/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
100535 shenzhen 13/10/2001 Debt re-negotiation + 53 
100535 shenzhen 27/11/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
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100535 shenzhen 13/12/2001 Debt renegotiation + 53 
100535 shenzhen 25/12/2001 Debt re-negotiation + 53 
100535 shenzhen 31/01/2002 Asset swaps + 421 
100535 shenzhen 21/03/2002 Debt re-negotiation + 53 
100535 shenzhen 20/07/2002 Auctioned M&A + 151 
100535 shenzhen 06/09/2002 M&A with payment approval + 14 
100535 shenzhen 03/12/2002 M&A with payment completion + 14 
100536 shenzhen 20/04/1999 M&A with payment + 11 
100536 shenzhen 16/01/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100536 shenzhen 08/02/2002 Asset sales update + 412 
100536 shenzhen 18/06/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100536 shenzhen 03/08/2002 M&A without payment + 21 
100536 shenzhen 30/11/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100536 shenzhen 04/01/2003 Renegotiation with creditor + 53 
100536 shenzhen 26/07/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100536 shenzhen 25/12/2003 Asset sales update + 412 
600760 shanghai 10/07/2002 Renew debts + 52 
600760 shanghai 02/07/2003 Renew debts + 52 
100710 shenzhen 10/10/2002 Increasing leverage + 51 
100710 shenzhen 20/11/2002 Asset swaps + 421 
100710 shenzhen 16/01/2003 Renew debts + 52 
100710 shenzhen 26/03/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
100710 shenzhen 23/10/2003 Renew debts + 52 
100678 shenzhen 19/10/2000 M&A with payment + 11 
M&A with payment 
100678 shenzhen 27/06/2002 cancellation 
- 
13 
100678 shenzhen 24/07/2002 'Appointment + 33 
100678 shenzhen 24/08/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100678 shenzhen 07/06/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100678 shenzhen 27/11/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100678 shenzhen 30/12/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100571 shenzhen 28/12/1999 Asset swaps + 421 
100571 shenzhen 21/09/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600698 shanghai 30/12/2000 Asset swaps + 421 
600698 shanghai 24/05/2003 Appointment + 33 
600698 shanghai 26/06/2003 Appointment + 33 
600698 shanghai 29/08/2003 Forced asset sales + 441 
Supplier apply for the co's 
600698 shanghai 27/09/2003 bankruptcy + 541 
600698 shanghai 30/12/; 003 Bankruptcy follow-up + 542 
100738 shenzhen 30/05/2002 Asset swaps + 421 
100738 shenzhen 20/05/2003 Appointment + 33 
100738 shenzhen 26/06/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
100017 shenzhen 30/12/1999 Debt restructuring + 53 
100017 shenzhen 14/07/2000 Debt restructuring + 53 
100017 shenzhen 30/08/2001 Debt restructuring + 53 
100017 shenzhen 12/12/2001 Forced asset sales + 441 
100017 shenzhen 31/12/2001 Auctioned M&A + 151 
100017 shenzhen 13/03/2002 Termination and appointment + 32 
100017 shenzhen 11/10/2002 Auctioned M&A follow-up + 152 
100017 shenzhen 16/11/2002 Forced asset sales (auction) + 441 
100017 shenzhen 12/12/2002 Auction M&A completion + 153 
100017 shenzhen 29/08/2003 Change of management + 33 
600338 shanghai 01/03/2001 Increasing leverage + 51 
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600338 shanghai 31/10/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600338 shanghai 27/05/2002 Asset sales update + 412 
600338 shanghai 26/03/2003 Renegotiation with creditor + 53 
600338 shanghai 31/05/2003 Appointment of management + 33 
100040 shenzhen 29/12/2000 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100040 shenzhen 11/12/2002 Increasing leverage + 51 
100040 shenzhen 05/04/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100040 shenzhen 30/09/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100040 shenzhen 30/12/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
Termination and appointment 
600776 shanghai 18/01/2002 of management + 32 
600776 shanghai 30/03/2002 Operational restructuring + 431 
600776 shanghai 10/09/2002 change of management + 31 
600886 shanghai 12/01/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600886 shanghai 28/04/2002 M&A with payment + 11 
600886 shanghai 08/05/2002 Asset swaps + 421 
600886 shanghai 24/08/2002 Resignation + 31 
600886 shanghai 10/10/2002 M&A with payment approval + 14 
600700 shanghai 12/03/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600700 shanghai 14/06/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600700 shanghai 09/07/2002 Forced asset sales + 441 
600700 shanghai 11/03/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100013 shenzhen 12/04/2002 Forced asset sales + 441 
100013 shenzhen 05/11/2002 Resignation and appointment + 31 
100013 shenzhen 11/01/2003 Forced asset sales + 441 
Resignation and appointment 
100013 shenzhen 19/02/2003 
, 
follow-up + 31 
100013 shenzhen 05/03/2003 Forced'asset sales + 441 
100013 shenzhen 09/08/2003 Forced asset sales + 441 
100013 shenzhen 17/10/2003 M&A with payment (auction) + 151 
100013 shenzhen 06/11/2003 M&A with payment follow-up + 152 
100013 shenzhen 17/12/2003 M&A completion (auction) + 153 
100030 shenzhen 27/09/2000 Debt renegotiation + 53 
100030 shenzhen 07/04/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100030 shenzhen 20/07/2001 Forced asset sales + 441 
100030 shenzhen 31/08/2001 Debt restructuring + 53 
Forced asset sales 
100030 shenzhen 20/12/2001 confirmation + 442 
100030 shenzhen 31/12/2001 Forced asset sales + 441 
100030 shenzhen 18/06/2002 Forced asset sales + 441 
100030 shenzhen 18/09/002 Forced asset sales + 441 
100030 shenzhen 11/10/2002 Auctioned M&A + 151 
Forced asset sales 
100030 shenzhen 04/12/2002 confirmation + 442 
Asset restructuring (one 
100030 shenzhen 15/02/2003 production discontinue) + 431 
100030 shenzhen 06/03/2003 Change of management + 32 
100030 shenzhen 24/10/2003 M&A without payment + 21 
M&A without payment 
100030 shenzhen 25/11/2003 approval + 24 
600891 shanghai 20/12/2000 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100560 shenzhen 13/11/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
100560 shenzhen 18/12/2001 M&A with payment update + 12 
Forced asset sales to pay 
100560 shenzhen 23/11/2002 debts + 441 
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Forced asset sales to pay debt 
100560 shenzhen 24/12/2001 due + 441 
100560 shenzhen 29/01/2003 Increasing leverage + 51 
100560 shenzhen 26/03/2003 Borrow to pay old debts + 52 
100560 shenzhen 14/05/2003 Asset sales + 411 
600807 shanghai 29/04/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
600807 shanghai 04/07/2001 Discontinuation of operating + 431 
600807 shanghai 26/09/2001 Termination and appointment + 32 
Termination of management 
and appointment of new 
600807 shanghai 09/11/2001 management + 32 
600807 shanghai 11/04/2002 Termination and appointment + 32 
M&A with payment 
600807 shanghai 27/05/2002 cancellation + 13 
M&A with payment proposal 
600807 shanghai 02/07/2002 (later cancelled) + 11 
Appointment of new chairman 
and supervisory board 
600807 shanghai 03/08/2002 chairman + 33 
Increasing leverage (unsigned 
600807 shanghai 07/12/2002 agreement) + 51 
Increasing leverage approval 
600807 shanghai 24/06/2003 by board + 51 
600807 shanghai 21/11/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600807 shanghai 16/12/2003 Asset sales update + 412 
600807 shanghai 27/12/2003 M&A with payment cancelled 
- 
13 
600670 shanghai 03/03/2000 Operational restructuring + 431 
600670 shanghai 20/03/2002 M&A with payment proposal + 11 
600670 shanghai 20/05/2002 Terminbtion and appointment + 32 
600670 shanghai 25/06/2002 Debt related (renewal) + 52 
Change of management 
600670 shanghai 30/05/2003 announcement + 32 
Forced asset sales to pay 
600670 shanghai 13/06/2003 debts due to its bank + 441 
Forced asset sales 
600670 shanghai 12/07/2003 confirmation + 442 
600738 shanghai 22/09/2000 M&A without payment + 21 
600738 shanghai 21/04/2001 Asset swaps + 421 
600738 shanghai 04/09/2001 M&A proposal + 11 
600738 shanghai 21/12/2002 Operation restructuring + 431 
Operation restructuring follow- 
600738 shanghai 07/01/2003 up + 432 
600738 shanghai 23/05//2003 M&A proposal follow-up + 12 
M&A with payment 
600738 shanghai 06/09/2003 announcement + 11 
600738 shanghai 09/10/2003 M&A with payment approval + 14 
600738 shanghai 17/12/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
M&A with payment 
100586 shenzhen 03/12/2001 announcement + 11 
100586 shenzhen 08/04/2002 M&A with payment update + 12 
100586 shenzhen 17/09/2002 Asset swaps + 421 
100586 shenzhen 29/10/2002 Asset swap follow-up + 422 
100586 shenzhen 24/12/2002 M&A with payment approval + 14 
100586 shenzhen 30/04/2003 M&A with payment approval + 14 
Appointment of new board 
100586 shenzhen 25/11/2003 members + 33 
600082 shanghai 10/10/2001 M&A without payment + 21 
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M&A without payment 
600082 shanghai 26/11/2001 announcement + 21 
600082 shanghai 31/12/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600082 shanghai 13/05/2002 Asset swap completion + 422 
600082 shanghai 23/11/2002 Increasing leverage + 51 
100765 shenzhen 29/04/2001 Asset swaps + 421 
100765 shenzhen 12/06/2001 Asset swaps + 421 
100765 shenzhen 20/11/2001 Asset swaps + 421 
100765 shenzhen 21/05/2003 Resignation + 31 
100765 shenzhen 19/06/2003 Appointment of new directors + 33 
600766 shanghai 30/05/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
600766 shanghai 28/11/2002 M&A with payment update + 12 
600766 shanghai 19/11/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
600766 shanghai 05/12/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600766 shanghai 23/12/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
Forced asset sales to pay 
600858 shanghai 24/05/2002 debts + 441 
600858 shanghai 18/04/2003 M&A with payment + 11 
600858 shanghai 05/07/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600858 shanghai 23/08/2003 M&A with payment follow-up + 12 
600858 shanghai 13/11/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600240 shanghai 27/11/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
600240 shanghai 28/12/2001 Resignation and appointment + 31 
600240 shanghai 26/12/2002 M&A with payment + 11 
600240 shanghai 28/01/2003 M&A with payment follow-up + 12 
600240 shanghai 09/09/2003 M&A with payment approval + 14 
900912 shanghai 04/01/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100005 shenzhen 25/12/2000 Renegotiation with creditor + 53 
100802 shenzhen 24/01/2002 Increasing leverage + 51 
100802 shenzhen 13/04/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100802 shenzhen 15/06/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100802 shenzhen 31/08/2002 Increasing leverage + 51 
100802 shenzhen 30/11/2002 Asset sales update + 412 
100802 shenzhen 21/12/2002 Asset sales update + 412 
100802 shenzhen 09/10/2003 M&A with payment + 11 
100008 shenzhen 13/03/2002 M&A with payment + 11 
Forced asset sales to pay debt 
100008 shenzhen 14/09/2002 due + 441 
100008 shenzhen 08/11/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100008 shenzhen 19/02/2003 Debt restructuring + 53 
100008 shenzhen 25/03/2003 Asset sales update + 412 
100008 shenzhen 20/06/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100008 shenzhen 28/10/2003 Asset sales update + 412 
M&A without payment 
600873 shanghai 04/03/2000 announcement + 21 
600873 shanghai 04/07/2002 Increasing leverage + 51 
600873 shanghai 12/09/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
M&A (with payment) 
600873 shanghai 18/02/2003 announcement + 11 
600873 shanghai 12/06/2003 M&A with payment approval + 14 
600873 shanghai 08/07/2003 Asset swap + 421 
600873 shanghai 15/08/2003 Asset swap follow-up + 422 
600799 shanghai 27/03/2002 Operational restructuring + 431 
600799 shanghai 03/01/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
600799 shanghai 25/01/2003 Asset sales announcement + 411 
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100931 shenzhen 21/01/2001 Increasing leverage + 51 
100931 shenzhen 27/10/2001 Increasing leverage + 51 
100931 shenzhen 28/05/2002 Renew debts + 52 
100931 shenzhen 10/10/2002 Increasing leverage + 51 
100931 shenzhen 29/03/2003 Increasing leverage + 51 
100931 shenzhen 11/06/2003 Increasing leverage + 51 
100931 shenzhen 10/12/2003 Debt restructuring + 53 
100769 shenzhen 08/02/2001 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100769 shenzhen 09/04/2001 Asset sales update + 412 
100769 shenzhen 28/10/2001 M&A with payment + 11 
100769 shenzhen 12/12/2001 Asset sales/swap + 421 
100769 shenzhen 29/06/2002 Change of management + 31 
100769 shenzhen 25/12/2002 Asset sales announcement + 411 
100769 shenzhen 17/04/2003 M&A with payment approval + 14 
100769 shenzhen 06/09/2003 Asset swaps + 421 
M&A with payment 
600613 shanghai 29/03/2002 announcement + 11 
600613 shanghai 22/04/2002 Asset swaps update + 422 
600613 shanghai 06/07/2002 M&A with payment update 
- 
12 
600613 shanghai 18/09/2002 Debt restructuring + 53 
M&A with payment 
600613 shanghai 28/12/2002 cancellation 
- 
13 
M&A with payment 
600613 shanghai 29/03/2003 announcement + 11 
0 
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